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S U M M A R Y
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the early development 
of the Venezuelan oil industry both in relation to developments 
in the oil industry worldwide and in relation to Venezuela's 
social and economic development* It is argued that both aspects 
are crucial for an understanding of the early development of the 
Venezuelan oil industry®
At the level of developments in the oil industry worldwide, 
this thesis argue that developments occurred not because of 
lucky strikes in the USA or Venezuela but because developments 
elsewhere, namely in kerosene fired devices and the internal 
combustion engine, made oil an economic necessity for their 
practical application® Within this section the thesis attempts to 
refute allegations of an "oil war" between British and USA oil 
interests in Venezuela, Using original source material the thesis 
attempts to show that this allegation, widely published in the mass 
media of the time, really concealed the reality of an alliance 
between the big British and USA oil consortia against oil producing 
countries on the one hand and small oil companies on the other. 
Finally this thesis puts an emphasis on the existence of an 
"oil surplus" and the gap between the real oil cost and oil price.
In the period studied technical developments in the internal 
combustion engine reduced the amount of "waste" in oil and therefore 
reduced the real cost of producing oil at the same as the increasing 
demand for oil products pushed the price of oil up. This gap
- l i ­
as oil surplus, which has shown a tendency to increase over time, 
led to a position where it was possible for the bargaining 
power of oil producing countries to increase provided the country 
had the political strëngth to use this power* It is argued in this 
thesis that Venezuela did not begin to acquire this political 
bargaining strength until the 1950's.
To develop Venezuela's natural riches after the 1870's a 
strong central Government to ensure stability was required. The 
old constant "caudillo wars" were no longer functional either 
to the Venezuelan ruling class or to the Great Powers wishing to 
exploit Venezuela's natural resources. The development of the 
Venezuelan oil industry assisted this process of a strong central 
Government. The development of this strong central Government, 
that of the dictator Gomez, has been portrayed by most Venezuelan 
historians as being totally subservient to the interests of the 
US oil companies* This thesis argues that Gomez was in fact more 
the representative of the Venezuelan ruling class at a time of 
change. And if remained almost permanently under the sway of the 
foreign oil companies it was because he was seriously 
constrained by their threatened, and at times actual, support of 
the Venezuelan opposition to him. However oil did introduce 
profound social and economic changes, and also" instability into 
Venezuelan society. And after 1958 this foreign oil company 
policy of threatening to topple Gomez by supporting "caudillo 
adventures" against him was no longer viable.
CHAPTER I
Introduction
This work studies the early development of the Venezuelan 
oil industry until the moment when it reached its full development® 
Turning points in history do not happen overnight; however some 
events have always been used as an approximate approach to such 
turning points, in order to make easier the study of certain 
problems. 1928 has been chosen as such a turning point. First of 
all, during the period 1921-1927, annual Venezuelan output increased 
by over 100% more than twice as much as the world output during 
the same period. After 1928 its rate of increase in production 
fell to below 50% per annum and after 1950 it followed the path 
of world output.
Until 1922 the whole of Venezuela's oil ouput came from British 
owned enterprises and between I925 and 1927 over 5OI0 of this output 
came from British owned companies, particularly the Shell Group,
After 1928, the share of the Venezuelan oil output produced by US 
corporations passed 58% of the whole.
Finally, the political events which occurred between 1928 and 
1938 brought about basic changes in the Venezuelan political 
structures, Gomez the almighty tyrant, became only a decorative 
figure. The rest of Gomez's family lost any political influence while 
the old caudillos disappeared for ever.
This thesis has been worked out by studying different 
primary sources, especially British ones; different parliamentary 
papers related to both the world oil market and the relations 
between Britain and Venezuela; information published by the British
press and recorded in the Shell archive; records of the Board of 
Trade regarding the incorporation of companies involved, in the 
Venezuelan oil industry, etc. Also some important secondary 
sources have been used such as memoirs, researches on the Latin 
American market during the 1910's, reports about the alleged 
struggle between Shell and Standard Oil in the course of the 1920'sp 
etc. However- the main pillars of this research are the despatches 
and telegrams sent by the British Ministers at Caracas between 
1906 and 1928 (recorded under the key number .F«0. 37l) and the 
reports published by The Times between I9OO and I902 and between 
I9O8 and 1927, In the case of The Times, special emphasis has been 
placed on the renorts of the annual Shell share holders' meetings and
y
the direct reports from the oil market®
Prom the outset of this research a clear contradiction
emerged between the evidence given by the primary sources on the
one hand, and the Venezuelan modern literature on the other. Since
 ^ 2/
1958, when Romulo Betancourt's Politica y Petroleo was published, 
the Venezuelan historians involved in the subject have followed in 
his wake to a greater or lesser extent. Even Domingo Alberto
V  , 4/
Ranvel and Pedro Estevan Mejia Alarcon, who disagree with 
Betancourt in general terras, support some of these views.
Firstly, Betancourt supports the TT8 historians in linking the 
progress of the oil industry almost entirely to successful oil 
strikes - for examnle, the well known left wing H8 historian
y
Harvey O'Connor sustains these views, The PS writers mention 
discoveries which took nlace in the TTSA, like the successful 
drilling in Tytusville, Pen sylvania, led by Edwin Drake (1859) or 
the otPer in Spindletop, Texas, initiated by Anthony Lucan (19OO),
R. Betancourt represents the incorporation of Petrolia del Tachira 
(1861 ) as the great a.chievement within the Venezuelan oil history. 
It was, in fact a small company operating near San Cristobal, 
capital of the Tachira State, and near to the border between 
Venezuela and Colombia® This company produced an almost negligible 
output, which was sold within the Venezuelan area surrounding San 
Cristobal and the Colombian territory around Oiicuta, Petrolia*s 
output was so small that in ipi?, 36 years after its incorporation 
over 99/-3 of Venezuela's kerosene needs had to be imported, 
Betancourt charges the Venezuelan government of the day with being 
the reason whv the oil company Petrolia del Tachira did not 
achieve a greater success. According to Betancourt the Venezuelan 
rulers at that time were subservient to European ideas and culture 
and consequently they were more eager to support the foreign 
railway companies than to back Petrolia which was owned by 
Venezuelan citizens®
Another ma^or area of contention arising in this research 
relates to bets.ncourt 's view of the Venezuelan ruler Juan Vicente 
C-omez, who was in power from I9O8 until his death in 1935<» Some 
writers who nublished their books during and after bopez Contreras'
y  1/
government (1935'”1941) - for example, hieuwon and Rourke 
- present Gomez an a corrupt ruler who used his position to defraud 
both the international oil consortia and the Venezuelan treasury to 
his own advantage. However, the modern Venezuelan literature 
guided after 195^ by Romulo Betancourt, sees Gomez as a puppet 
of the ITS government and a servant of the international oil 
combines. Even a writer like Domingo Alberto Rangel^ who disagrees 
with Betancourt in many substantial points, has also stated, on at
least one occasion, that the beginning of Gomez's government
y
signified the establishment of a IIS protectorate in Venezuela,
Finally, Betancourt and those historians who tend to follow
0
his line of argument accept uncritically the image created by 
books during the 1920's of a supposed struggle between Shell 
and Standard Oil, This contest was fully reported in the US 
medio, during this period. Journalists, academics and others
1/
published research on the subject; the US journalists Ludwell Denny
10/ 11/
«rrrewZ y  ■'n*
and Louis Fisher and the Spanish professor Sebastian Barcia, 
are three cases quoted in this research among dozens of others, 
Ludwell Denny is especially important for the present study 
bee anse he devoted whole chapters in his books to Latin America 
and especially to Venezuela® Denny's books contain some useful 
information; however some of his view and opinions are clearly 
unconvincing and outdated. In spite of this, Betancourt repeats 
all Denny's views without any criticism or even analysis.
These are the main points of disagreement between what 
this research maintains and the views held by Betancourt and 
historians influenced by him.
Regarding the first point, as is to be explained in further 
chapters, in general terms the discovery of new uses of certain 
minerals is more effective in revolutionising a particular mining 
activity than the discovery of new deposits of the same mineral.
In the case of oil, the intervention of kerosene - fired devices 
was the great breakthrough which led the oil-extracting activities 
into the great development they underwent during the second 
half of the last century. And this first boost given by kerosene 
only provided outlets for the oil produced by the oilfields near the
consumption markets, namely the Eastern states of the USA and 
Europe; countries like Venezuela, without an internal market 
large enough to sustain its own oil industry during the intial 
stage, had to wait until this centurj'", when the development of 
the internal combustion engine generated such an increase of 
demand that the oil deposits of the Eastern USA and Europe were 
no longer able to cope with it.
Regarding Betancourt's attitude to Petrolia del Tachira it is
agreed in this study that Petrolia has only a relative importance
in the histor^r of Venezuela's oil industry. It shows that Venezuela
had people capable enough to develop such enterprises for themselves.
Indeed, the first foreign company which initiated oil explorations
in Venezuela appointed a number of Venezuelan professionals who
made up nearly a. half of the skilled workers included in their
12/
exploration terms.
However it was not lack of skill which stood in the way of 
Petrolia's success; it was lack of markets. Taking into account 
the fact that Venezuela had less than two million inhabitants at 
that time and that 95% of this sparse population lived at subsistence 
level, it becomes apparent that the infrastructure needed to 
deliver the oil all over Venezuela would make the unit cost of 
this oil incredibly expensive due to the low volume of internal 
consumption. Betancourt overemphasised the significance of 
Petrolia's internal problems in its demise and failed to link 
the history of the Venezuelan oil industry to the development 
of the oil activity worldwide.
Two principal facts in connection with Petrolia a,re of 
paramount importance in the period covered by this research. One is
how important demand was in the development of the oil industry, 
particularly during the early stages. Whoever was able to control 
the consumption market, controlled the whole oil industry. Just 
as Petrolia del Tachira did not achieve a great success due to 
lack of markets, the smaller British and US companies, some also 
involved in the Venezuelan oil industry faced similar - or even 
worse ” problems later. The great oil consortia such as Shell and 
Standard Oil, succeeded because they managed to create a, world 
wide marketing; system*
The other fact is that the social basis of the Venezuelan 
government made it not only unable bi’t also unwilling to support 
Petrolia. IXiring the nineteenth century, the Venezuelan ruling 
classes - overv/helminmly landowners - regarded mining as a way of 
balancing the budget without affecting their ovm pockets. Thus 
mining being a source of revenue, the Venezuelan gove-^nment never 
attempted to encourage mining enterprises with public money.
The Venezuelan government was predisposed to direct public money 
only towards the agrs.risn industry* They supported new railway 
systems which would carry the crops to the ports, new harbour 
instalations which would be useful to load the ship to export the 
crops, etc* Mining was envisaged as a short term source of 
revenue. It is consistent with Betancourt’s general approach 
that he failed to analyse the relationship between the Venezuelan 
government and the Venezuelan oil industry.
The limitations of Betancourt's framework also affect his 
view of J*V, Gomez's government in relation to the Venezuelan oil 
industry. In criticising his views it is essential to point to the 
link between the internal situation aud the development of the
oil industigr worldwide.
After 1880 a strong central government, able to represent the 
Venezuelans in the face of increased economic and. political 
pressure from abroad, became badly needed* Consequently 
increased revenues also became an urgent need as a strong central 
government would need an army powerful enough to defeat the 
private armies organised by the caudillos (landowners involved in 
politics trying to impose their will by force of arms)®
A new situation in Venezuela coincided with a new situation 
in the world oil market. At the same time that the need for a 
strong central government made an increase in revenue urgent, the 
development - f the interna.1 combustion engine meant a sharp 
increase in oil consumption. If Venezuela needed revenues, its 
oil potentialities could provide them. The mining code of I9O6 
made it apparent that Venezuela was trying to develop its oil 
wealth.
During the first decade of this centui'y foreign entrepreneurs 
replaced Venezuelan capitalists in many activities inside 
Venezuela. In the world oil market big oil combines, able to 
develop world wide marketing schemes had replaced small companies 
unable to control the oil activities at each stage of the production 
and marketing process. So the Venezuelan oil was entrusted to 
foreign capitalists. If the industnp/" was not developed until 1912 it 
wa,s because Venezuelan demands were far beyond what the oil 
combines were willing to give and consequently these consortia 
boycotted Venezuelan oil. Conditions in the world market prevailing 
at that time allowed the combines to follow such policies.
This is the context in which the nosition of General J.V. Gomez
should he analysed. This thesis is not claiming that the famous 
dictator was either a national hero or a great popular leader.
Indeed, he was certainly neither; during his government 
Venezuela v/as undergoing great transformations, particularly connected 
with the early development cf the oil industry® These transformations 
v/ere not being developed through Gomez's leadership and, to some 
extent, they happened in spite of him. However he was able not 
only to obtain personal advantage from these developments, but to 
direct similan? advantages towards the upperclass - or at least 
elements of it, Gomez enjoyed the support of those elements 
until his death, and this was the basis of his success. The 
main strength shown by Gomez was his skill in dealing with 
foreign combines and their supporting Great Powers, He had learned 
from his predecessor's failures the limits of his bargaining 
possibilities with the Great Powers and international consortia. 
President Cipriano Castro (l899“1908) had tried to impose his 
will on the foreign companies working in Venezuela, This policy led 
him. into a head-on clash with the Great Powers and finally he was 
overthrown by his closest allies headed by his then vice-president 
Juan V, Gomez, Gomez knew that he could only negotiate with 
the foreign companies and their supporting Powers, without, at the 
end of the day, imposing his wishes in full. Knowing this fact 
Gomez acted well within the limits he perceived.
Until 1912 the oil policy followed by Gomez was similar to 
Cipriano Castro's; he even demanded more revenue from oil 
than his predecessor had. The concession granted to Max Valladares 
in 1912 (a concession which eventually became the property of a 
Shell subsidiary) amounted to a sort of surrender to the oil
companies. After this the first Venezuelan oil well below 300 
feet was discovered (I914). In 191? the "Mene Grande" oilfield 
came into production and in I9I8 Venezuela stopped oil imports.
World War I had meant a great increase in oil consumption.
The Bolshevik government had nationalised the Russian oil industry 
and the Mexican government was trying to increase its oil taxation.
As those two nations were among the major oil exporters of the day, 
these two last events encouraged many other oil producing countries 
to claim a better share in their own oil wealth. As a consequence 
of the war the big consortia could only benefit from boycotting the 
rebel countries if they could obtain some support from within 
those countries.
Initially Venezuela was one of the countries tracing to 
increase its share of its oil wealth. Between 1917 and 1920 the 
Venezuelan government issued a number of laws, decrees and new 
concessions aiming to increase the tax and royalties paid by the 
oil companies and replace the old system of concessions - normally 
granted to Gomez's friends and relatives - by auctions, etc. In 
order to implement this policy, the government attempted to annul 
old concessions which were outside the scope of the new laws.
Facing this situation, the oil combines initiated a boycott 
against the Venezuelan oilfields. As a, result of it, the 
Venezuelan output, which in 1918 was three times that of 1917? 
registered negligible increases in 1919 and 1920. Venezuelan oil 
exports diminished sharply in I9I8 and 1919? declining to zero in
1920.
However the consortia wel] knew that they could not successfully 
maintain such pressure for long unde^ th-^  new economic circumstances;
the market needed Venezuelan oil* Therefore the;/ began tn use a 
new method to force the Venezuelan governm'-'nt to accept their 
terms. They gave political and. economic shelter to the old
the oldfashioned political leaders of 19th centurqr 
Venezu'='la« These candillns neve^' attained enough suppn-rt to 
overthrow Gomez, but th^y ellowed the foreign companies and their 
supporting' Powers to impose their will be effectively blackmailing 
him. It seems more than coincidence that in 1921? t h o  weapons that 
the caudillos were loading onto vessels in Swansea and Amsterdam 
without interference from the authorities were embargoed by 
Scotian'^ Yard as soon as Gomez ma.de his oil policy more favourable to 
the compani es.
After this policy defeat in 1921 (evidently recognised by 
Gomez in the new hydrocax’bon law of 1922, drafted by the TIG concession 
middleman Addison-McKay) there followed a period in which tho 
Venezuelan oil industry underwent rapid development; this period 
culminated in 1928 when Venezuela became the second oil nroducing 
nation in the xjorld and the leading oil exporter. On the other 
hand,Gomez became the tool the oil combines needed, to counteract 
the rebellion of mony oil exporting countries; Venezuela wa,s 
uarticularly useful a.gainst Mexico, whose presidents Albaro Obregon 
(1920-1924) and Plutarco Elias Galles (1924-1928) had followed a 
policy which did not nlease the oil consortia®
Gomez made it clear on a,t least two occasions, that he was 
not performing this role wmllingly. In 1924 ho attempted to enact 
a new hydrocarbons law and to annul the concession held by V.O.C®, a 
Shell subsidiary which exploited the most prolific oilfields in 
Venezuela, In 1929 he initiated a similar policy, this time
attempting to ennu], the concessions held by Caribbean, another 
Shell subsidiary. Tn both cases Gomez was out-ma.noeuvered. As in 
1921 the caudillos were supported politically a.nd economically until 
Gomez desisted from his new policies, whereupon Scotland Yard once 
again helped Gomez to thwart the plans hatched by the caudillos.
Thus VaO.C. a.nd Caribbean concessions were not annulled and 
the hydrocarbon laws of 1925 and 1929 did not achieve substantive 
changes to the 1922 law. Betancourt fails to mention either the 
1925 or the 1929 law. As regards V.O.C. and Caribbean, he chooses 
to stress Gomez's violation of a law enacted by himself and to 
present Gomez as a puppet of the US interests in a struggle with 
Britain.
Regarding the alleged struggle between Shell and Standard Oil,
British non confidential diplomatic papers admit the possible action
of US interests against British enterprises, but even so they do
not make a great deal out of this issue. Later in the 1920's
confidential documents begin to show a rather different reality.
Secret documents sent as early as 1925 show that Standard Oil was
12/
closer to Shell than to other US interests. The alliance
between Shell and Standard Oil becomes apparent when the British 
Minister at Caracas explains that the US combine is supporting 
Shell in the Schumneter case (launched by a US citizen against a
,  M /
Shell subsidiaiyr in 1928).
Thus, in the context of events in Venezuela between 1917 and 
1929? it becomes apparent that there was no struggle there between 
Standard Oil and Shell. It is nevertheless a fact that the US 
oilmen who were trying to annul Shell's concessions were also 
suuported by Standard. They were working wit% and to a certain extent,
for Standard Oil, but they were not Standard Oil itself. The 
fact that they received some support from Standard in their attempt 
to push Shell out of Venezuela, support which in no case was 
enough to defeat Shell, can be explained in terms of the following 
two motives®
A® There is a reason to suppose that Standard Oil 
was supporting a media campaign, alleging a 
struggle between American and British oil interests 
in order to hide a real struggle between the big 
and small oil combines world wide.
B® By supporting minor US oilmen in Venezuela,
Standard Oil may have been aiming to obtain 
advantages in an agreement with Shell. As it to 
be explained later, the agreement had been in 
process since the end of the war, and culminated with 
a comprehensive accord signed by both companies in 
Achnacary (Scottish Highlands) in September 1928®
The campaign initiated by the media had a great impact. The 
struggle between British and US oilmen seemed so evident that 
Gomez attempted to exploit the supposed contest to his ovm advantage. 
His effort was a complete failure as was to be expected. Meanwhile 
both the British and the US governments supported the big oil combines 
agannst the small ones* By the end of the decade the small oil 
concerns had been all but destroyed and the rebel oil exporting 
countries had been forced into temporary retreat*
Gomez's Venezuela had been a very useful, although unwilling, 
tool in the hands of the oil consortia in their battle a.gainst 
other oil exporting countries « But due to the development of its 
oil industry, Venezuela had undergone a series of transformations in 
the economic, social and political fields. 1/hen events like the 
Urbina invasions took place (1929-1930) it became apparent that 
Venezuela had experienced fundamental changes and the methods
previously used by the combines to pressurise the Venezuelan 
government were no longer possible®
Gomez tried to wrest as many advantages as he could from the 
oil consortia. If he failed it was due to weak points in the social 
fabric that the combines were able to exploit. Certain elements which 
appeared in the oil market after IROO, gave the oil producing 
countries a strong bargaining position. The development of the 
internal combustion engine increased oil demands and enlarged the 
range of serviceable hydrocarbons. Therefore, while increasing 
demand meant higher prices, a larger range of usable hydrocarbons 
meant diminution in wa,ste and consequently a reduction in costs. This 
gap created between prices and costs is still present to this 
day; the invention of the cracking method and the development 
of the petro-chemical industry further widened the price-cost gap.
This gap which has been renamed in this research "oil surplus" is a 
reaj.ity in the free market system, even when it is not the oil 
consortia themselves who take advantage of it. The constant 
potentiality of taking at least part of this "oil surplus" afforded 
the oil producing countries a, stronger bargaining povjer.
The present thesis proposes that the oil hi stoip of this 
century is a tale of ceaseless struggle between the oil consortia, 
other industries (motor car, shipyards, transport etc.), oil 
consuming countries and oil producing' countries for the control of the 
largest share of the "oil surplus". The concept of "oil surpl^'s" 
shows that the history of the Venezuelan oil industry cannot be 
fully understood except in world-wide terms.
The link between international annational events, the economic 
and political evolution of Venezuela, is the subject of this
research. It is a, suhjoct which is still current today with the
formation of OPEC and the oil crisis of the 1970's. The study of
the up,r]y stages of the Venezuelan oil industry, the central
theme of this thesis, uncovers the roots of the present
situs.tion of Venezuela's oil policy today and the kinds of limitations
surrounding it.
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CHAPTER II
World conditions in which the Venezuelan 
oil industry was initially developed
This chapter will deal with the early development of the world
oil industry up to World War I because it was within that framework
that the Venezuelan oil industry appeared. It will also consider
the early development of the industry on other Latin American
countries, especially Mexico, which held second place in world
production between 1914 and 192?? when it was displaced by Venezuela's
ovm production. Although the Venezuelan oil industry appeared 17
years later than the Mexican oil industry, there is a strong link
between the development of each; as will be seen in later chapters,
the big oil consortia encouraged such a link in order to play off
the one country against the other. During the 1920's in particular
Venezuela was used to bring Mexico to its knees in terms of revinues
charged and other conditions.
It is usually accepted that the oil industry appeared with the
successful drilling made in Titusville, Pennsylvania on 20th August
1859e In fact the oil industry had existed since long before then.
Oil was well known; oil seepages and pitch lakes were scattered all 
1/
over the world, Venezuela itself had an abundance of seepages along 
the Maracaibo Lalce and a pitch lake in Guanoco (in the North East of 
the country). Since the early days of mankind oil had been used as 
medicine, to feed lighting and heating devices, as building and 
caulking material, for firebrands, mortar, dye, etc. In the 
particular case of Venezuela, pre-Columbian inhabitants had used 
Mene - as they called crude oil - to caulk their primitive vessels.
After the Spanish conquest, both Spaniards and buccaneers used the 
crude oil seeping from the Venezuelan soil for similar purposes.
In some places, when the natural output was not enough to 
cope with the local demand, wells were dug next to the seepages in 
order to increase the output. During the 18th centujcy oil had been 
studied by chemists and in 1738 a sort of primitive oil refinery had
y
been built in Alsace,
Nevertheless, oil demand was so small that in many countries, 
natural oil resources were not used. Although oil occasionally 
reached very high prices in places where it was scarce, the level of 
demand was not sufficient to cover the cost of transport from distant 
places where it was in surplus production®
The event which revolutionised the oil market was a series of 
inventions by the British chemist James Young (I8II-I883). In the 
late 1840's he patented a liquid hydrocarbon mixture, known today 
as kerosene or paraffin, to feed lighting and heating devices. It was 
cheaply obtained from the crude oil yielded from a seepage located 
in Derbyshire. This was the cheapest way to obtain oil, and it was 
only when the diminishing out put from that seepage was no longer able 
to cope with the increasing demand, that Young obtained paraffin from 
other sources, firstly from coal and then from the Scottish oil 
shales. It was the possibility of obtaining cheaper paraffin from 
crude oil that encouraged discoveries like Titusville.
The discovery of Kerosene encouraged oil production to such an 
extent that world output increased from 1/2 million barrels in 
I860 up to 149 millions in I9OO, However the world output was still
y
very small. In I9OO, although 300 times as high as in I860; it was 
still only equivalent to what the USSR (the main world producer)
obtains in 1 l/2 weeks today.
Kerosene therefore extended the market and led to the development
of the oil industry in areas near to the main consumer ma.rkets,
namely Europe and the Eastern states of USA®
In 1881, Karl Benz (1844-1939) made the first car and in 1893
Rudolf Diesel (1858-1913) designed the engine known today by his 
name. However, these inventions had very little effect on the 
market until this century. In I9OO only the USA and France had a
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recorded car output. After I9OO the effect of these inventions on 
the oil market was of paramount importance.
First of all, costs of oil were lowered as a wider range of
hydrocarbons were found to have uses and waste was consequently 
diminished. Very soon, kerosene was no longer the main product and
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it became a byproduct of the production of gasoline.
As the level of crude oil production, based primarily on the
demand for kerosene, proved insufficient, the rapid development of 
the internal combustion engine led to an important increase in world 
oil demand. In 1915 world output reached 42? million barrels, 2,9
y
times as large as in I9OO,
As the development of the internal combustion engine extended the 
market, increased oil needs required the exploitation of new oil 
fields further away from the areas of main consumption. In the USA, 
the Texas oil fields had begun to be exploited in I9OI, In the rest 
of the world Mexico and Persia had appeared in the world oil ranking 
at the same time. Fields in Egypt, Trinidad and Argentina had 
followed them before the end of the decade, Burma, Dutch East Indies 
and Peru had all initiated their oil exploitation some years before
1900,
Leading figures in the World Oil Market -- Two men shaped the 
oil world in which Venezuela eventually became involved, namely 
John D. Rockefeller (1839-1937) and Henry A* Defending (1866-1939)» 
Rockefeller and Defending represent two particular oil markets. Each 
of them knew how to exploit to their own personal advantage the 
particular oil market in which they developed their activities.
Rockefeller ruled the oil market during the kerosene period.
He was a business man engaged in supplying the army during the 
American civil war. As kerosene was needed by the army after 1863 
Rockefeller became involved in oil refining enterprises. In 1871 
his "Standard Oil Company" had US ^2,5 millions capital and refined
y
10% of US crude output. In 1879, it dealt with 95% of this output.
After 1905 the man who took control of the world oil market was 
Henry Defending. His methods were better adapted to the "internal 
combustion period",
Henry A, Defending had been a bank executive in Dutch East 
India and was involved in the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, becoming 
the company's manager in I9OI, After a, price war in I905, Deterding's 
company defeated Standard Oil in the European market; after that, he 
took unchallenged control of the world oil market until the end of 
World War I, In I9O7 Deterding's company Royal Dutch merged with 
Samuel Brader's Shell Transport and Trading Company, which had been 
severely battered by the price war in I905, to become the "Shell"
Group of oil companies, the Dutch partner holding 60% of the
V
consortium and the British partner 40%.
The policies followed by Rockefeller and Defending seems to be 
the antithesis of each other; but rather than being different sets of 
criteria to face the same problem, each policy represents a correct
solution to a different set of problems.
While Rockefeller, on the one hand sought to avoid drilling
enterprises, in order to take control of oil transport refining and
marketing, Retarding sought to get involved in each stage of the oil
industry from the well up to the filling station. Rockefeller
initiated some drilling enterprises, but this was only in order to
reinforce his mastery over the extracting companies. In 1904 while
Standard Oil refineries produced 86% of the kerosene sold in the USA,
oil fields owned by the same company scarcely yielded 10% of the US
crude oil output. Retarding also bought oil from other producers in
certain places and on certain occasions, especially within the USA,
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but he tried to rely on his own sources of supply.
Rockefeller kept prices as low as possible and to avoid 
competition he sold oil below cost of production until competitors 
became bankrupted. Retarding promoted an alliance among the oil 
producers, keeping prices at the highest possible level so that every
3/
company could survive®
Rockefeller supplied the world with US oil while Retarding supplied 
the world with the world*s oil,
Ruring the kerosene stage, the oil industry produced a lot of 
waste as only a small range of hydrocarbons was serviceable. The 
well in Titusville was 69 feet deep and by the end of the century oil 
wells had reached a depth of 1,000 feet. Therefore there still 
existed an abundance of shallow oil deposits around the main centres 
of consumption especially in the USA, This abundance of shallow 
oil deposits meant that on several occasions, especially during crisis 
periods like in 1870, crude oil prices fell below the cost of 
production.
Drilling was still an enterprise which needed a relatively 
small amount of capital. Although big fortunes had been made 
overnight in such enterprises, oil drilling business represented a 
gamble in which it was much easier to lose than to win. Therefore, 
drilling enterprises were small businesses partly because there 
were abundant shallow oil deposits near the main oil consumption 
areas with the necessary infra-structures available. The most 
important reason, however was that nobody was willing to risk large 
amounts of capital without a reasonable possibility of recovering it 
with a good margin of profit. The bulk of oil required by the 
market was so small that big initial investments in the oil extracting 
enterprises were uneconomic; these initial investments would have an 
excessive effect on costs per crude oil barrel due to the small 
quantity of oil required by the market. Let us compare as an example, 
the Venezuelan oil deposits in Maracaibo and the oil shales of 
Scotland, In Maracaibo the development of such a void area needed 
large initial investments, but the quality of the crude oil obtained 
there made operational costs very small because of the high economic 
processing costs. The Scottish oil shales on the other hand needed 
almost negligible initial investments but they had high operational 
costs. Even so, relative to the conditions prevailing in the world 
oil market at that time, the Scottish shales still gave a better 
economic return than the Maracaibo oil fields.
The Rockefeller method was well suited to this situation.
Within the part of the world where the main oil consumption markets 
were located, the principal oil resources were in the USA and 
consequently, the control Rockefeller had over the oil market enabled 
him to impose his mastery over 70% of the world oil market.
After 1900 the development of the oil fed internal combustion 
engine had a great effect on the market, Firstly costs in the 
oil industry decreased as the waste diminished; however, prices had 
a tendency to increase as demand for oil products also sharply 
increased. In such conditions a big initial investment in oil 
drilling enterprises became economic, but only if these drilling 
enterprises would be able to sell large quantities of oil at 
profitable prices to be able to absorb the large initial investments * 
The only companies able to do so were those who had a world wide 
marketing scheme. Using the same comparison between Venezuelan 
oil fields and Scottish oil shales observed previously, the Venezuelan 
oil fields now became more economic as the initial investment 
became increasingly absorbed by greater production. But, even so, 
only companies like Shell and Standard Oil were able to take advantage 
of this situation because they had the marketing scheme to enable 
them to sell large quantities of oil needed to absorb the large 
initial investments.
Moreover the gap between prices and costs just described is a 
natural phenomenon which can be detected in any free market economy, 
even when the oil producers do not draw advantage from it and the 
benefit is enjoyed by other bodies in the system. In this thesis the 
phenomenon is named oil surplus. Since I9OO the history of oil 
has been the history of the struggle between different bodies to 
tsdce the major part of the oil surplus. The existence of oil surplus 
made possible the system of alliances between all the oil companies 
propounded by Deterding, High prices allowed the survival of 
the smaller oil companies, whose costs of production were higher, but 
at such price levels the big corporations got very high profit rates.
For instance, between I907 and 1914 Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, paid 
dividends averaging 45% per annum, and its British partner "Shell”
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Transport and Trading Co, obtained dividends of around 35% per annum.
The policy followed by Deterding temporarily postponed the 
crisis which was ultimately to be faced by the small concerns.
After 1905 Standard Oil fell under Shell's sway and subsequently prices 
began to rise steadily. In 1913 prices reached US 02*50 per barrel 
which was a record for the century. However the situation for the
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small companies became increasingly uncomfortable. When in 1913 
the British Crown purchased a controlling stock of the Anglo Persian 
Oil Company some small British oilmen got official shelter for 
themselves. But, apart from this case the smaller British oilmen 
began a gradual withdrawal from the oilfields in the developed 
countries. In some of these countries, like Peru, it was the small 
British oilmen who had been the originators of the oil developments.
So we can see that the number of companies able to develop oil 
enterprises diminished as a large amount of capital as well as a 
marketing scheme became necessary.
Moreover the world output was much below the potential 
production; the whole world output of 1915 is today produced by the 
USSR in just 1 l/2 months. Therefore the smaller number of oil 
companies able to exploit these oil fields could select the most 
profitable places in which to invest their capitals.
This situation was particularly inconvenient to countries like 
Venezuela which had plenty of oil but not the possibility of 
developing this activity by themselves. To illustrate this fact the 
particular case of Trinidad can be useful. The retreating group of 
small British oil companies in the developing countries had taken on
the role of middlemen between the big oil combines and the local 
governments; in 1912, the South hapacima Oil Co, working there for 
some years, asked from the colonial government a diminution in 
taxation to be paid by the company. Only two years later, when the 
request had been accepted, did Shell settle in Trinidad,
As will be explained later, the alliance between small and big 
oil companies encountered difficulties over other interests and led 
to a crisis in 1914 (just before the war) which meant bankruptcy
u /
for many of the small oil companies.
Thus the discovery of uses of oil, rather than the discovery of 
oil deposits, encouraged the development of the oil industry. New 
inventions increased oil demand and consequently encouraged searches 
for new oil deposits and increasingly large investments in the oil 
industry. Later on another important factor will be mentioned; 
namely the development of better forms of refining. Prices cannot 
be regarded as causal factors, but their significance lies in the 
fact that they give an important glimpse of the competing elements 
within the oil market at any particular moment. For instance, in 
some cases oil prices have fallen and subsequent world output has 
increased.
First Steps of the Oil Industry in South America - The oil 
industry did not appear in any country South of the Rio Grande before 
1900, Although in Peru (1863) as well as in Venezuela (I88O) some 
drilling ventures had been developed before this time, they were so 
small that their relative outputs were negligible in world wide terms, 
Within the area, Mexico, Venezuela, Trinidad, Peru, Colombia 
and Ecuador were particularly well conditoned to develop an oil 
industry, since all of them had oil seepages known even before the
Europeans appeared there,. Paradoxically Peru and not Mexico or 
Venezuela was the first of these countries where oil fields began to 
be exploited on a large scale (I896), Mexican oil fields began to be 
exploited soon afterwards (19OI), Then Argentina a country which 
had not previously evidenced any oil deposits discovered by chance 
important reserves. In fact, men of the Argentinian Army headed by 
General Mosconi, dug a prolific oil well in Comodoro Revadavia,
Chuleut Province, when they were looking for water in this dry 
region (1907). The Trinidad oil industry began in I9O8 ; Venezuela 
however, which was, after Mexico, the country where the existence 
of oil was most clearly exhibited, had to import kerosene for its 
own needs until 1917*
If in South America oil resources had remained idle until the 
beginning of this century, it was due to the lack of a market. As 
w a s  previously pointed out, the main consumption areas had no 
need of oil imports, and the Spanish American countries, not highly 
populated and with the largest part of the population living on 
subsistence levels, had no internal market to support the development 
of the local oil industry. Therefore each country had to find a 
local basis on which the oil industry could be developed.
In legal terms mining in all the Spanish American countries 
followed the rules of the Justinian law which granted the natural 
resources lying "under the soil" to the State, The Justinian principle 
concerning mining had been accepted by the Spaniard since the Middle 
Ages, but it was particularly convenient in the case of Latin 
America because the Spaniards were especially interested in the 
raining resources. But, at least initially, they tried to respect the 
Indians* property right over the surface. Thus whereas a Real Orden
awarded the coal mines existing in Spain to the landowner beneath
whose property the mine lay (28th November 1789)s the Qrdenanzas para
la Mineria de Nneva Espana extended the Royal rights over any
possible mineral (22nd May I783). These Qrdenanzas originally were
only applied in Nueva Espana (The territory of Mexico and Central
America except Panama) but were gradually extended over Spanish
America as a whole. They represented the first Mining Law in every
Spanish American country after independence. This law makes special
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references to the "liquids seeping from the earth".
The principle stated by Justinian formed the core of the Latin 
American mining laws issued afterwards. Other principles have also 
had some influence; they are the principle enforced in the Roman 
Republic (and today in the Anglo-Saxon countries) which awards the 
mining resources to the landowner beneath whose property the mine
làJ
is, and the principle established by the French Revolution which 
awards the mines to their discoverer. However, the influence of 
these other principles is very limited and only applied in a 
secondary form. The only main exception to this was Mexico between 
1884 and I9 17. During this period the property rights over oil and 
coal resources were awarded to the landowners,
Peru, Mexico and Trinidad were the only countries within the 
area where neither Shell nor any other great oil combine took part 
in the initial development of their oil industry. The increasing 
demand for oil in world wide terms gave the basis for development of 
both Trinidadian and Argentinian oil industries in their initial 
stage, but Peru and Mexico needed a local basis to initiate their 
own process.
In the case of Peru, this basis was the local market formed by
that country and Its neighbours. It was large enough to sustain the
oil industry but too far away and too small to be economic for
Standard Oil, So a number of British corporations like Lobitos,
Positos y Negutos took control over Peruvian oilfields. Within the
area, Chile was particularly important as an oil consumer, especially
when, at the beginning of this century oil replaced coal as the
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fuel for the Nitrate industry. But this change caused the 
eventual ruin of these small companies, because it eventually 
attracted Standard Oil's attention. In the late 1910's International 
Petroleum, a Standard subsidiary incorporated in Canada, became the 
main oil producer in Peru,
In Mexico it was the railway which encouraged the oil industry 
during its initial stage, Mexican coal deposits were very poor and 
therefore, the well known oil deposits existing in the country were 
used to feed oil-burning steam engines. Before I9OI (vfhen this 
possibility arose) every attempt to develop the Mexican oil 
potentialities had failed (the first attempt was during the early 1870's 
The first oil refinery built in Mexico processed US crude oils; it 
was owned by Waters Pierce - a Standard Oil subsidiary incorporated in
làJ
Saint Louis, Missouri*
Thus the initiators of the Mexican oil industry were closely 
involved in Mexican railway enterprises; they were the British citizen
u j
Weetman Pearson (later Lord Cowdray) and the US citizen Edward Dohery, 
The Mexican government, particularly interested in developing the 
railway system, encouraged oil investments. The 
enacted in December I9OI gave a 10 years holiday tax to the oil 
industry; oil fields underlying public lands had to pay only 10% 
royalty (7% to the Federal government and 3% to the State where the
oil field was).
Although Mexico initiated its oil industry in connection with 
the development of its own railway system, soon afterwards it 
became subordinated to the US market and consequently to Standard Oil, 
E, Uoheny built few refineries in Mexico, the largest part of the 
output of his "Huastica Corporation" being sold unrefined to Standard
Oil. The Compahïa de Petroleos "El Aguila" (better known as the 
Mexican Ea.gle) ovmed by Pearson, had some refineries and sold its 
output to small oil trading companies in Europe, but when his 
company's output increased, he was forced to sell a large part of 
his crude oil to Standard Oil. In 1917? when Pearson sold his 
company he obtained over £Y^000,000 and in 1926 when Uoheny sold his 
interests he got US 0150,000,000; they must, nevertheless be 
considered minor oil enterprises because they were never able to 
develop a marketing scheme capable of dealing with their large 
output in a profitable way.
Due to their dependence on Standard Oil, these two, as well
as other smaller oil companies operating in Mexico, tried to obtain
a relatively less unfavourable position by fighting violently
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between each other. In some cases this struggle stooped to 
criminal activities. When the Mexican civil war began Pearson 
and Uoheny intervened giving economic support to different parties. 
However this action proved completely unsuccessful, especially for 
Uoheny; he supported the parties which eventually became victorious,
iS/
but after victory he did not obtain any advantage. On the other 
hand, Pearson who had supported Uiaz against Madero and Huerta against 
Cananza, found himself in a very uncomfortable position after Huerta's 
defeat and decided to sell out all his ventures to Shell, Uoheny
continued for another 9 years and extended his Empire to Colombia 
and Venezuela. Finally he also sold his possessions to Indiana 
Standard, In 1931 Indiana Standard sold its Latin American enterprises 
to Standard Oil of New Jersey - known today as Exxon, Taking into 
account what was previously said about Trinidad, and in spite of 
some token ventures held by other US corporations, such as Sinclair, 
Cities Services etc, (initiated during the 1930*s) after 1931 the seven 
partners of the Achnacarry cartel (to be explained later) took 
complete control of the Latin American oil market.
After the beginning of the Mexican revolution, the new 
governments tried to obtain a better share from their oil wealth.
On the 3nd June 1912 they broke the tax holiday by exploiting a 
loophole in the Ley de Petroleo; this new tax amounted US 00,03 per 
barrel. On 21st June 1914 another tax of US 00,10 per oil ton was 
established. Finally the new constitution issued in 1917 brought 
back property rights over oil deposits to the nation. Nevertheless 
the new constitution did not affect the rights previously acquired 
by the oil companies and although the US ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, 
described the tax of 1912 as an "expropiatory taxation" both taxes 
together were very low. Until 1921 Mexico was a sort of paradise 
for the oil companies in comparison with other countries, particularly 
Venezuela during the same period.
Until 1920 the Mexican oil industry did not have any direct link 
with the Venezuelan one. In fact, during this period the Venezuelan 
oil industry was practically non-existent. The initial searches 
began in 1912, In 1914 the first Venezuelan oilfield was opened.
Until I9I8 Venezuela had to import kerosene and other oil products.
But this brief account of the beginning of the Mexican oil industry
is necessary for this research. Firstly because the link between 
the post-1921 Mexican oil industry and the Venezuelan oil industry 
is of paramount importance. Secondly because it describes a stage in 
the history of the Latin American oil activities from which Venezuela 
was almost excluded since it appeared in the twilight of this 
period; namely, the stage in which the British companies - Shell and 
Anglo Persian excluded - played an important role. However these 
minor British oilmen had tried to initiate Venezuelan oil ventures, 
but they failed. Finally the tax policy implemented by Mexico 
during this period explains why Venezuela failed in its attempts to 
attract foreign capital to develop the Venezuelan oilfields.
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CHAPTER III
Venezuela before the early developments of its Oil Industry
Until 19215 when oil exports became a discernible item within 
Venezuela's balance of trade, over 99% of Venezuelan exports were 
agrarian items, especially coffee, cocoa and sugar cane, coffee 
alone yielding 2/3 of the figure. There were some mining operations, 
especially asphalt, gold and copper, but in 1912 all these
1 /
commodities together made up less than 1% of Venezuelan exports.
At the beginning of the twentieth century the population was 
less than two million with less than 1 inhabitant per square kilometre. 
Although over 95% of this population was living at subsistence 
level, it cannot be said that Venezuela was a poor country in
2/
resources, as its exports surpassed imports by 30% to 50% a year® 
Rather it was an underdeveloped country. In 1912 for instance, the 
whole of Venezuela's international trade represented £2 per inhabitant, 
9 times less than the Trinidadian figures (£18 per inhabitant).
Venezuela during the nineteenth century - During the colonial 
period gold dominated mining activities in the country, with the 
eastern side of the country as the main area. Gold mining however, 
was negligible when compared with Venezuelan agrarian activities. In 
the context of the Spanish American Empire Venezuela was primarily 
an agrarian economy geared to supplying the mining nation of Mexico 
with certain crops, particularly cocoa.
The Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada, which included Venezuela was 
the place where the ideals of Bolivar, for a United Spanish America 
was nearest to success, as it became the republic of Colombia; but it 
lasted for only a few years. In November 1929 the Popular Assembly of
Valencia decided to form the Republic of Venezuela as an independent 
entity. The South American nations were formed according to the 
economic units existing within the Spanish Empire, and thus, the 
Venezuelan nation had its centre in the area where the cities of 
Valencia and Caracas and the ports of La Cuaira and Puerto Cabello 
are located.
The main difficulty for the economic development of the Latin 
American states seems to have been the lack of an internal market. 
They had a very sparse population, the larger part of which was 
living at subsistence level. Therefore these countries were 
dependent on the external market. But at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century this was also insufficient to absorb the complete 
output of each country, Consequently, Venezuela, Argentina and 
Uruguay with their cattle, Colombia and Ecuador with their quina 
etc, had great difficulty in getting their unsophisticated products 
into the market. For, after the world market had been saturated, 
the remaining available goods had no economic value at all.
The above situation discouraged capitalisation as demand covered 
only part of the production they obtained in wild conditions, and, 
after saturating the market, no real value would remain to be 
destroyed in civil war. This could recru.it for their private 
armies the peasantry who had become idle after collecting the goods 
needed by the market. In this way, the landowning caudillos, a 
common political element in many South American countries, appeared*
In the case of Venezuela, a military advantage was enjoyed by 
the landowners of "Los Llamos" and "Los Andes", Ports and other 
premises needed by trade were a permanent value and consequently, the 
central area of the country was so vulnerable to effects of warfare
that the caudillo who broke into the area, immediately obtained the 
surrender of the government. Internal wars in Venezuela, normally 
finished in a battle near Valencia: the battle of Carabobo which 
sealed independence in 1821 and the battle of La Victoria which 
decided the last classic revolution in 1902, are good examples.
Nevertheless the economic advantages enjoyed by the ruling 
elements of Caracas and the central area allowed them to win the 
peace after being defeated in each civil war; the source of income of 
these landowner caudillos was foreign trade and it was controlled by 
the ports of La Cuaira and Puerto Cabello, The banner of these 
caudillos was federalism,through which they tried to get rid of the 
central government, but they could not avoid their dependence on 
the ports tlirough which they exported their crops. Therefore, the 
victorious caudillos were easily attracted by the leading elite of
P
Caracas and no real change was ever achieved. Venezuelan federalism
V
was never more than formal.
Thus, civil wars were rather frequent in Venezuela. Between 
1830 and 1857 there were eleven civil wars and in this last year began 
a series of armed struggles knov/n as the "Federal War", which lasted 
up to I863. After that, the Federal Constitution of I864 was 
enacted; it represents the highest tide in the fortunes of Venezuelan 
Federalism and caudillism as even armed rebellions gained legal 
approval.
But afterwards the development of a more centralised state 
became badly needed. The increased world demand for Venezuelan crops, 
particularly coffee and cattle made civil wars increasingly 
damaging as now all the Venezuelan crops were required by world 
markets; a similar phenomenon occurred in other South American countries
At the same time, as civil struggle became increasingly damaging, 
the European Powers re-discovered Venezuela, and it began to 
suffer all kinds of pressures from them. Therefore a central 
government became increasingly needed both to give internal peace 
and order and to face these external pressures in a more united way.
The task of Venezuela's unification was achieved by four 
caudillos who consecutively ruled Venezuela between 1880 and 1935? 
they were Antonio Guzman Blanco, Joaquin Crespo, Cipriano Castro 
and Juan Vicente Gomez, The first two were, in fact "primus inter; rares' 
among the other caudillos and they and their successors continued in 
power as long as they were able to keep the loyalty of the other
y
caudillos. But in 1898, when Crespo died in battle, a new stage was 
initiated, Castro and Gomez sought the support of the caudillos 
and some of them, like Felix Garivaz, became important supporters, 
but no longer at the same level of influence. The caudillos who 
did not accept the way of these new rulers, were attacked and were 
finally crushed. After 1899 no caudillo leader succeeded in over­
throwing the government; nevertheless caudillo warfare continued 
until 1930»
The new conditions in the world market encouraged investments 
within Venezuela, particularly in connection with agriculture. The 
main fields where investments were required were transport and 
trade. In many cases, Venezuelan citizens initiated these 
enterprises and the Venezuelan Government supported them as well 
as it could. After 1880 a number of railways were built which
connected different Venezuelan ports and their respective hinterlands;
2/
many of them were built by Venezuelans, Up to 1881 Trading Houses 
in Trinidad controlled the wholesale market within Venezuela;
Trinidad had become a sort of store house for Venezuela. In 1881 
Guzman Blanco established a 35% surtax on all imports from the 
European colonies within the Caribbean area. This surtax put an 
end to the control enjoyed by the Trinidadian trading companies 
over Venezuelan wholesale; subsequently, a number of Venezuelan 
trading companies took control of wholesaling and kept this control 
until the beginning of this century.
But while the market in the developed countries had increased
enough to absorb the whole output of the developing areas, the
accumulation of capital in these developed countries forced their
capitalists to look beyond their frontiers for places where they
could invest their capital in more profitable ways. So the emerging
Venezuelan capitalists (as in other developing countries) had to
face the competition of these powerful foreign competitors who were
larger, more experienced and already in control of the market where
8/
the Venezuelan production was directed.
The Venezuelan government was able to support these Venezuelan 
entrepreneurs, but only within certain limits. First of all, the 
government needed the backing of the landowners. Although a good 
number of these businessmen were also landownders, there existed a 
conflict of interests between capitalists and landowners. It was 
irrelevant to the landowners whether the people involved in trade were 
or were not Venezuelans; what they needed was to have better prices 
for their crops and the opportunities to buy imported goods more 
cheaply.
At the same time, the Venezuelan Government was suffering strong 
pressures from the Great Powers, The only way in which Venezuela could 
face successfully such pressures was by obtaining support from some
of these Powers against others? and this support had to he paid 
for by granting certain privileges to the businessmen of these 
supporting Powers,
Finally, Venezuela was, in economic terms, almost entirely 
geared for providing the foreign market with certain crops, especially 
coffee. Therefore, the central government had no possibility of 
helping the Venezuelan tradesmen in the consumer market. Rather than 
Venezuela, it was the importing countries - the same Great Powers - 
which were able to support their citizens in these markets against the 
Venezuelan businessmen.
Thus, lack of an internal market played an important role in 
crippling the early development of the Venezuelan economy and 
when the foreign market enabled Venezuela to develop its economy, 
the newly emerging Venezuelan capitalist had to face the capitalists 
of the developed countries who were looking for places where they 
could invest their capital in a profitable way. As is to be explained 
later in this chapter, the Venezuelan businessmen were finally 
defeated when Castro, in order to achieve badly needed national 
organisation increased custom duties and they became no longer able 
to compete with foreign capital. When the Venezuelan oil industry 
appeared, the national capitalists had been already defeated by 
foreign capital and the Venezuelan ruling classes were just picking up 
"the crumbs left by the foreign enterprises.
Mining in Venezuela during the nineteenth century - After 
Independence and up to 1917? 99% of the Venezuelan exports came 
from agriculture. In 1911 for instance, coffee exports only totalled 
£2.25 millions, 60% of the whole Venezuelan exports. Some mining 
activities existed in the country even before Independence, especially
gold, copper and lead. At the end of the nineteenth century some 
important potentialities were known, expecially hydrocarbons and 
hematite (iron ore). As is to be explained latter the heavier 
hydrocarbons, best known as asphalt were already being exploited in 
the 1880's and by 1912 had become the leading commodity among mineral
y
exports.
On the 27th April 1784 the Qrdenanzas para la Mineria de Nueva 
Espana had been introduced in Venezuela and were the laws governing 
mining activities in Venezuela until the 15th May 1854* While 
Venezuela was still a part of the Republic of Colombia, Simon Bolivar 
issued his 'Decree of Quitd' on the 24th October 1824 to govern mining 
activities within the country, but the decree was entirely based on 
the Qrdenanzas.
Venezuelan mining law has been changed on many occasions without 
the principle of state ownership over mining resources being put to 
test. There used to be discussion as to whether the ownership of 
the mines belong to the nation or to the individual states. The 
solution was found whereby mines were held to belong to the individual 
states, but administered by the central government.
In fact some mineral changes on the principle of state ownership 
of mining resources had been introduced in Venezuela, as a consequence 
of the cultural influence of Revolutionary France upon the new 
Latin American nations. The first Venezuelan Mining Code (1854) 
was influenced by the French mining code of 1810; the French tried 
to make a synthesis between the state and the landowner's ovmership. 
Although it had some effect, the principle which gives the property 
right to the state prevailed in the Venezuelan Mining Code. The 
constitution of I864 gave to each state the property-right over
wealth underlying their territories; this article was copied by 
the constitution of 1874» Finally in 1881 a new constitution was 
issued; according to this new constitution underlying wealth 
belonged to each state, but was to be administrated by the federal 
government. This principle has been kept in every new constitution 
issued ever after.
Between 1854 and 1910 nine different Mining Codes were enacted, 
namely, 1854, 1885, 1887, 1891, 1896, I9O4 , 1905, 1909 and I9IO. It 
ought to be remembered that between I864 and 1881 there was no 
federal mining law because these problems had been put under local 
control. Apart from these codes, the decree of 26th May 1877 must 
be mentioned. It created Compania Unio^n Federal* to be studied 
later. In spite of its failure, this decree was the most important 
attempt to develop the Venezuelan mining potentialities by the
10/
state itself.
The reason the Mining Code had to be changed so frequently was 
that they did not legislate for an activity which was already in 
progress. These laws tried to encourage an activity which was 
actually non existent.
The Venezuelan government tried in fact to develop mining.
This effort was not due to any problem of unemployment; in 1912 
about 80% of the workers in the few mining enterprises operating 
in Venezuela had to be drawn from abroad (they came especially from 
the West Indies). Later on, this lack of manpower was also one 
of the problems the oil industry had to face in its early stages. 
Nor was there any balance of payment problem to cope with; up 
to 1912 exports surpassed imports by between 20% and 40% per
2/
annum.
What Venezuela tried to obtain by developing mining further
was revenues. The landowning elite who ruled the country wanted to
obtain enough money to finance the budget without affecting their
own pockets, Venezuela, a country with a balance of payments
highly in the black had a government which was in a condition of
near bankruptcy. For instance, according to the biennial report
published by the Ministry of Finances on 23rd May I907 expenditure
11/
exceeded revenues by 10@2% in I9O5 and by 6,1% in I9O6 . This 
permanent budget deficit was financed, if at all, by revenues 
coming from custom-taxation of over 70% (in 1912 custom-taxation in 
Venezuela represented 76% of all Venezuelan revenues), and this 
taxation especially affected agriculture as the tax overwhelmingly 
came from exports*
Thus, the Venezuelan governments tried to encourage mining not 
thinking of the future but to obtain revenue in the present. 
Consequently, no policy which meant any kind of expenditure was 
seriously followed.
This is illustrated by the case of the "Compania de Explotacion 
Minera Union Federal" incorporated by the above mentioned decree of 
1877 to explore and exploit the mineral resources in the country.
The "Union Federal" was a State owned corporation whose partners 
were the central government and the local governments of each 
Venezuelan State, The existence of the company was merely a legal 
fiction; political disturbances following the death of President 
Liraares Alcantara led to the project being abandoned.
Apart from some attempts to develop state ownership in mining 
enterprises, the Venezuelan government also granted a number of 
mining rivhts to private concession-holders. In many cases, these
12/
enterprises were very successful, which proves that the concessions 
were in no way inconvenient to the concession holders. Perhaps, 
there were some cases, like the first Venezuelan oil concession, 
granted in I865 by Nueva Andalucia State, where the concession 
holder had so many duties to fulfil that the concession became 
unworkable; but this was an exceptional case* The fact is that 
the lack of infrastructure in the country discouraged private 
entrepreneurs from undertaking such enterprises within the country.
So the Venezuelan attempt to obtain revenue from mining failed*
Between I9O8 and I9IO Venezuelan revenues obtained from mines 
averaged 0,3% of the whole Venezuelan annual revenue. Between I9II 
and 1912 mining revenues averaged 0*6% of the whole* ^
Castro's government - Although the Venezuelan oil industry 
did not begin until ten years after he had been overthrown Castro's 
government (1899-1908) is important for us because through his 
government and its subsequent overthrow, the defeat of the local 
bourgoisie became apparent, and the patterns of relations between the 
Venezuelan government and the foreign enterprises were established® 
Foreign capital, especially British, had been present in Latin 
America since the early days of independence. Initially it came in 
the form of loans to the new independent states; British trading houses 
also settled branches in many of these states® After 1840 British 
entrepreneurs initiated other activities there like railways, public
y
services and other enterprises® At that time, the spearhead of these 
few foreign capitalists were individual promoters who went to each 
country and sought concessions from the governments; in many cases 
these promoters undertook duties which were never fulfilled. Normally, 
after obtaining the concession the promoter sold his concession to a
company especially incorporated by himself in which he was an 
important shareholder. Although the largest number of these promoters
m /
were North American, the concessions were normally sold in London*
After 1880 a number of concessions were granted in Venezuela to 
British, French, German and US entrepreneurs. However some of them 
ran into difficulties with Crespo's government when the Venezuelan 
leader tried to demand the complete fulfilment of their duties.
Although some measures against these concessions were decided, the 
lack of political order prevented their implementation.
By the time Castro took over, the need to a central and well 
respected government was recognised by every one, but each caudillo 
wanted to be at its head. Consequently, the creation of a powerful 
national army appeared to be the main priority; an army which 
would prevent any further caudillo rebellion having a real chance 
of success. But such an army cost money and Venezuela, in spite 
of a positive balance of commerce of between 30% and 50%, had a 
budget which was deeply in the red*
The first problem Castro had to face was how to balance the 
budget. The provision^solution found for the problem was to force 
the banks working inside Venezuela to provide a loan to the government; 
the bankers who tried to resist his orders, both Venezuelans and
15/
foreigners, were sent to prison. But looking towards a more 
permanent solution Castro sought to increase revenues, for this 
purpose he increased custom duties, he sold concessions to foreign 
enterprises and tried to obtain money from those foreign companies 
operating in Venezuela who were at logger-heads with the government* 
Although the forced loan was eventually paid in full and within 
a shorter period than ever before, the conditions in which it was
obtained united bankers, foreign capitalists and traditional 
caudillos against the government. They rallied around the banker 
and "General" Francisco Antonio Matos who launched the Revolucion 
Libertadora* Although this civil war did not die out until 1903? when 
Ciudad Bolivar was retaken by Castro's vicepresident Juan Vicente 
Gomez, it had already been decided in a number of battles near 
Valencia, the last of which lasted for a fortnight (La Victoria 11th
16/
October - 2nd November I902), This warfare brought Venezuela 
close to bankruptcy. Its ports were blockaded by British, German
11/
and Italian war vessels, sent to demand the payment of an 
external debt which Venezuela was unable to pay, and to obtain 
compensation for the damage suffered by foreign entrepreneurs during
m /
the Revolucion Libertadora,
Therefore, in 1903 Castro's situation was desperate. The 
blockading Powers had talc en over part of the custom revenues of 
La Guaira and Puerto Cabello in accordance with a verdict settled by 
the International Court of The Hague to solve the previous crisis*
The policy previously described, by which Castro had sought to 
balance the budget, failed. His attempts to get money from the 
companies which had had problems with previous Venezuelan governments 
created difficulties between Venezuela and some International Powers* 
These problems were particularly serious in the case of France 
and the USA, as the main companies which had legal difficulties were 
either American (like the asphalt enterprise New York and Bermudy Co.) 
or French (like the company which held the monopoly on telegraphic 
links between Venezuela and the rest of the world). To counteract the 
enmity of these two Powers, Castro sought the friendship of 
Britain and Germany. But Britain did not give the help Castro
expected, as on the one hand, France was Britain's world wide 
20/
ally and Germany its leading rival, and at the same time the ÏÏS 
company New York and Bermuda had an important part of its stock 
in the possession of British citizens»
Due to these unresolved problems with foreign companies, 
Venezuela did not succeed in selling concession to foreign 
entrepreneurs. These concessions were sold through Venezuelan 
middlemen and, as is to be explained later, became the medium 
through which members the Venezuelan ruling class received the 
crumbs of the national wealth*
The increase in custom duties was the only one of Castro's 
measures which succeeded in increasing government revenues. But 
it damaged the Venezuelan trading houses which were no longer 
able to compete with the foreign companies also involved in trade 
with Venezuela, These foreign companies, the principal of 
which were German, were better protected against custom duties as 
they could minimise ill-effects by importing larger quantities of 
goods.
Thus Castro achieved the task of creating a responsible 
Venezuelan government at the expense of virtually destroying the 
new Venezuelan capitalists. This made it easier to the Powers and 
foreign companies to de-stabilise his government. As is to be 
explained later, stable government was finally achieved by Gomez 
and oil provided the revenues which made the task easier,
Castro was finally overthrown when, after his failure to obtain 
British support during the difficulties with France he tried to force 
Britain's hand by taking retaliatory measures against British 
interests. He not only failed to change British policies in his
22/
favour, but converted Britain into one of his leading enemies#
Just a couple of months later, Castro was overthrown by his own 
friends headed by his vice-president Juan Vicente Gomez®
British economic presence in Latin America between 1910 and 1914 ” 
Castro’s overthrow coincided with a period in which British 
capitalists tried to reinforce their presence in Latin America®
Between 1909 and 1912 British investments in the area increased 
by nearly 51% (see Table l)*
TABLE I
British Investments in Latin America
1909 1912 % increase
between 
1909 and
Million £ % Million £ % 1912
Railways 287.6 40.2 451-5 46.0 48.9
Government Securities 510,9 45«4 500.1 52.0 -5«5
Banking and Shipping 20,8 2.9 29,9 5*2 45*8
others 26.5 1 5 .5 1 75 ,9 18.8 82.5
TOTAL 7 1 5 ,8 100 9 57 ,2 100 5 0 .9
Original source; The South American Journal
British capital, especially devoted to transport and loans, 
had controlled the region for a long time, but at the beginning of 
this century, British entrepreneurs met the challenge of German and 
US investors who tried to break into the area. The next chapter 
will show how different publications, either independent or 
parliamentary etc, reveal this new attitude of the City of London 
towards South America,
Although Venezuela had just 1% of all British investments in
South America, it will be shown in the next chapter that British economic 
researches of the period paid a great deal of attention to Venezuela.
But they hardly mentioned oil or even asphalt. The main interest 
of these researches was directed to the development of Venezuelan 
transports (especially railways and the Orinoco waterway), cattle 
breeding and public services. As previously said, Venezuela had 
been re-discovered by the world capitalist centres, even before its 
oil had aroused this interest.
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CHAPTER IV
The Beginning of Juan Vicente Gomez’s Regime
The coup d ’etat - On the 19th December I9O8, Cipriano Castro 
was overthrown by a conspiracy in which some of his more close friends 
were involved and whose leader was his own Vice President and old 
acquaintance, Juan Vicente Gomez,
The conspiracy got support from all the main powers except 
Germany, and some of these powers, namely the USA and Holland made 
ostentatious displays of force along the Venezuelan coast, either 
before, during or after the bloodless coup, but the principal role 
was played by the Venezuelan conspirators.
When Castro lost the already cold British support he had, the
1/
Venezuelan ruler became an "everybody's business" and all the Powers 
tried to get rid of him. However, even the British recognised
2J
Castro’s popularity® Moreover, nobody either abroad or inside 
Venezuela wanted the country going back to anarchy and civil war; 
this was another reason why the coup had to be bloodless as a 
"legal justification" was badly needed.
In 1973? when the Chilean president Salvador Allende was 
overthrown, the word "de-.stabilisation" was created. Nevertheless, 
the first and more successful case of "de-stabilisation" was the one 
which took Cipriano Castro out of power. The European Powers and 
the USA expressed publicly their views and Venezuela was isolated in 
different ways. From August I9O8 , the Dutch fleet had been making 
a hostile display along the Venezuelan coast. But the success of 
Castro’s last tour throughout the country showed that if they were 
to have a bloodless coup it would be necessary to have Castro abroad
before the coup. His travel to Europe for medical reasons crea.ted the 
opportunity®
The navy was considered as a Castro stronghold. Therefore, 
General Roman Delgado Chalbaud, the man in charge of this service
i /
needed to play an important role. To prevent any eventual 
Castroist resistance by their men of war, the Dutch fleet captured
4/
two Venezuelan gunboats in the week before the coup®
Finally, to discourage any further Castroist resistance, the 
conspirators asked the Powers to send war vessels to La Guaira to give 
"moral support" to the new government® But, only one Power, the USA
5/
sent a fleet to Venezuelan shores®
However the main role was played by the Venezuelans themselves.
The conspirators organised some popular demonstrations and patriotic
meetings, intended to be against the Dutch, but in fact against
Cipriano Castro. These actions prepared the people’s mood, and
then, by a bold manouevre, performed by Gomez himself on 19th
December at dawn, the main barracks of Caracas were taken, its
commanders replaced by Gomez’s men, and those ministers who still
supported Castro put in prison. The coup had been "easier than 
§/
drinking water"®
There were some attempts at Castroist resistance by the
1/
Venezuelan gunboat "Miranda" and by some military units commanded
by some of Castro’s relatives. But they were attempts only; the
8/
coup d ’etat was completely bloodless®
As Castro had been so easily overthrown, the presence of US 
war ships in La Guaira became an unnecessary vexation to the 
national pride. But Gommez found a scape goat in Jose de Jesus Paul, 
one of his main fellow conspirators v/ho had invited the USA, as well
as other Powers, to send war vessels to support the coup, in his
capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Venezuelan Congress
(still the one elected under Castro's guidance) empeached him
when he was in Europe as a plenipotentiary trying to come to terms
•2/with France and Holland* In this way, Gomez got rid of a possible
competitor and uncomfortable partner.
Finally, the legal justification was found. After unsuccessful
attempts to prosecute him for attempting to kill Gomez (they did not
get enough proof) Castro was officially accused of the assasination 
, . 10/
of General Paredes » In fact, the failed invader of I9OY had been 
executed without a trial. Without being particularly difficult, 
the legal justification was the less easy task connected with the
11/
coup d'etat®
Meaning of G(^mez's dictatorship - Despite, or perhaps because of, 
the ease with which Castro was overthrown, Juan Vicente Gomez, the 
new ruler, remained in power for 27 years (1908-1935) and the only 
reason for the curtailment of his government was his o\m natural 
death. It ought to be pointed out that Gomez's ' success is a 
consequence of Castro's failure.
It seems that Castro had strong support inside Venezuela almost 
until the very moment of his overthrow. This strong support came from 
the large majority of Venezuelan landowners, businessmen and 
intellectuals; they represented less than 5% of the Venezuelan 
population, but the rest had no real political power.
These influential groups needed a strong leader able to give 
them peace, so that they could run their business free from interferance 
from warfare. There was a sort of contradiction between urban 
businessmen and landowners with regard to foreign capital; while the
latter sometimes preferred to deal with foreign trading houses, 
as they were able to pay more for their crops and to sell imported 
goods cheaper, Venezuelan capitalists tried to keep their own 
share in the national market.
As Castro had his main support in the commercial circles, he could 
be blamed for their failure, and consequently lose their support, 
and this happened to some extent. Sir Vincent Corbet reports that 
the Venezuelan Minister for Foreign Affairs Jose de Jesus Paul reported
that;
"He (Paul) does not conceal his dismay at his 
(Castro's) commercial policy, which he confessed 
was ruining the country and indirectly, I fear, 
seriously affects the Minister's own pocket," 12/
B u t  it was only in part, otherwise Castro would have fallen 
long before. The main problem was that the bourgoisie had recognised 
their defeat by international capitalism and subsequently had 
accepted both the conditions established by these international 
entrepreneurs and the role reserved for themselves. Thus Castro's 
overthrow was a surrender of Venezuela to international capitalism, 
Gomez's policy eventually proved that this surrender had not 
been unconditional,
Gcmez's government was therefore, a consequence of Castro's 
failure. The new ruler knew very well what he could do and what 
he was not able to do, but in broad terms he followed similar 
policies to Castro,
During the first years of his long period, Gomez moved in 
different directions as far as both external and internal policy 
is concerned, but finally, continued the policies Castro had
followed. During the intial months of his government he wavered 
between Great Britain, France and the USA, but at the end of 
1909 he was, like Castro entertaining close relations with the 
German Emperor, Just after having overthrown Castro, Gomez 
sought the friendship of the old caudillos in order to put aside 
some partners in the conspiracy against Castro; some of them like 
Dr Leopoldo Baptista could overshadow him. But a few years 
afterwards, these caudillos who did not accept all his conditions 
were also put aside and had to go back to exile, while Gomez 
went back to the same social groups who had previously supported 
Castro, having rid himself of any threat to his leadership.
Once in government, the first task to be undertaken by Gomez 
was to come to terms with the Great Powers, especially with the USA, 
whose naval support, although almost unnecessary, had been 
requested and subsequently had to be repaid. The Commander of the 
US fleet was the Rear Admiral William J, Buchanan, After conversations 
with the Venezuelan representative, Dr Gonzalez Guinan, which 
lasted for nearly two months, the Buchanan-Gomez Protocols were 
signed (13th February 1909)» This agreement fully satisfied the 
five US claims, concerning a US citizen damaged by warfare in 
1902 and four companies which had been either partially or totally
M /
stripped of their concessions in I904; they were generously compensated. 
The New York & Bermudez Co, was not included among the US claims, 
but Admiral Buchanan helped to arrange an agreement between the 
Venezuelan government and this company according to which the concern 
recovered its premises by paying just 1.25% of what the Federal Court
15/
of Cassation had previously decided on as a fine and compensation 
due to the support given by New York & Bermuda to the Matos Array
(it is to be studied in the next chapter).
However, Gomez was less generous towards other Powers.
British concessions, stripped out in I9O8 were recovered when the 
Federal Court of Cassation declared their annulment non-constitutional, 
but other British claims remained unsettled or received a settlement 
far below their expectation; the 30% surtax was not abolished.
Paul's impeachment was also useful in diplomatic terms. When he was 
dismissed by the Congress, the talks he had initiated in France and 
Holland went back to square one. It was helpful to Venezuela 
because the longer the period since the crisis of December I9O8, the 
stronger Venezuela felt in diplomatic terms. Butch claims remained 
unsettled for even longer. As far as France is concerned, an 
agreement between Venezuela and the French Cable Co. was reached in 
1909» According to it the company was now officially allowed to 
keep the international service in the way it had been established
M /
but rates were lowered by half.
Gomez understood that he was able to bargain with the international 
companies and their supporting Powers, but that there existed a 
limit to his bargaining power. Moreover, if he was partially 
able to stop the presure put by the Powers upon him, in no case was 
he able to dictate conditions from Caracas over any Great Powers.
This had been the mistake committed by Castro.
But within these limits Gomez moved fairly well. According to 
Rangel, Rufino Blanco Fombona went abroad soon after December I9O8 ,
11/
knowing that his country had become a Protectorate. It could be 
argued that that seems not to be the case. Gomez's Venezuela was 
neither less nor more dependent than any Latin American country at 
that time, and although it was as dependant as others it was clearly
less obedient than many*
As far as oil is concerned, this research has to deal with three
main rebellions against the oil companies headed by Gomez, In all
of these cases the Venezuelan government was defeated. In all
of these occasions Venezuela was attacked economically; the
international consortia boycotted Venezuelan oilfields. But on
the last two occasions, transnational combines and their supporting
Powers also put political pressure upon Venezuela by helping
Venezuelan conspirators like Ortega Martinez, Penaloza, Hernandez,
Linares Alcantara, Delgado Chalband, Arisbeigueta etc, in
Poni 
18/
hatching plots against Gcmez. Rufino Blanco ntbona himself v/as
involved in these conspiracies at least once,
Gomez’s Venezuela before the beginning of the exploitation of 
Venezuelan oil on a world wide scale - At the beginning of this 
century Venezuela was a country of contrasts. In fact; it could 
be considered a wealthy country. Table No, 2 shows us that the 
Venezuelan Balance of Commerce between 1902 and 1912 yielded 
surplusses between 29.1% (19IO-II) and 82,1% (1905-O6), However the 
total amount of its exports and imports was £2 per inhabitant - 
Trinidad added exports and imports for £18 per inhabitant - and the 
National revenues did not cover all the budget needs. As 
previously pointed out, Venezuela faced a permanent budgetary deficit; 
for instance, expenditures exceeded revenues by 10,2% in I9O5 and by
23/
6.1% in 1906,
In Venezuela, the wealthiest were so wealthy that they were 
able to send their children to study in the USA and Europe whereas 
the rest of the population, who accounted for over 95% were barely 
able to buy the roughest material for their clothes. No one starved
because food was actually free and excess clothing (consequently
expensive) was not necessary as the climate was mild, but
the large majority of the population had no access to the comforts
20/
of civilisation because of their severe lack of money.
As said before, coffee was about 2/3 of Venezuelan exports*
In 1912 Coffee was 60.1% of it and added to cocoa exports totalled 
69*3% of Venezuelan exports® German capitalists controlled 
foreign trade; it was a vital activity to Venezuela, as in 1912
.21/
76% of Venezuelan revenues came from the custom duties.
TABLE 2
Venezuelan Balance of Commerce
Year
1902-03
Imports 
(in £1,000)
1 ,0 40 .9
Exports 
(in £1,000) 
1,586.1
Surplus 
(in £1,000) 
545.2
(in%)
5 2 .4
1903-04 2 ,2 79 .3 3,2 27 .8 948*5 4 1 .6
1904-05 1,918.1 2,9 00 .6 982.5 49.4
1905-06 1,778.6 3,239 .3 1 ,460*7 82.1
1906-07 2 ,043 .3 3,116.1 1 ,0 7 2 .8 52 .5
I907-O8 2,1 41 .1 3,005 .6 864 .5 4 0 .4
I9O8-O9 1,838.6 3,260 .6 1 ,4 2 2 .0 77.3
1909-1910 2 ,0 9 9 .1 3,122.6 1 ,023 .5 48.8
1910-11 2,909 .6 3,756 .6 847.0 2 9 .1
1911-12 3,529 .1 5,280*2 1 ,751.1 7 6 .8
Source; Milne *s report (Cd,
22/
London 1913)
Venezuelan means of transport are good examples of the 
wildness of the country* In 1909 the British Minister reported 
that Venezuelan road were in an appaling condition, even those
surrounding the main cities, Caracas, Valencia, La Guaira, etc.
In 1912 the whole of the rail tracks throughout Venezuela totalled
24/
533«75 miles* In I9I8 when the Venezuelan railway system had 
been extended by 40% (then its extent was about 740 miles) it 
still had less than half the extent of the Uruguayan tracks,
2SJ
Venezuela being six times as large as Uruguay*
In 1912 Venezuelan railways were owned by eleven independent 
companies. Seven of these linlced ports either on the Caribbean 
coast or on the Maracaibo banks with the interior* Although one of 
these companies had been incorporated by French capitalists and 
another had 10% of its stock oivned by US investors, these seven 
companies were wholly controlled either by the Venezuelan State or 
by Venezuelan private entrepreneurs. The other four companies 
were linked geographically. The sort of railway system these 
companies formed was centered in Caracas and extended its tracks 
between Puerto Cabello (NV) Valencia (S¥) La Guaira (NE) and 
Santa Teresa del Truy (SE), These railways belonged to three 
British companies and one German concern. Differences in the 
track gauge of these four companies hampered the good work of this 
railway network.
42% of this railway system belonged to Venezuelan companies 
(224 .75 miles) 37% was owned by British concerns (l97®5 miles) and 
the German corporation had 21% of this extended track (111,5 miles). 
But the most important railways were the foreign ovmed ones, and the 
only one with a "reasonable margin of profit" was the British owned 
"Caracas and La Guaira Railway Co,"*
As previously pointed out, Venezuelan capitalists had been 
expelled from their oivn national market. Some people involved in 
market research at that time, like Milne and îünock, present the event 
as the consequence of purely subjective reasons: Venezuelan
wealthy people were simply not willing to risk their savings in 
economic enterprises. This view has been recently supported 
by Doctor B*S, McBeth, But Minister Corbett suggests in some of 
his despatches an alternative explanation which is being sustained and
'èèJ
developed in this research*
The main national activity, namely agriculture, was still in 
national hands, although there were some farming enterprises owned 
by foreign entrepreneurs, especially British, These were mainly placed 
in the Llanos and were devoted to cattle breeding.
But Venezuelan crops were principally devoted to the foreign 
market and foreign trade was controlled by foreign enterprise.
While German companies dealt with Venezuelan exports, harbour 
installations such as those of La Guaira, were controlled by British
enterprises. As has been pointed out above, only one key of the
foreign trade, namely railways, remained largely in Venezuelan 
hands, but, even though 42% of the railway network was controlled 
by Venezuelan capitalists, all the important railways, and among 
them the only profitable one, were o^ vned by foreigners®
The goods Venezuela imported mainly came from the UK and the
USA and while Venezuelan goods went to different parts; the USA and 
France absorbed two thirds of these exports (See Table No, 3)®
It was previously pointed out that British capital owned 
urban transport and other public services except in the international 
telegraph. Also a small number of industries were British,
Mining enterprises were British, North American, Canadian, French, 
and Venezuelan, In general, over a half of the capital invested 
in Venezuela belonged to British concerns. Thus British capitalists 
controlled the Venezuelan economy, although the country was a
comprehensive supplier of raw material to the USA and France,
TABLE 3
Venezuelan International Trade between 1902 and 1912
Year
IMPORTS ] 
Value UK & poss USA Germany Value USA 
(£1,000) % % % (£1,000) %
EXPORTS 
Brance Hdllsnd 
% %
Germany UK 
% %
1902-03 1,010.9 21.7 33.6 21.1 1,586.1 35.7 31.2 19.8 5.4 1.2
1903-04 2,279.5 32.3 23.8 20.0 3,227.8 25.5 35.1 14.0 5.0 7.3
1904-05 1,918.1 24.3 29.5 21.4 2,900.6 34.1 19.3 15.1 4.9 11.2
1905-06 1,778.6 29.8 30.2 19.7 3,239.3 31.1 25.4 14.6 5.3 8.0
1906-07 2,043.3 38.0 25.2 19.8 3,116.1 36.8 25.1 11.9 6.2 8.6
I907-O8 2,141.1 35.2 27.7 18.0 3,005.6 35.5 35.2 4.9 5.8 9.2
I9O8-O9 1,838.6 32.0 25.1 25.8 3,260.6 44.8 29.8 4.1 5.4 9.2
1909-10 2,099.1 28.7 27.9 20.1 3,122.6 35.8 33.2 5.0 9.4 11.2
1910-11 2,909.6 32.2 25.9 18.8 3,756.6 32.6 27.6 4.3 16.1 11.1
1911-12 3,529.1 30.3 27.3 18.3 5,280.2 32.5 29.5 3.6 16.9 8.0
Source; Milne's report (Cd. 6969 London
22/
1912)
At the beginning of this century, British entrepreneurs, 
challenged by US and German competitors tried to improve their 
activities in Latin America in order to avoid being expelled 
from this region whose close links with British capital dated from 
the time these countries had become independent. Measures to 
encourage such activities came from both the government and the 
private sector. Table No. 4 shows us that the campaign was fairly 
successful. British investments in the area increased by 31% in 
three years.
TABLE 4
British Investments in Latin America
1909 1912
Country Million £ % Million £ % % increase 
1909 and li
Argentina 2 5 2 .7 35 329 .9 35 31
Mexico 1 3 9 .2 20 1 5 6 .9 17 13
Brasil 1 55 .6 19 211.1 22 56
Uruguay 44.4 6 45.8 5 3
Chile 44.0 6 6 1 ,1 7 48
Peru 2 5 .2 3 2 5 .8 3 11
Venezuela 7.3 1 8.1 1 11
Others 6 9 .8 10 98.4 10 41
TOTAL 7 16 .2 100 957.1 100 31
22/
Source; the South American Journal.
Many books and other publications reported the conditions in 
which the trade and investments in the area could be developed#
Through these documents it can be argued that the main areas in 
which the City was interested were Brazil, Chile and the Caribbean 
countries, Venezuela was one of the Caribbean countries in which 
Great Britain was especially interested in developing its 
agricultural resources as well as in taking control of its 
transport, both by extending railways and by improving waterways.
In October I9II the Advisory Committee on Commercial Intelligence 
appointed G#T# Milne to enquire into conditions and prospects of 
British trade in Central America, Colombia and Venezuela, The report 
of this enquiry was published in 1913® Among the private publications
concerning the development of British trade, as well as the "South 
American Journal", a weekly paper which had been published for a 
long time, the South American Supplement of "The Times" which first 
appeared in 1913 needs to be mentioned# Among the books appearing 
at this time we can mention "The Republics of Central and South
America" by Charles Reginald Enock (London 1913) and "Mexico" and "The
Andes and the Amazonas", by the same author* Another important 
example is the book "Venezuela" by Leonard V® Dalton#
Milne and other writers show British interest in Venezuelan 
potentialities, but not the Venezuelan oil. Chapter 5 will try to
prove that this was not through lack of interest but as the
result of a kind of boycott because of the Venezuelan oil policy#
Concession mongers and concession hunters - The role played 
by what Minister Corbett called the "Venezuelan monied class" in 
the economic development of their o\m country was a very small one; 
with regard to the international companies their role can be compared 
to the relationship between the 'remora* fish and the shark. The 
concessions the Venezuelan government gave to the international 
companies# The framework in which this scheme operated was 
established by Cipriano Castro but it was widely developed by Juan 
Vicente Gomez#
Romulo Betancourt, in his book Politica y Petroleo shows that 
the method of granting oil concessions was the worst crime committed 
by Gômez against the National Interest and to the profit of a 
small number of privileged people. In fact, Betancourt's view can 
be accepted. Moreover, these concessions affected the whole of the 
Venezuelan economy. Mining grants were not for oil only; iron,
copper, coal and other deposits were also granted in this way.
Concessions were granted in the public service field, including
transport systems, harbour installations, urban water supply,
waterways, etc. Finally some industrial concessions were granted; the
grant holder obtained the internal monopoly of the goods he
produced for a number of years. According to B.S. McBeth, during
Gomez's lifetime, 4?875 concessions of all types were granted to
28/
Venezuelan citizens of which only 2434 (49%) referred to oil,
Reports of British Minister Corbett and his successor Frederic Hartford 
suggest that before 1915 hardly any concessions referred to oil.
After 1910 the people who were involved in this activity, who 
can be called "concession mongers" had the most profitable available 
jobs in Venezuela. The name "concession monger" wa,s used by 
Frederic Hartford in his annual report for I9II where he wrote:
"'General* Delgado Chalbaud, in company with 
'General' Corao, another notorious concession-monger 
and company promoter, who had been successfully 
the confidential agent of Castro and Gdmez, went to 
Europe in I9II to sell these concessions..®" 29/
Thus, it might be suggested that Betancourt is relatively 
shortsighted; he seems to be more interested in proving the lack of 
honour of Gcmez's government than in studying the development 
of Venezuelan society® And this statement could rebound on Betancourt 
because one of the most 'conspicuous concession monger' had been his 
leader during the 'Falke' revolutionary expedition. General Roman 
Delgado Chalbaud. This General never got oil concessions, but that 
was because oil concessions were not important until I914 and 
Delgado Chalbaud lost Gomez's favour in 1915 when a conspiracy against 
his master in which he was involved was discovered.
Logically everyone needed strong official support both to
become a 'concession monger' and to remain in this profitable
business® Therefore the people involved in this activity belonged
to the groups most closely linked with official circles. General
JO/ Jl/
Gomez was a concession monger himself, as well as his children
J2/ 21/
and other relatives. Ministers, other officials and even humble
clerks were also granted this kind of gift® Concessions became
normal currency used by the government to pay political favours
and to buy somebody who was needed as an ally®
The illiterate peasants were completely controlled by the
landowners and the urban working class was almost non existent, a
high percentage of its small number being composed of foreigners®
Therefore the previously described ruling group, whose power was
actually unchallenged, became divided over the issue of concessions
and transferences.
Dr B,S® McBeth brings documents to show that just 51% of the oil
concessions granted during Gomez's lifetime, were given to
Gomezist concession-mongers while 45% were granted to non
21/
Gomezists and 6% to foreigners* It gives strong support to 
McBeth's view with regards to the Tribunales de Responsabilidad Civil 
y Administrativa. set up by the A,D. government in 1945* He stresses
15/
that these tribunals hardly proved any irregularity. The only 
criticism of McBeth's view is that he did not deal with the fact 
that, for good or bad the question of concessions became Venezuela's 
main political issue until 1928, It was observed by the caudillo 
General Jose Manuel "Mocho" Hernandez* As he was a "man of the 
past" he realised what was going on in Venezuela with shame® In 
September 1919 he wrote in a letter to his fellow conspirator
Dr Leopoldo Baptistaî
"In our eventful internal struggles, it could 
be argued about historical parties, fighting to 
reach an ideal until General Cipriano Castro's 
time, but since then it can be said that any 
party notion has died in Venezuela being replaced 
by the most shameful utilitarianism#" 36/
Dr Baptista on the other hand was a "man of the present time" 
and consequently he was too involved to have any good answer to 
General Hernandez's criticism® Therefore he avoided any answer by 
writing in his reply;
"I also agree with you when you state that since 
Castro any party notion died in Venezuela being 
replaced by barren personalism*" 36/
Some documents suggest that the opposition tried to obtain 
economic support from foreign companies by offering wide concessions 
in payment, once the revolution was victorious. For instance, on 
the 11th June 1926, the British Controlled Oilfields Limited reported 
to the Foreign Office that they had been visited by Captain Harold 
Lindblad, a retired member of the Royal Swedish Navy who asked 
the company to supply £1 0 ,0 00 to finance a revolutionary movement 
in Venezuela led by General Linares Alcantara. This economic support 
would be generously repaid with oil concessions in the case of
22/
victory. The Foreign Office has a lot of documents like this one.
Usually the Great Corporations did not deal directly with the 
'concession monger'. The middleman was another person, usually 
North American or British who bought the concession from the 'concession 
monger' and sold it later to the company® Like the previously 
mentioned William Braden, they normally spoke Spanish with acceptable
fluency, had some expertise in the legal system in the countries 
where they operated and had obtained the connections they needed 
from influential people in the same area. They also had enough 
capital to operate as independent entrepreneurs until they found 
the company which was interested in their concessions.
These kinds of people were particularly important in Mexico, 
where they received the name "concession hunters". They were 
less important in Venezuela, because there, many "concession mongers" 
usually dealt directly with the international companies. However, 
in the early 1 92 0's a number of concession hunters appeared in 
this country, and were particularly important because of their 
connections with high political circles.
The "concession hunter" recalls the old promoters like those 
who were mentioned in Chapter 3® The main differences between them 
relate to the companies they worked for. The promoter usually 
sold the concession he had obtained to a company formed by him to 
deal with it and became one of its managing directors if not 
the chairman; in the other cases, the concession was sold to a 
transnational combine. In many oases the concession hunter did not 
receive any stock from the new concern as the transaction had been 
agreed beforehand.
In some particular cases, some "concession hunters" tried to 
become old time promoters. They did not obtain any success and 
instead of any support from their national government, they had to 
face hostility from these authorities. At least this is the case 
of Britain towards Venezuelan oil. Between I9IO and 1930» two 
British promoters tried to develop oil schemes in Venezuela, John 
Allen Tregelles and William Buckley and they faced such problems.
The Tregelles case will be returned to in Chapter 6 of this 
research as it was the first oil concession granted by Juan 
Vicente Gomez, This concession-holder had been an employee in 
the "Mexican Eagle" and obtained his concession on behalf of the 
Venezuelan Development Company of London, The results of this 
enterprise will be examined later, but here the attitude of the 
British government ought to be noticed, Tregelles did not get any 
support. By suggesting such an attitude. Minister Corbett wrote;
unless, as is possible, the demand for oil 
should greatly increase, I do not believe there is 
any intention of sinking wells on a large scale*
The oil company's contract is in the nature of a 
monopoly and will, no doubt, bring good profits to 
the President and a few others, but not to the 
shareholders. As soon as there are signs that it 
is a remunerative concern - if that day should ever 
arrive - the Venezuelan Government will step in 10/
either to cancel the concession or to levy blackmail,"
William Buckley and his brother Edmond appeared in Venezuela 
in 1925» In fact, Edmond did not come to the country, but he was his 
brother's partner. They had been in Mexico for many years, becoming 
wealthy "concession-hunters", but they were trying to become oil 
entrepreneurs. Although the Buckley brothers were British citizens, 
they worked in partnership with a number of "small" US oil men,
William Buckley acted in Venezuela in two dealings, namely the V,0,C, 
(1924-I925) and the Turiamo oil harbour project (1928),
The reason why the company was prosecuted, the progress and 
eventual conclusion of the V,0,0, law suit is to be examined in 
Chapter 9® As far as Buckley is concerned, he tried to take advantage 
from the possible nullification of the V.0,0, concession for his 
partners and himself. In the case of Turiamo he tried to develop 
the scheme of a nationally owned oil harbours. It would remove the
control the hig oil companies had over the oil harbours and would 
give to Venezuela the possibility of dealing better with the royalties 
paid by the companies (which could be paid in crude oil if the 
government asked it) and to have a better control over the oil 
exports. Both attempts failed,
William Buckley was not on good terms with the great oil 
consortia; as one of his own partners pointed out :
'«a. being, as it were, rather on the outskirts of 
the oil world, and being undoubtedly very clever 
in cutting it, and buying concessions while others 
are deciding whether to do so or not, is not likely 
to be popular with the large concerns operating in the 
country." 38/
In fact, Buckley had attempted in Mexico to get the nullification 
of certain oil concessions oimed by the Shell subsidiary Corona Co# 
After failing in such an endeavour (July I923), he attempted 
similar action against the Transcontinental (subsidiary of Jersey 
Standard)# Therefore the ill-feelings against him were to be 
expected from the transnational oil combines, Corona Co# had the 
following opinion about W# Buckley:
"I think this gentleman is best described as a coyote 
of the worst type, his chief activity being to 
endeavour to detect flaws in legal documents and 
institute claims against companies on the grounds 
of some small omissions in contracts#" 39/
The attitude of the big companies is understandable. But the 
fact is that the British government backed the great combines on 
every occasion# The attitude of the Foreign Office towards 
Buckley ranged from total indifference in the case of the harbour 
project to active hostility in the case of the V,O.C# suit# In 
this case the British government gave full support to Shell although
the existing flaws of the Aranguren contract was officially 
recognised® And despite the US nationality of some of his partners, 
Buckley himself was British, his company had been incorporated 
in Great Britain and had some British partners too; let us remember 
that the Shell Group was 60% Butch* Other sides of these problems 
will be re-examined in Chapter 9»
Thus in this new situation the old promoter became "concession 
hunter" and the national entrepreneur became "concession monger".
It suggests that the real struggle wa,s not between national and 
foreign companies, but between transnational combines and sma,ll 
capitalists; in this battle the first ones defeated the latter.
It is true that practically no local company was a transnational 
combine and consequently all the national entrepreneurs were 
defeated. The Bolivian tycoon Simon Itury Patino (1862-1947) might 
be considered as the only important exception; Patino controlled 
the Bolivian tin mines - the richest tin mines in the world - 
and at the time of his death he controlled 60% of Bolivian exports, 
having a personal income larger than the Bolivian budget. But 
Patino himself became a foreigner in his own country. He spent 
most of his lifetime abroad, being a diplomat during two decades 
(between 1920 and 1926 in Spain and between 1926 and 1941 in France), 
He died in Buenos Aires and his descendants are scattered throughout 
Europe, However, apart from almost all the national companies, 
a number of foreign firms were also obliterated by the onslaught 
of the Big Business.
There is another character who will play an important role 
in this new situation, namely the lawyer. In many cases British 
Ambassadors and Consuls blamed the Spanish language because of its
10/
lack of accuracy; any text could be understood in opposite ways» 
In fact it is not true; Spanish is a fairly accurate language.
The real problem is that in countries where the law is entirely 
written, lawyers usually exploit grammatical artifices to sustain 
the best interpretation for his side. But in Venezuela a>t that 
time existed also another problem. The tribunals were actually 
dependent on the President; therefore they had to give the verdict 
he asked for. Consequently, the settled jurisprudence was almost 
impossible to follow. However it was not so negative to 
the companies they learned the game very soon. They paid for 
good lawyers and they not only stopped any attack coming from 
this side, but they obtained also, good advantages from this game. 
The poem written by Neruda against these lai^ ryers, shows us that
41/
this problem was a general one all over the region.
When the lawyers did not succeed in malcing the company's views 
prevail, the transnational companies, either alone or supported by 
their governments, exploited political disturbances to their 
advantage. They also obtained diplomatic and even military support 
from their governments.
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CHAPTER V
Venezuelan Hydrocarbon industry prior to the Venezuelan Oil
Boom
The beginning of the Venezuelan Oil Industry - The date of 
birth of the Venezuelan oil industry is usually fixed on 
15th April 1914 when the drilling in Tumaque 1 well in Mene Grande
1/
oil fields (Maraoaito basin, 120 Km, S,E. of Maracaibo) was
successfully finished. The development of the oil industry in
Venezuela meant radical changes in Venezuela's life: an agrarian
country became a mining one and one of the less developed countries
in Latin America become after fifty years the nation which had the
2/
largest national income per capita within the area.
Nevertheless this transformation did not occur overnight, and 
the successful drilling was neither the beginning nor the end of 
this metamorphosis a Since I865 there had existed people interested 
in exploiting the Venezuelan oil resources and since 1881 these 
resources had been exploited although on a very small scale; 
moreover, since the eighteen eighties asphalt deposits had been 
exploited (in 1912 asphalt was first among mining commodities 
in the Venezuelan Balance of Commerce). The discovery of I914 did not 
mean that Venezuela was no longer an oil importer; oil imports 
were stopped only in I9I8 when San Lorenzo refinery began to work. 
Until 1921,, even as an oil exporter, Venezuelan exports meant very 
little within both the Venezuelan economy and within the world 
oil market. In 1930 Venezuelan oil exports reached a daily 
average 6 1/2 times as large as the whole annual exports of 1917®
Until 1925 coffee continued being the first commodity among
Yb,
Venezuelan exports. In 1926 although oil was the first exports of 
Venezuela the country still was an agrarian one because coffee, 
cocoa and other crops added about 55% of the Venezuelan
4/
exports. Only in 1928 Venezuela became an important oil producer
V
ranking second in the world after the USA.
Petrolia del Tachira - Only six years after the Tytusville
discovery the first oil concessions were granted in Venezuela.
On 24th August I865 the Government of Zulia State granted an oil
concession to the North American citizen Camilo Perrand, On the
2nd of February 1866 the Government of Nueva Andalucia State granted
another oil concession to Manuel Olavaria. Finally on the 19th
December 1866 the Government of Truigillo State granted an oil
6 /
seepage at Escuque to Pascual Caranova. None of these entrepreneurs
u
succeeded in his undertakings.
These failures can be explained in two ways. Firstly, as previously 
shown, at that time the world oil demand was only able to absorb the 
oil coming from the eastern part of the USA and Europe. It should
/ A
also be remembered that the same happened in Mexico although Mexico 
had an internal market much larger than the Venezuelan one as México 
had a more developed economy.
The second reason is connected with the Venezuelan policy towards 
raining. As has been explained before, the Venezuelan ruling classes 
saw raining development as a means of balancing the budget without 
affecting their own pockets. Reports coming from the USA, about the 
financial success achieved by those who operated in this sphere 
encouraged the Venezuelan government to ask for a very high share in 
this activity. The Olavarrfa concession is particularly suggestive 
in this respect.
The Olavarria concession was for only twenty five years. He
had to pay 17% royalty, to put public lighting with kerosene
fired lamps in the cities of CumansT and Maturin (The installation
of the lamps as well as the kerosene needed to feed these lamps
had to be paid by the concession-holder), to build a bridge over
the Manzanares River, to pay Br.3,500 (£134*12s.8d) for mending two
churches badly damaged by an earthquake and to put clocks in
2/
each of these churches®
This contract is a bargain if its terms are compared with those
signed during the nineteen fifties and early nineteen sixties. In
1957 for instance the Italian combine ENI signed a contract with
the government of Iran, According to this contract the resulting
company was 50% owned by the Iranian Government without paying
anything while ENI had to pay 50% royalty over the profits yielded 
8/
by the rest. But at that time the situation in the oil market was 
rather different.
After the First World War oil had become increasingly cheap 
due to the development of drilling techniques, refining methods and 
the development of the petrochemical industry® Consequently, 
although the crude oil prices did not go over US ^3 per barrel 
until the late nineteen sixties, oil had become increasingly profitable, 
Moreover the development of the oil related chemicals industry 
encouraged oil demand in world wide terms; it enabled the oil 
producing countries to take advantage of this wealth.
But this was not the case during the early eighteen sixties.
The world need for kerosene was small enough to be supplied by the 
eastern part of the USA and Europe, Even important oil bearing 
areas within the US territory, like California and Texas would
remain idle until this century although oil exploiters within the 
USA did not pay royalties at all. Thus while after the second 
world war the governments were in a strong bargaining position, 
before the first world war the advantage fell to the oil combiners.
The first Venezuelan oil concession which became a working 
enterprise was granted by the Andes State to Manuel Antonio Pulido 
over the 100 hectares of his farm. The concession was lOKm from 
Rubio and 25Km from San Cristobal, the State capital, Pulido 
incorporated the Compania Nacional Minera Petrolia del Tachira 
with the partnership of Doctor Carlos Gonzalez Bona, who was, as 
well as being a medical doctor, an engineer and the company's 
pioneer, his relative Pedro Rincones, who eventually became the
sJ
company's technical manager, and other three gentlemen.
Then Rincones went to the USA in order to study drilling 
methods and to buy equipment. In 1880 Rincones came back with a 
modem drilling rig. But this machinery, after a difficult trip on 
the backs of donkeys and bullocks, was broken during the first day of 
use. It was never repaired and drillings continued by hand and 
shovel, the oil eventually being extracted by the use of pail and 
rope.
In 1882 the company built a refinery, the first to be built in
Venezuela. It was in La Alquitrana Village in Rubio district. In 1924
the refinery had two distillation units, each one able to work
600 gallons (they needed 21 days to fill each unit and l6 hours
to distill the crude oil). Two tanks of 500 gallons each (one for
kerosene, another for petrol) and a tank of 200 gallons (for residue)
10/
completed the company's premises. The petrol was not its 
principal produce. Petrolia's kerosene, in spite of the fact that
it was rather explosive, had a huge demand because it gave little 
smoke and had a shining light* Petrolia del Tachira's kerosene was 
delivered on donkey's backs to the areas of San Cristobal, Cucuta 
(Colombia) and the regions surrounding both cities.
With these primitive methods the company's output was very 
small, P,E, Mej/a records between 15 and 20 barrels a day (about
Ü /
6,400 barrels a year) and Betancourt reports that in 1912 the 
daily output of Petrolia del Tachira was 60 barrels a day (21,000
12/
barrels a year),
Petrolia del Tachira is a symbol of patriotism for some Venezualan 
writers, while it is scarcely mentioned by some US historians.
It might be suggested that both points of view are partially 
wrong. It could be argued that those American historians try to show 
the importance of foreign capital in the area, while the Venezuelan 
writers reject this view.
The supporters of foreign capital believed its task was to 
introduce modern technology into the area, which was, in their 
view, the only way to achieve this progress. Thus for them 
Petrolia del Tachira's importance is negligible. It gave a very 
small output and Venezuela had to import over 99% of its oil 
needs until 1917*
On the other hand, according to the historians who reject 
foreign capital, these corporations did not have any positive task, 
and they were able to take control of the Latin American economy either 
by bringing their rulers or by luring their intellectuals through 
certain political and economic theories.
The hypothesis of this research is neither to justify nor to 
attack the presence of foreign capital in the Latin American country,
but to explain why the transnational oil corporations took over the 
activity all over the region. Although Petrolia del Tachira 
produced a negligible output and the technology it used was so 
primitive, the fact that it survived for fifty years is remarkable. 
Moreover, the technical problems it faced do not nrove they 
were incapable of reaching a higher degree of technology. The
reason behind the lack of technology will be explained later,
. Today the technical research is carried out by teams usually
appointed by the transnational combines, in laboratories belonging to
them - subsequently the inventions eventually obtained in this way
belong to the combines. But even in this case, technology can be
transferred from one country to another without allowing the
entrance of foreign companies. These techniques can be either bought
or rented from the companies which own the technical method as in
many cases the companies which supply the technology are not the
same as those who exploit it. During the nineteenth century,
the acquisition of technology without dealing with foreign
companies was even easier because the investigation was usually
carried out by private researchers who were able to find buyers for
their inventions,
P.E. Mejia points out that Petrolia del Tachira is a good
example to prove that foreign capital is not needed to bring about
12/
advanced technology. This statement can be accepted, although it 
is a very poor example; a better one could be, for instance, the 
Chilean coal mines, wholly owned by Chilean capitalists, because 
they used a technology the same as that developed in Europe. In fact 
the import of technology can be independent of the import of capital. 
The Chilean coal mining companies imported British and Belgian
or »
engineers, but the companies remained Chilean. In Petrolia del 
Tachira Rincones was succeeded by the US citizen Clarence G,
Brown, but Brown became anchored in Venezuela when he married 
Pulido's daughter.
Betancourt concludes that Petrolia was not wholly successful
and barely survived during its 50 years existence because it did
not receive enough support from the government. This lack of
support is explained by the cultural subservience of President 
/
Guzman Blanco to Europe, which meant that he preferred to support
iêJ
the foreign railway companies instead of the Venezuelan concern.
Betancourt's assertions suggest two questions, namely why the 
Venezuelan government had to support this Venezuelan enterprise, and 
how it could be done.
In connection with the first question it must be remembered 
that Venezuela did not support the railways which linked Valencia, 
Caracas, Puerto Cabello and La Guaira because they belonged to 
foreign enterprises. They supported the railways because they 
moved the exports of Venezuela, core of its economic life,
Venezuela did not need to increase exports; its balance of 
commerce was favourable enough. Venezuela did not need to combat 
unemployment; to some extent they had a lack of manpower. What 
Venezuela needed was to increase revenues and this would not be 
obtained by giving money to this Venezuelan enterprise. The 
previously mentioned railways moved exports to La Guaira and Puerto 
Cabello; 70% of Venezuelan revenues come from custom taxes, 90% 
of which were obtained in these two ports. Therefore the money 
given to the railways was immediately repaid, but it was not the case 
with the oil company.
Any positive answer to the second question is even more 
difficult to obtain. The only thing Venezuela could do was to give to 
the company a grant without any likely possibility of further 
repayment. To protect the new born activity by custom tanrifs 
could be as damaging to the national economy as it was useless. 
Strangely US oil was more accessible to La Guaira than Tachira's proved 
to be. To reach La Guaira Tachira's kerosene had to go by a non 
existing pipe line to the banks of Maracaibo Lake, and there it 
had to be loaded through non existant harbour installations in non 
existant tankers to be carried to La Guaira; the tankers had to be 
special ones, since they had to be able to cross the shallow mouth 
of the Maracaibo Lake, All the investments to build these non 
existant premises would make the kerosene's price too expensive 
to be sold; it had to be paid by the very small internal market 
and consequently it could not distribute a large bulk of oil. Let 
us remember that foreign markets were still closed to crude oils 
arriving from outside Europe and the East of the USA,
Thus it was the lack of market rather than lack of skill or 
lack of official support that hampered the further development of 
Petrolia del Tachira. The causes of the early destruction of the 
drilling rig does not prove lack of skill. The reason why it 
happened could be due either to the method of transportation or to the 
kind of soil in which it was working. Also the fact that the 
drilling rig was never mended is not necessarily due to lack 
of skill. Perhaps, such restoration would have cost more than 
what possible further profits were able to pay for. The refinery 
seems to have been as developed as the standard ones used in the 
USA at that time. Eventually this company developed technical
improvements in order to satisfy its small market of Venezuelan 
Tachirs and Colombian Santander. This isolated market was well 
protected against external competition, but the company had very 
slim possibilities, if any, to plunge in other areas. The same 
isolation which prevented the company from being attacked by the 
large oil corporations in this small market, also stopped its own 
expansion.
The Venezuelan Asphalt Industry = Despite the fact that the 
Venezuelan oil industry began to develop just before 1920, in 
1884 it had already become an exporter of hydrocarbons. Its territory 
was full of deposits of those heavy, semi-liquid hydrocarbons called 
asphalt or pitch. In I912 these products ranked as the leading
15/
mining commodities among Venezuelan exports.
What happened in the case of natural asphalt is the opposite to
oil. It had been used as caulking material in the ship building 
industry, as a water protecting agent and, mixed with other solid 
elements like stones and sand, as a paving material for roads and 
streets. Today it is no longer used because it cannot compete in 
price with the asphalt obtained as a byproduct of the oil refining 
industry.
The last section in the third chapter contained a summary of 
the concession granted to Horatio Hamilton and the difficulties which 
eventually arose between the concession holders and the Venezuelan 
government were noted. This event is particularly important in this 
remark. The New York and Bermudez Co, which eventually held the 
concession over Guanoco pitch Lake (only part of the Hamilton 
concession which was ever developed) sampled first among Venezuelan 
asphalt producers for a long period and the conflict between this
company and the Venezuelan government shows the strong link 
between some British and some US economic interests*
As previously mentioned, the most valuable concession included 
in Hamilton's grant was the Guanoco pitch Lake* The lake is a 
superficial asphalt deposit of 1,100 acres located in Carupano 
Valley* It is not very deep, although it kept its depth while 
exploited, seepages in its bottom replacing the asphalt which had 
been taken out* While the Trinidad pitch Lake centaines 40%
16/
of earth and organic matter, Guanoco Lake has only 3% or 4% impurity*
As previously stated the exploitation of the pitch lake was the 
only venture granted in the Hamilton concession which was ever 
developed,
Hamilton sold the concession to the New York and Bermudsz Company 
on l6th November 1885® This concern especially created to deal 
with the Guanoco Lake, paid Hamilton US /l in cash and 9?000 shares 
of its own stock.
This lake was first exploited in 1891® In 1893 the Trinidad 
Asphalt Go, absorbed this new and dangerous competitor by buying 
its whole share stock* After a number of transferences the 
General Asphalt Company, a US concern registered in Philadelphia 
took control over New York and Bermudez,,
The crisis between the company and the Venezuelan government 
has been previously mentioned® It ought to be stressed that after 
1904 the trial initiated by President Crespo had been forgotten*
The company was now prosecuted for having given support to the 
Matos Army*
During this conflict the attitude of both the US and the 
British governments seems to be rather strange® The US government
showed a relative reluctance to support this US company. In fact 
the company finally got some official backing as it had some 
influential supporters, but it also had powerful enemies both in 
Wall Street and in the Capital*
When, in I904, a new prosecution against the New York and 
Bermudez Co. was initiated, this company got full support from the 
US government* This situation reached its climax on 10th March 
1905, when the US Charge d'Affairs at Caracas, Mr Russell, handled 
an official request from the State Department to President Castro
iZ /
which was practically an ultimatum* Due to the proud answer
given by Venezuelan Government to the White House, influential
circles within the USA greeted General Cipriano Castro as a
"South American Jefferson"*
This event meant a complete change in the US attitude towards
New York & Bermudez^, The US Senate appointed a special commission,
whose chairman was Judge Colhoun, to enquire about the affair* The
change of the US position became apparent by a new note on the
10th November I905.
The Judge Calhoun commission submitted a report about the New
York & Bermuda?, affair which did not become known to the US public
until March 1908* It had been sent long before in a letter of
John W. Poster, a member of this commission, to Senator S.M. Cullom,
12/
Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations of the US Senate*
At first sight, available evidence seems to suggest that Judge 
Calhoun and his team were convinced of the company's guilt, but this 
is not the case* In fact the commission recognised that the 
company had not fulfilled the duties undertaken by the Hamilton 
contract and that there was a principle in International Law according
to which any individual settled in a foreign country, who 
voluntarily takes part in or assists an insurrection against the 
established government of that country, forfeits the right to the 
protection of the government of which he is a citizen. But the real 
reason why the commission declared that New York & Bermudez was 
no longer able to obtain support from the US government, was that 
they had supported the "Matos Army" without reasonable motives for 
believing that Castro's Government was about to take any measures 
against their interests. In fact the report stated:
"About fifteen years after granting of the concession 
(1900) the Company having established itself meanwhile 
and being engaged in exploiting asphalt, its 
managing officials came to the conclusion that 
President Castro was hostile to the company® This 
conclusion was based upon the fact that holders of other 
claims for similar exploitation in the region covering 
the Bermudy Company concession were pushing their 
claims and upon certain confidential declarations 
of government officials as to Castro's hostility." 19/
Thus, the Judge Calhoun's report implies that any US company 
working abroad would be allowed to hatch conspiracies against the 
local governments, and then to ask US support if it failed when the 
local government had prosecuted them for whatsoever reason.
Calhoun placed US companies working in foreign developing 
countries above the local law. Moreover there is enough evidence to 
demonstrate that according to the principle stressed by Calhoun,
New York & Bermudez had the right to ask for official support. Castro's 
attempts to enforce the measures taken by Crespo and Andeade against 
the company became apparent before I9OI. On 11th January I9OI "Reuter" 
News Agency reported from New York that the Venezuelan Government had 
officially denied any right to the US Government to interfere in the
legal dispute between Venezuelan Government and New York & Bermudez 
20/
Co. Later, on 17th January the same agency reported from
Of
Washington new arguments between the USA and Venezuela over the 
21/
same affair. The first cheque draw by New York & Bermudez Go*
to Matos is dated on 18th November 1901? namely 11 months after
the official dispute between the Venezuelan Government and New York
& Bermudsz had reached diplomatic level. Clearly, the company had
more than merely assumptions about Castro's ill-feelings against it*
The "La Felicidad" affair, which is to be observed later in this
chapter, is the only problem the company had to which the Calhoun
report makes direct reference (without giving its name), It was a
civil law suit which never put the company's interests in any serious
jeopardy. Thus, Calhoun, while denying official support to New
York & Bermudez settled a principle by means of which any other
company could demand support when faced with a similar situation.
On the other hand British diplomats both in the USA and in
Venezuela showed special interest in the Bermudez affair. This might
be explained just by the fact that Britain, being the main capital
exporter in the world, had to be interested in the fate of any
foreign company whose rights were put in jeopardy. In fact there
are British documents showing concern about all the other US claims,
at least one of which, namely the Orinoco Steamship Co, had an
22/
important part of its stock owned by British citizens. However,
New York & Bermudez was especially important for the British Government, 
When in January 1906, the company's premises had been embargoed by 
the Venezuelan Courts, the British Minister at Caracas, Bax-Ironside 
reported the event in the following way;
"In any case, negotiations are now at an end between 
the company and the Venezuelan Government and 
President Castro's agents remain in possession of 
the valuable Bermudez Asphalt Lake and continue to 
work it for the President and his associates," 24/
On 9th January I907, the Foreign Office instructed the British 
Ambassador at Washington, Mr Howard to ask the State Department 
whether the US Government contemplated taking any action for the 
settlement of the questions in dispute between the USA and 
Venezuela, Following these instructions, Mr Howard wrote to the
25/
Secretary of State on the 5th of February. On the 11th April 
I9O8, when the new British Ambassador in the USA, Mr James Bryce 
wrote to the Foreign Office reporting the results of Calhoun enquiries 
and sending a copy of them, he said among other things :
(you) may infer that while the USA feels bound 
to present these claims against Venezuela and 
is naturally annoyed by the shifting and crusty 
behaviour of President Castro, it feels no 19/
great zeal on behalf of the claimants here mentioned.
Finally, when the USA suspended its diplomatic relations with 
Venezuela (June 1908), a British citizen sent a private letter to 
his friend Cecil Hurst, on behalf of the New York & Bermudez Co® He 
informed them that this company had sent all its mail between its 
main offices in the USA and its administration in Venezuela through 
the American official mail; now when it was no longer possible because 
of the break-down of diplomatic relations between the USA and 
Venezuela, the sender asked if it could be done through the Foreign 
Office, The reason why it had to be done, in his opinion, was that 
the General Asphalt Go. although incorporated in Pennsylvania, was 
owned by British capitalists. It must be recognised that Mr Hunt 
was very doubtful about his friend's report. He pointed out in his 
reply that he always thought that the above mentioned company was 
an American concern and that other companies which were British 
"bona fide" ones never received such treatment. Finally he suggested
89,
it could be done occasionally. Nevertheless, Hurst sent this
private letter to the Foreign Office and it was registered as an 
26/
official one*
This isolated document certainly is not enough to prove anything, 
although it explains the British interest in the fate of this US 
company* Later General Asphalt would always work in close hnlc with 
Shell Group.
It is to be explained that all this information about the
General Asphalt Co* does not attempt to prove that the company was
British instead of North American* In this case as well as in
others the real struggle was not between British and US companies*
Some British interests linked with some US ones fought against
22/
other British interests linked with other US ones, each fighting 
group trying to obtain support of either or both governments*
The real character of this struggle became clear during the 
nineteen twenties. In this decade both the British and US governments 
usually supported the same groups of companies*
After a trial lasting two and a half years. New York & Bermudez 
was condemned. It had to pay Br*24,000,000 (about £925,000) in 
redress for damages suffered by the country during the Matos war*
The sentence was given by the Court of First Instance on 12th 
August, 1907® The company appealed but a year later the Federal 
Court of Cassation upheld the original verdict* In January I906 
the company's plants were put under the control and exploitation 
of the state*
During the discussion of the Buchanan-Gomez Protocols, the 
New York and Bermudy affair was not included among the US claims* 
However, Rear Admiral Buchanan conducted a series of talks between
7'^ e
representatives of the General Asphalt Co. and the Venezuelan
Government. An agreement between both parties together with the
Protocols were signed on 15th February 1909* According to this
agreement the American company recognised the validity of the
verdict against it which had been settled by the Venezuelan Courts,
but the government accepted the payment of only Br*500,000 (about
£11,500), The amount of Br®500,000 had to be paid in three instalments,
the first of which had to be handed over to the Venezuelan Government
at the moment the agreement was signed. After this first payment
28/
the company would receive the Guanoco pitch lake back*
By the new agreement the company was obligated to pay a royalty 
of four Bolivars per each extracted ton of asphalt, but this 
royalty would have a minimum amount of 100,000 Bolivars per year*
So, in 1909, the New York & Bermudez Co, was again involved in the 
exploitation of the Guanoco pitch Lalce* In I9IO an asphalt 
refinery was built by the company, and in 1912 it produced between
r , , ^65% and 70% of the Venezuelan asphalt output* This company 
continued the exploitation of the Guanoco Lake until 1954? when the 
asphalt obtained from this pitch deposit was no longer able to 
compete with that obtained as a by-product in the oil refineries*
The rest of the Venezuelan asphalt out-put in 1912 was produced 
by a British concern, the Val de Travers Asphalt Paving Co* This
12/
British corporation already existed in 1887; in I9OO it had an 
asphalt mine in Pedernales at the mouth of Juanita River, In the 
latter year they built a small refinery on an island in the "Delta 
Amacuro" (Orinoco Delta)*
There also existed other asphalt producers which had operated 
before 1912, The best Icnown among these enterprises was the United
91,
States and Venezuela Co. This company was incorporated to deal 
with the "Inciarte" mine which concession had been granted to the US 
citizen George Crishfield on the 20th April 1901, On the $rd 
of February the concession holders had bought a ninety acre plot 
near the Maracaibo Lake containing the asphalt mine.
But according to the concession contract, the United States 
and Venezuela Co, had to build a railway between the mine and Puerto 
Limon (on the Lake's bank) and improve some natural waterways.
Since the company was unable to fulfil its duties, the concession 
was abrogated by the Constitutional Assembly of 1904® Moreover in 
this year Castro declared the US Ambassador Bowen "persona non grata" 
and Castro stopped the international policy he had sought since 
1902 in order to entertain good relations with the USA,
This affair gave rise to one of the US claims to be solved by 
the Buchanan-Gomez Protocols, According to this latter agreement
ji/
this case was referred to the International Court of The Hague, 
and this international tribunal stated that the company would 
resign all its rights and properties to the National Government 
of Venezuela which would repay the company a compensation amounting 
to Br.2,375,000 (atout £95,000).
Some years later Venezuelan entrepreneurs began to exploit the 
asphalt mine of La Cope. It was not far from San Cristobal and was 
under exploitation until 1956* Its asphalt was used in paving 
San Cristobal's streets.
The "La Felicidad" Mining Company has been mentioned before, 
in connection with the New York & Bermudy affair. This company was 
incorporated by a North American syndicate to exploit an asphalt 
concession in the Venezuelan State of Bermudaz® The concession was
granted to Antonio Bianchi on the '^ Oth November 1897 and the grant- 
holder transferred it to the company soon afterwards. However Bianchi's 
concession fell within an area previously granted to Hamilton®
This gave rise to a law suit whose final verdict was settled on the 
28th January 1904® This verdict declared the Bianchi concession to 
be without legal validity because the Hamilton concession had 
been granted beforehand. This difficulty was the least important one 
in New York & Bermudez had to face, but it ought to be mentioned 
because it was the only one directly referred to by the Judge 
Calhoun commission in this report.
Another asphalt concession which was never under exploitation 
became intensively used by Gomez as a tool to impose his oil 
policies; his attempts to use it in this way were completely unsuccess­
ful, This concession was granted to Andres Espina, who acted on 
behalf of Andres Valbuena, Federico Bohorquez and himself. The 
three partners were awarded four asphalt mines of JOO hectares 
each (1904). The procession was particularly advantageous to 
the Venezuelan state; it lasted only 25 years and the concession 
holders had to pay 25% royalty. Therefore it is not surprising 
that these partners were very unsuccessful in trying to sell 
their concession.
The Valbuina and Bohorquez concession became included in the 
Aranguren concession (1907) and in the Valladores concession (19I2).
This gave rise to a law suit which will be observed later. After 
failing in the struggle against Aranguren (19I8), Valburna and 
Bohorquez got unexpected official support in their fight against 
Valladares; this would be used by the government for other purposes.
The covert aim of this law suit is to be studied later; for now it need
only be said that in 1925 Espina, Bohorquez and Valbuena did not 
get their concession back, but they obtained good compensation, as 
a small part of the concession area granted to the Caribbean 
Petroleum Company (holder of the Valladores concession) was 
sold by auction and the money was given to them.
The most important asphalt concession in Venezuela was the 
Arangurean one, because it was exploited as an oil grant and 
Venezuelan Oil Concessions Ltd,, who eventually became its holder, 
developed the most prolific oil fields in the country during the 
1920*8. How the Aranguran concession became an oil one and the 
problems V.O.G. had to face because of this flaw in their concession 
will be observed later in this research, as it was one of the main 
problems linked with the early development of the Venezuelan oil 
industry,
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CHAPTER VI
Venezuelan Oil Policy Before 1912
The Reason why the Venezuelan Government tried to encourage 
the development of the oil Industry ~ As previously pointed out, 
the political task followed by Castro and achieved by Gomez was the 
creation of a well established central government, the end of the 
almost permanent civil war and the destruction of the caudillos 
and to be able to succeed in this task they needed enough revenue 
to meet the increased expenditures this new type of Venezuelan 
Government would require*
The Mexican oil boom after I9OI was known all over the world and 
Venezuelan potential to develop its own oil industry was equally well 
known since long before that* Therefore, after I904 Cipriano 
Castro's Government made clear attempt to encourage such activity*
But Castro's target was not to develop the National oil industry; 
it was in fact to obtain revenue, and the development of oil 
activities in Venezuela was just a way to fulfil the real target* 
Consequently the issue of a law, like the previously mentioned 
Mexican Ley de Petroleo of December I904 which encouraged the 
Mexican oil industry by the temporary abolition of any taxation 
upon oil activities within the country, was not possible for 
Venezuela* In Mexico the oil industry appeared closely linked 
with the development of the railways; in Venezuela it was initially 
encouraged in order to increase revenues*
So, the Mining Code issued in Venezuela in I904 was the first 
Venezuelan Mining Code which included an article referring to
yot
asphalt a.nd similar substances. The decree of I9O6 (which embodied 
the Mining Code of 1905) extended the reference to any kinds of 
hydrocarbons. In this way the Venezuelan Government made apparent 
its clear intention to develop its oil potential*
The decree established only that such resources were not 
affected by any of the rules created by the same decree with
y
regard to the other mineral resources* In this way the concession 
contract to be signed between the Venezuelan Government and private 
grant“holders became the first Venezuelan law ruling oil activities 
within the country. In fact, in I906 a bargaining period between 
Venezuela and the oil companies began. How this bargaining 
was developed and how it ended is the subject of this chapter. The 
fact that the law did not attempt to rule the oil activity was a 
way of giving "carte blanche" to the government in this 
bargaining with the oil entrepreneurs interested in exploiting 
the Venezuelan oil resources. So, by drafting the concession- 
contracts, the executive would draft the Venezuelan oil law itself 
and consequently, the oil entrepreneurs interested in dealing with 
the Venezuelan oil resources would be more easily attracted as they 
could take part in the draft of the law which would rule their 
activities.
But it did not happen at the beginning of this important stage 
in the early development of the Venezuelan oil industry. The first 
concession granted by Castro in 190?» to be observed in the next 
section of this chapter, were drafted by the Government alone and 
granted to some Venezuelan citizens; then, the oil companies did 
not take part at all. However the method ws,s finally applied* The 
first concession to be exploited on a large scale, the second
Valladares one, was drafted by the General Asphalt Co. and after
minor amendments the government accepted the draft*
The Initial Oil Concessions - In 19G7» the first important
oil concessions were granted in Venezuela® On 28th February, Andres
Jorge Vigos was granted a concession over the oil deposits within
Colon District of Z'ulia State* The same day Antonio Aranguren
received a huge asphalt concession over Maracaibo and Bolivar
2/
Districts of the same State* On the J>Td July an oil concession 
over Tamora and Acosta Districts of Falcon State and Silva District 
of Lara State was granted to Francisco Jimenez Arraiz* Finally 
on the 22nd July,Bernabe Planas got an oil concession over 
Buchivacoa District of Falcon State* Vigas, Planas and 
Jimenez Arraiz were doctors of law, Aranguren was a "general". 
Bernabe Planas had been one of the representatives sent by the 
dying government of Andrade when their master was already in 
exile, to discuss the surrender of Caracas under Castro's victorious 
army (1899)? this had been the most important role played by any 
of these concession holders* Then, through this fact it can be 
inferred that oil concessions were still minor rewards.
The 1907 oil concessions were the first ones ever granted 
in Venezuela which eventually became oil ventures exploited at 
world wide level. But they are also important for another 
reason* Since the decree of I9O6 had given to the government the 
right to establish the principles according to which the oil 
industry had to be ruled, these four concession-contracts embodied 
the first Venezuelan legislation concerning the oil industry*
There existed some differences between the concessions, 
for instance, Aranguren was granted with asphalt deposits only*
However, all those contracts followed a common pattern* All these
concessions holders (or these people who received the concession
from them either by transference or legacy) had to initiate the
work within four years of the signature of the concession contract;
after paying a fine of Bn.2 ,5 0 0 (£96.3s*Id.) they would have
another four years term to begin the works. The concessions were
granted to pay Be.2 - per hectore granted and Bs.4 - per each ton
1/
extracted, but they would not be affected by any other taxation.
Betancourt points out that such concessions were a 
bargain to the companies to whom these concessions were eventually 
transferred. If these concessions are compared with those 
granted at the present, they certainly were a bargain. If we 
consider that some of the companies which obtained these concessions 
reached 55% annual profit during the nineteen twenties, they 
certainly were a bargain. But if we remember that at the same 
time oil exploiters in Mexico did not pay taxation at all, the 
Venezuelan concessions are no longer a bargain. The fact is that 
oil companies did not show any interest in these Venezuelan 
concessions and that these concession mongers failed in trying to 
sell their merchandise. All of them had to pay Bs,2,500 in I9II 
in order to keep their right over these concessions.
There is no break in the oil policy before and after the 
overthrow of Castro, The 1909 Mines Code made more references 
to oil. However concession contracts were still the most important 
part in the oil legislation. Just after the mentioned one was 
enacted a concession was granted to John Allen Tregelles on behalf 
of the Venezuelan Development Company Ltd, (1st December I909)*
Tregelles concession included, Tachira, Trijillo, Merida,2 ulia
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Lara, Falcon, Yaracuy, Carabobo, Azoategui, Sucre, Monsgaa,
Nueva Esparta and the Delta Amacuro States, and within these states 
only a few areas were excluded. The only pa.rt of Northern Venezuela 
not granted to the Venezuelan Development Company were the Aragua 
and Miranda States and the Federal District which formed the 
centre® Tregelles concession totalled about 23 million hectares*
John Tregelles was the "last of the mohicans" as far as small 
promoters is concerned. With no official support from any Great 
Power he began exploration around the concession area. Although 
he registered some deposits in some places, his concession finally 
lapsed due to failure to fulfil the duties undertaken by the 
concession holder*
The oil concession over Pedernales Munisitality, Paria 
Peninsula and BenitezDistrict of Sucre State, the few territories 
within the Tregelles which were especially excluded in this 
concession contract, was granted to Doctor Max Valladares (New York 
& Bermuchz's attorney) on 14th July IRIO, A few days later, this 
concession was transferred to the Bermudn Company, a subsidiary of 
General Asphalt*
Both the Tregelles and Valladarez concession-contracts were 
issued according to the patterns established by Castro's contracts* 
Moreover, the royalties per extracted ton were fixed at 5% of its 
value instead of Bs.4* In fact, it was more or less the same 
amount ; Bs.4 per ton was approximately equivalent to US ^0.11 
per barrel and the standard price for crude oil was about US $2 
per barrel. But oil prices were going higher and an increase of 
revenue was probable. Another important improvement in these first 
concessions granted by Gomez is related to the duties undertaken by
1U2,
the concession-holder. These new concessions clearly pointed out 
that the concession-holder had a two years exploration period at 
the end of which he had to select plots and pay royalty per each 
selected one. On the other hand the old concessions granted by 
Castro only stated that the concession holder had "to begin works 
within a four years period"* It could be understood that by digging 
a single well, the concession holder had fulfilled this duty, but 
had to pay superficial royalties only for the 400 hectares plot 
where the single well was placed*
As previously said, Sir Vincent Corbett, the British Minister 
at Caracas was against any official support to John A. Tregelles* 
Corbett did not mention the First Valladarez concession as 
General Asphalt, at least officially, was a US concern* Concerning 
the British attitude towards Tregelles, if we go back to the despatch 
quoted in Chapter 4 in which Minister Corbett proposed not to 
support the Venezuela Development Company, we can find interesting 
suggestions. First of all, Minister Corbett states:
"The oil company's contract is in the nature of 
a monopoly and will, no doubt, bring good profits 
to the President and a few others, but not to 
the shareholders." ^
This text may be linked with Minister Bax-Ironside's despatch 
reporting the embargo of the Guanoco Lake, in which he stated:
"President Castro's agents remain in possession of 
the valuable Bermu&ez Asphalt Lake and continue to 
work it for the President and his associates." ^
This seems to be a scarcely veiled attempt to show that any legal 
action taken by the Venezuelan state against a private company 
would be an act of plunder by the President and his allies in favour
IU3,
of their own pockets. Following the same line of thought, it 
seems to he that what Corbett disliked in the Tregelles. contract 
was not its monopolistic character, but the fact that it was 
advantageous to Venezuela*
In the same despatch Corbett also said:
"As soon as there are signs that it is a 
remunerative concern - if that day ever 
arrives - the Venezuelan government will step 
in either to cancel the concession or to levy 
blackmail*" ^
This text stresses an idea previously pointed out in this work. 
Although neither the Soviet nor the Mexican Revolution had yet 
taken place, interventions in other independent countries had 
become increasingly difficult. After I909 the USA intervened in 
some Caribbean countries, on at least five occasions (during the 
1910*s in Mexico and Haiti, during the 1920's in the Dominican 
Republic and Nicaragua and in the Dominican Republic in 1965)0 But 
only the USA was able to intervene in the Caribbean, and even for 
them this kind of intervention became increasingly difficult.
Thus the companies working abroad had to be able to defend 
themselves and the newly incorporated Venezuelan Development Company 
certainly was not in a strong enough position.
Apart from paying the above mentioned royalties per ton and 
per hectare granted, the oil companies had either to buy or to 
rent the land to dig the well. In I9IO a new Mining Code was 
issued. At that time Gomez was acting in close links with the 
landowner caudillos and subsequently a very high share of the 
return from mining enterprises going to the landowner of the 
surface was established. Articles 40 and 42 in the code gave a
J - U 4 .
third of the profits on any mining enterprise to the landowner 
beneath whose property the mine was®
By observing the new concession-contracts, one fact becomes 
apparent. Although the first two concessions granted by Gomez were 
a bit less good for the concession-holders than the four granted 
by Castro, in general terms, the duties undertalcen by the concession- 
holders were less than those undertaken by the holders of other 
Venezuelan grants issued beforehand, like Espina or Olavania,
It proves in a clear way just how much Venezuela needed revenue 
because it was offering its oil concessions much more cheaply than 
previously®
However, Venezuela did not succeed. The next section of 
this chapter will describe the prevailing world oil market conditions 
at that time, and show that Venezuela was still offering its 
oil at too high a price to be sold in the world oil market of 1912® 
The international oil corporations ignored the Venezuelan oil 
fields, and oil did not provide either revenue to the Venezuelan 
State or new sources of income to its ruling groups®
Therefore Venezuela was forced to withdraw from the oil 
policy it had sketched in the above mentioned concession-contracts 
and the I9IO mining code. In this case the withdrawal was forced 
by economic methods, namely by an actual boycott of the Venezuelan 
oil fields. On two occasions during the period involved in this 
research, namely 1918-1921 and 1928-1930 Venezuela attempted to 
renegotiate the conditions under which the Venezuelan oil was 
exploited, in order to increase revenues coming from this industry®
In these other cases the oil corporations and their supporting 
Powers used political methods to force Gcmez; namely they blackmailed
the Venezuelan government by giving relative support to the 
conspiracies which its political enemies were hatching abroad.
Conditions prevailing in the world oil market in the early 1910's 
The section in the second chapter devoted to Deterding, explained 
how the development of the oil market debarred the small corporations 
from involvement in it. It did not happen only due to the lack of 
capital these companies had; wealthy companies were also either 
expelled or driven out of the oil market, because they did not 
have a world wide marketing system*
A good example of that is Lord Cowdray and his Mexican Eagle 
Co® This oilman had accumulated a capital of millions of pounds, 
produced tens of millions of oil barrels, owned a tanker fleet 
which enabled him to put his oil wherever he wanted and had two 
refineries which could process 60,000 barrels a day, but he did not 
have a world wide marketing system* Trying to control even 
the Mexican market, he ran into conflict with the Waters Pearce Co® 
or rather with Standard Oil, which owned 2/3 of Waters Pearce’s 
stock and he was forced to reach an agreement and the marketing 
system he needed did not have the opportunity of being created,
Cowdray had too much oil to sell it easily in profitable conditions 
and too little to put the world market under his feet. In fact he 
obtained good contracts with the Royal Nav^ r and got some other 
profitable possibilities, but in 1912 prevailing market conditions 
forced him to accept an agreement with Standard Oil to sell them
k!
20 million barrels of crude oil a year. Finally, due to the 
Mexican Revolution, Cowdray became involved in political intrigues 
and his situation in Mexico was made increasingly uncomfortable 
when Carranza defeated Huerta, because he was considered as a Huerta
1/
supporter. In 1919 Cowdray abandoned the oil industry; the
8/
Mexican Eagle was sold to the Shell Group® These facts will be
considered in the next chapter in connection with Cowdray's
unwillingness to invest in Venezuela®
Among the newcomers into the oil market only two American
concerns, namely Gulf and Texaco, and one British concern reached
a world wide level* This last consortium was formed by entrepreneurs
who got the Grovm's partnership when the government bought a
2/
controlling stock of Anglo-Persian Co; it subsequently became BP, 
The high price for crude oil prevailing in the world until 
1913, gave a partial protection for the smaller concerns and 
postponed the crisis. In August 1915 the crude oil price in 
New York was US /2.50 per barrel while in Russia the price was
10/
40 copecks per pood; between 1907 and 1913 the world output had 
increased by about 30%, But then the oil companies ran into 
difficulties because of conflict of interests, and the greater 
oil consortia were forced to drop oil prices. In January 1915
the price for crude oil in Russia had fallen to 30 l/2 copecks per
pood while in New York, the crude oil barrels cost US /l,15« This
new situation brought bankruptcy to many of these "small" oil
companies, but the enormous control which the big consortia had 
over the market can be seen if one considers that despite the 
bankruptcy of many companies, world output increased by 7% during 
1913-19149 It was just 1/2% below the increase rate for the
12/
period 1912-1913* before the beginning of the crisis.
Some of these oil companies which were able to survive, 
became mere "concession hunting" companies, before disappearing.
They used the equipment and expertise they had in obtaining new
u.'V / a
concessions and after exploring them and discovering good oil
resources, then sold these ventures to the big consortia® Often
these small companies were used by the large consortia to press
their own demands on the local government®
Therefore, while the number of countries offering oilfields to
be exploited, increased, the number of companies involved in
large oil ventures outside the USA diminished® Texaco, Gulf and
Anglo Persian became world wide oil consortia only during the
1920*3 and in 1912 only Shell and Standard Oil were willing to initiate
these kinds of oil enterprises.
Therefore the period 1907-1912 was a bad time to initiate
bargaining approaches with the big oil consortia* At that time their
power, particularly that of Shell, was unchallenged® Moreover,
although the world output was increasing at a rate averaging about
10% annual, the world output was just over 1 million barrels daily®
Today the USSR and Saudi Arabia alone produce over 21 million
barrels daily between them® Consequently, the well known oil
resources of which exploitation was easy, produced more than
enough to meet the existing demands, and many of these potential
oilfields remained idle® In such a world oil market the oil
consortia were able to impose their own conditions®
An event which occurred in Trinidad shows clearly what was
going on in the world oil market. In I9IO one of the "small" oil
companies operating in Trinidad, the North Naparina Oil Company,
asked the colonial government for a change in the conditions
under which the concession had been granted® After two years of
negotiations between the company and the authorities, agreement
was reached and as a consequence Shell was willing to establish
12/
operations in Trinidad®
Thus, the Venezuelan government had no possibilities of 
success* Moreover, the need for new revenues forced them to try 
to sell their oil resources* Liet.men has pointed out that 1920 was the 
first attempt made by Venezuela to obtain a better share of its
14/
o\<m oil* In fact this early bargaining period might not have 
been taken into account by Lieuwen because he may have considered 
the Venezuelan oil industry not to have been yet born* However it 
clearly had been.
The Venezuelan change of policy and the subsequent appearance 
of the Venezuelan oil industry is the subject of the next chapter*
But now it can be said that the change was carried out in two 
stages. The first one was the issue of the second Valladarez 
concession-contract on the 2nd January 1912. The second stage was 
the verdict settled by the Federal Court of Cassation which 
declared non constitutional the 40th and 42nd articles of the 
Mining Code of 1910 (2?th June 1912).
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CHAPTER VII 
Venezuela becomes An Oil Producer
The second Valladares concession - On the 23rd December I9II, 
just a fortnight after the Tregelles concession had lapsed, Doctor
y
Max Valladares demanded from the Ministry of Foment-o. a wide oil 
concession covering the whole of the area previously granted to 
John Allen Tregelles* The proposal was rejected by the Mines 
Director because it did not establish which kinds of oil deposits 
he wanted to obtain* After a few amendments, Valladares demand 
was sent back to the Ministry* The contract, having been approved 
by the Gonse.jo de Estado was signed by Doctor Aquiles Iturbe,
y
Minister of Fomento on 2nd January 1912* Leopoldo Baptista, then 
member of the Concejo de Estado* had expressed his opposition to 
the contract, because he found it dangerous for the nation's interests
y
to grant to one isolated person or company such a wide concession.
Two days later the concession was transferred by Doctor Valladares 
to the Caribbean Petroleum Company, a new subsidiary of General 
Asphalt Co* especially incorporated to hold this new Valladares 
concession.
As there were very few rules referring to oil in the I9IO Mining 
Code, the second Valladares concession actually became the 
Hydrocarbon Law which regulated this activity inside Venezuela 
during its initial period of development* In general terms it 
remained in force for six years, until the first Hydrocarbon Decree 
was enacted; however in connection with the initial concessions it 
remained in force for all the period covered by this research.
In general outline the new Valladares concession was 
issued in the same terms as the Tregelles one® The exploration 
period was fixed at two years; this decision made the 27 million hect­
ares of the concession area almost meaningless. Due to its size 
and the lack of means of transport in the country, to prospect 
accurately such an area in a mere two years period was almost 
impossible. The provision referring to the selection of plots 
in Tregelles concession, also appeared in the Second Valladares 
one. This more accurate text prevented the loophole previously 
described in the previous chapter which in the case of the concessions 
granted by Castro proved to be too damaging to the Venezuelan 
interests. In terms of royalties, this concession was particularly 
advantageous to the concession-bolder® The territorial royalty 
was still B'.So4 per hectare as in the four year old concessions 
granted by Castro, as well as the Tregelles and the First Valladares 
concessions, but the royalty per ton extracted dropped by 50% or more; 
instead of Be,4 - per ton extracted as in the I9O7 concessions or 
5% as in Tregelles and First Valladares concessions, the royalty 
was fixed at Bs,2 - per ton extracted. This rebate was awarded
4/
to all the concessions previously granted.
The Second Valladares concession was a kind of counter-proposal 
extended by the oil companies to the Venezuelan government.
Valladares proposals recall the similar one put forwards under 
the Trinidadian government by South Waparima Old Co. mentioned in 
the previous chapter. The agreement which was obtained in Trinidad 
after two years discussions, in Venezuela was obtained in a
y
couple of weeks.
The Second Valladares concession included the territory of all
I I Z .
these granted by Cantro in 1907* With Vigas Planas and Jimenez 
ibmiz, there was no problem; Valladares concession expressly excluded 
the sectors within the area which had been previously granted to 
other persons* But Aranguren concession only referred to asphalt 
deposits. Then General Aranguren demanded from the Ministry of 
Fomento a resolution establishing that, since the Mining Code 
included asphalt, pitch, tar, etc, and any kind of hydrocarbons in 
the same article, any asphalt concession had to be understood as 
a hydrocarbon one. The thesis of Aranguren was accepted by the 
Ministry and a document sent by Valladares on behalf of the
§J
Caribbean Co. denying this point of view was rejected by them.
As - previously said, the Valladares concession also got the
area previously granted to Valbuena, Espina y Bohorquez. After the
resolution issued by the Ministry of Fomente in favour of Aranguren,
the three partners, whose concession area was also included in
the Aranguren area, initiated a law suit against him ('1915) » In
this trial they had the support of General Juan Crisostomo Gomez,
Juan Vicente's brother. But at that time, Antonio Aranguren had
already incorporated the Venezuelan Oil Concessions Ltd. whose
chairman, Duncan Elliot Alvez visited Gomez and warned him that the
trial was damaging the good name of Venezuela among British
businessmen. Gomez, who was at that time particularly interested in
"attracting foreign capital" (to increase national revenue)
obtained soon after these talks with Elliot Alvez a verdict in 
1/
fa.vour of V.O.C.
The second important victory obtained by the international 
oil companies was the abolition of the articles 4 0th and 42nd of 
the 1910 Mining Code, On the 19th June 1912 the Venezuelan Attorney
General asked from the Federal Court of Cassation to consider 
whether the abovementioned articles of the Mining Code did not 
contradict the Venezuelan Gonsitution and the Civil Code® Eight 
days later the Federal Court of Cassation declared both articles 
as anticonstitutional.
As soon as the company had obtained all what they asked for, it 
initiated oil explorations around the granted area on a large 
scale® So, during 1912, Caribbean sent a team of 35 geologists, 
who, assisted by a similar number of Venezuelan civil engineers, 
explored the territory included in the concession® At the end of 
1913 the company had selected 1,028 plots totalling 514»000 hectares 
(1 ,269 ,580 acres). After building a road to begin the test drilling 
they bored in two sections on, both sides of the Maracaibo. When 
these initial works had been finished and drilling rigs had been 
received, six wells between 6OO ft and 1,700 ft deep were 
initiated (January I914)» On 13th of July 1914 the first of 
these wells, called Zumaque Wo. 2 was successfully finished. It 
began to produce 50 barrels a day.
2/
Nevertheless, Caribbean did not obtain any output until 1917»
The existence of oil suitable for exploitation on a commercial 
scale had been proved; now it was necessary to build other premises 
which were indispensable for these activities. A six inch pipe­
line from the "Mene Grande" oil fields to San Timoteo was built. This 
pipe-line, 15 Km long, had two pumping stations and was able to 
move 250 ,000 gallons per day. Not far from San Timoteo, the San 
Lorenzo refinery had been built. This little refinery which could 
treat less than 1,000 barrels per day, was able to obtain almost all 
oil products (lubricants excepted). It was planned only to fulfil
the needs of the Venezuelan market. The rest of the crude oil 
was to he sent to Curacao, where in I9I8 a refinery which treated
10/
6,000 barrels a day was already working* To store oil, the
company had 5 tanks of 55»000 barrels each* Finally, a sea port
especially fitted to deal with crude oil, roads and even houses
was necessary to be built; in the next section we will go back to this 
8/
subject.
In general terms the forerunners in the development of the 
Venezuelan oil industrjr were small enterprises although very soon 
they gave way to the larger ones. General Asphalt was a holding . 
company, but devoted to asphalt enterprises. At least this was the 
explanation given by its board to the shareholders when they 
decided to sell the whole of the Caribbean Co* to "a large oil 
combine", after the successful drilling and when Caribbean shares 
were being sold in Wall Street at over 200% of its nominal price 
(1914). The General Asphalt board also stressed that they did not 
have the large amount of capital Caribbean needed during this 
initial stage.
McBeth reports that a number of other enterprises were 
invited to hold Caribbean, and that only Shell accepted and took
n/
over the company. Although this event is not mentioned in "An
12/
International Oilman", it suits very well the image Henri Beterding 
had of himself, namely that his success was due to a special 
sixth sense which impelled him to take risks which others had 
rejected beforehand. This may have been true between I9OI and I907 
when his Empire was created, but now in 1914» he could operate in a 
way which was impossible for others. General Asphalt did have 
a marketing system, but to sell asphalt, not kerosene or gasoline.
standard Oil of New Jersey had had a world wide marketing 
system for decades and was developing a world wide oil drilling 
framework, hut it still preferred to deal with independent oil 
drilling enterprises. Other companies simply did not have a 
world wide oil marketing system at all. Moreover there was 
something more behind this event® Since 1913 General Asphalt was in 
process of being absorbed by the Shell Group® This process wa,s 
strongly linked with the incorporation of the Burlington Investment 
Company®
Burlington was a financing company incorporated by General 
Asphalt and Shell in 1913* The purpose of this company, whose 
initial capital was £1,000,000 seems to have been the gradual 
absorption of General Asphalt by Shell. Therefore the company 
survived until 1928, when its task had been fulfilled. In the 
incorporâtion-contract of this company was stated that General
ii/
Asphalt had to sell its oil ventures to the Shell combine®
Although Shell had had control over the Caribbean Company since
M /
1914s this combine tried to hide the fact until 1922® Then the 
combine recognised 75% ownership over Caribbean (the other 25%
15/
belonging to the General Asphalt Co.), In 1927, in connection
with disagreements between the Shell Group and some V®0,C. 
shareholders5 when one of these latter ones said in a V.G.G® 
shareholders' meeting that the Caribbean Company was wholly owned
IkJ
by Shell, nobody denied his assertion® Apparently the Anglo 
Dutch combine tried to hide its ownership of Caribbean in order to 
obtain full support from the White House as the Caribbean Petroleum 
Co® had been registered as a US concern® It could have been done in 
order to prevent any action against them from the US government,
12/
according to the Sherman Law®
The Development of other Venezuelan Concessions - The only
old concession which was directly taken by Shell was the Vegan one®
Andres Jorge Vigas seems to have behaved just like a concession-
monger. Sir Henri Deterding said that the concession he had got,
18/
was bought by the Shell Group from a certain Mr Curtin* The
Shell Group incorporated to deal with the concession a subsidiary
called Colon Development Company in which the .Royal Dutch-Shell
combine got 75% of the stock; the other 25% belonged to an
American company kno’t/n as "Caribb Syndicate", According to McBeth
12/
it had got the concession®
The Colon Company was the least developed Shell concern in 
Venezuela during the period covered by this research. It commenced 
exploration works in 1914® After solving a number of difficulties 
they staxted drillings during the last months of 1914» but the 
well was abandoned at 700 feet due to great difficulties with 
equipment and labourers. In 1915 the company succeeded in its 
second well on the Rio Oro, In I916 the Rio Oro well, a little 
over 1,000 feet deep, was able to give approximately 200 barrels 
a day, while drillings near Rio Terra were auspicious. Nevertheless 
the company's output was below 110,000 barrels in 1927» Colon 
Company became the reserve Shell kept for the future*
Caribbean and Colon were the only two enterprises developed by 
Shell from its initiation. In the latter case this participation 
was publicly recognised while in the case of Caribbean the initial 
Shell presence was hidden. The other oil enterprises in Venezuela 
were initially developed by "independent" companies, although Shell 
and other large combines took over these enterprises as the small com-
parties proved themselves unable to face the initial difficulties 
they found.
Particularly important is Venezuelan Oil Concessions Ltd®
which took over the Aranguren concession® Antonio Aranguren was
not just a concession monger® He attempted to become an oil
entrepreneur on a world wide scale; he became a kind of Venezuelan
Gulbenkian® Although he failed in trying to emulate the famous
21/
Armenian oilman Calouste Sarkis Gulbenkian he had some initial 
success®
In 1911 Aranguren went to London and there met Duncan Elliot
22/
Alves® This New Zealander who had not yet begun any important 
activity as an oil entrepreneur was eventually to become one of the 
main forerunners in the Venezuelan oil industry® On the 24th 
October Aranguren granted Alves an option for purchasing the 
concession®
On 15th August 1913 when the rebate of royalties had been 
already granted and the oil rights of the concession had been 
cleared, it was sold to Bolivar Concessions Ltd® This recently- 
incorporated company had £30 ,000 capital, divided in 30 shares of 
£1,000 each; its main shareholders were Duncan Elliot Alves (5 shares) 
and Antonio Aranguren (3 shares)® Some months later Bolivar 
Concessions became Venezuelan Oil Concessions Ltd® (£100,000 
capital in 100,000 shares £1» each)®
24/
On 19th January 1914 the company increased its capital by 50%* 
Moreover, in spite of some unsuccessful drillings in Santa Rita,
25/
test drilling in Santa Rosa oilfields gave hopeful results®
It became clear, however, that the development of this wealthy 
concession required no less than. £3,000,000 capital. They needed 
not only oil rigs but also pipelines, ports, tankers and even railways
as the area was extremely wild. In 1915 the shareholders were
informed that an agreement between the Shell Group and the
i§/
company had been reached,
McBeth also reports overtures previously initiated by V,0,C,
21/
to obtain Lord Cowdray's partnership* It could be suggested 
that Lord Cowdray had enough problems with his Mexican oil not to 
look for new ones. The problem faced by the other brainchild of 
Elliot Alves and Aranguren, British Controlled Oilfields Ltd., 
which in 1919 took over the Planas concession, will show us the 
fate reserved for the oil companies without their own marketing 
system.
According to this agreement the Shell combine would get 
control over V.O.C, by buying 205,000 shares of £1 each (but 
the combine had to pay only £2 per each 3 shares). The Shell 
Group gained also control over the management of the company and 
were paid for this with a fixed rate over 15 years and thereafter 
with 7% of the company's profits,
V.O.C.'s capital now had to be £500,000, But the Burlington 
Development Company was charged with incorporating a new company 
with £3,000,000 capital which had to buy all the properties 
of the existing company. An especial clause in the agreement's 
articles pointed out that the incorporation of the new company had 
to be done two years after the war. Finally the contract granted to 
Mr Alves his position as chairman of the company for five years 
and the position of other two directors in their places for three 
years ; Antonio Aranguren was one of them.
Apart from the Great War, two problems hampered any further 
development of V.O.C. until 1921. Firstly the mentioned law suit
versus Espina, Bohorques and Valbuena» whose final verdict in
V
favour of VoO.C. was issued on 15th April 1916 and then, what
is called in this research, the old crisis of 1919» This crisis was
due to a sort of non declared war between the Venezuelan government
which tried to increase the Venezuelan share in its own oil, and the
companies which tried to stop the Venezuelan demand. As a consequence
of these problems, V.O.C® did not have any output until 1922 and
consequently it did not get any profit. Despite these facts its
shares were well regarded on the stock exchange. Its prices rose
28/
from about 50% over its nominal value (May 1916) up to 90%
X ^over its nominal value (December 1917)»
The role played by Burlington in this operation suggests that 
V.O.C. was placed under Caribbean guidance. This is a good 
example in which the small entrepreneurs had to ask for help 
from the great oil consortia and how high a price they lad to pay for 
such help.
Bernabe Planas' heirs, with Aranguren as attorney, incorporated 
in London the Central Mining and Investment Corporation. In 1914 
the enterprise was offered to a number of possible purchasers,
Lord Cowdray among them. The entrepreneurs Invited to take over 
did not accept the offer; only Cowdray was willing to take part in
y J
the enterprise and then only as a sleeping partner. In 1915 
Central Mining became the Falcon Oil Syndicate closely linked 
with V.O.C. although this Syndicate never became part of the Shell 
Croupe Although they had some success in the initial exploration 
any further development of this company was hampered by lack of 
capital. The Falcon Oil Syndicate just survived until 1919» Then 
Duncan Elliot Alves incorporated with the support of the British
Controlled Oilfields Ltd. which absorbed the Falcon Oil Syndipate* 
Another example of a small concern hampered by lack of capital 
was Pauji Go» It had a concession in Trujillo. In the view 
of the US ambassador, in I9I6 this company tried to survive in
25/
order to sell its concession to a great oil consortium*
Therefore the big oil combines took control of the Venezuelan 
oil industry neither because of control over the technology nor 
illegal activities on the part either of the international 
companies nor the local governments. It was due to the large 
amount of capital these consortia could handle and, over all, the 
world wide marketing framework they had. This framework 
enabled them to obtain full advantage from the economies they 
could obtain by producing oil in a high scale*
The next section is devoted to explain better how it happened 
in Venezuela as a natural consequence of the existing conditions 
in the world oil market and how it also affected the oil market 
in a world wide scale*
First Problems which the Venezuelan Oil Industry had to 
face «° The principal difficulty these companies had to face wa.s 
the lack of means of transport, especially lack of roads. In I912 
Caribbean Petroleum had to build roads over swamp areas in order to 
transport material when the first wells were dug. Colon after the 
successful digging in Rio Oro also became engaged in the construction 
of roads. This problem was less great in case of V.O.C. because 
it was working on the very bank of the Maracaibo Lake.
Another common problem for all these companies was the fact 
that they had to work in swamp areas. It complicated both, the 
building of roads and other buildings and the instalation of the
2à/
drilling rigs*
The lack of manpower also affected all these companies*
According to Sir Marcus Samuel, as he reported to the Shell 
shareholders meeting gathered on 12th June 1917s manpower with 
materials and transport were three vital elements very difficult to
Ü /
obtain in Venezuela, Caribbean sought a solution by bringing 
manpower from abroad| about a third of its staff (about 400 
workers) were foreigners, especially West Indians*
However, there were some problems which affected only some 
of these concerns* Colon was especially affected by the presence of 
Indian Tribes, namely the Mettions, in the area they were working. 
Subsequently they needed a sort of private army to prevent 
any Indian attack; they created a force from 60 to 100 armed guards 
to protect the exploring teams while another force from 50 to 60
i V
guards protected the oil fields, B, McBeth, however, reports that 
long before landov/ners in the area obtained labourers by highjacking 
Indian children; this suggests that these guards could be also used 
to get manpower.
V.O.C. had difficulties with the drilling rigs; the first ones 
were not suitable to be used in the special conditions of the 
place. So in 1914 un order was placed for drilling equipment in 
the ÏÏSA. The vicinity to the shores of Lake Maracaibo was an 
advantage as far as transport is concerned, but this also represented 
a handicap, namely the generally unhealthy working conditions due 
to the impossibility of protecting the men from malarial 
mosquitos. The company had to face another problem, but in Caracas, 
as Espina, Bohorquez and Valbuena initiated the previously mentioned 
law suit against V.O.C. alleging their better rights. As already
said no ill-effects were suffered by the company, but the event 
aroused anxiety among the company’s shareholders. When the law 
suit resulted in a verdict in favour of V,0,G*, the company
25/
requested from The Times a special report about the event®
Caribbean Go., once it had become an oil producer, had to face 
new kinds of problems. The principal one was the shallow mouth 
of the Maracaibo Lake a,s well as the shallow coast of Venezuela 
on the surrounding area. This is the reason given by Sir Marcus
i£ j
Samuel in I916 to build the principal refinery in Curacao,
But the transportation from Maracaibo to Curacao was a problem which 
remained unsolved until 1920, Then a solution was sought by 
the purchase from the Royal Wavjr of a number of monitors. These 
obsolescent war vessels became the shallow drought tankers able to sail 
across this mouth less than 12 feet deep, to convey oil from
35/
Maracaibo to the refinery of Curacao,
All these investments were repaid in 5 or 2 years as the rate
26/
of profits these companies obtained ranged between 30% and 50%®
However, these investments had important effects on the development 
of the Venezuelan oil industry.
It was previously explained how these necessary large amounts 
of initial investments precluded the early development of the oil 
activities in Venezuela, How because of the same problem, the 
Venezuelan oil industry fell under the control of the transnational 
oil combines.
It is not only the fact that a large amount of money was 
needed to initiate a successful enterprise there? the high rates 
of profits to be expected would attract capital from everyv/here.
Sir Marcus Samuel, talking about Venezuela in one of his speeches
to Shell shareholders said;
"Extensive geological work and some drilling have 
satisfied us that the associated companies have 
acquired extremely valuable territories.
Development will be slow and expensive, I believe 
that a large addition, to world supply of oil 
will be provided when our plans are fully carried 
out," (22nd June 1915). 12/
But the case is that these investments had no connection with 
the bulk of crude oil to be exploited. Therefore the only way to 
develop a profitable oil enterprise in such conditions was by 
extracting huge quantities of oil; otherwise the cost per unit of 
crude oil would become increasingly high. During the early 1910's 
only Shell and, to some extent Standard Oil (New Jersey) were able 
to take advantage of this situation as they had a, world-wide 
marketing system; other companies would become dependent on 
Shell or Standard Oil and would not be able to obtain such profits.
Another set back which hampered the early development of the
Venezuelan oil industry was the First World War. The Great War
will reappear later in this analysis as it was an important
factor in the development of the oil industry. It made oil a
strategic commodity. In fact, aeroplanes and fired war ships
existed before the war, but only the USA had had a wholly oil fired
navy since 1915® At the beginning of the war only 40% of the
British Navy was oil fired; by the signature of the armistice 95%
of the British Navy had been provided with oil fired engines.
As far as planes are concerned Britain, whose industry made tens
12/
of thousands of aeroplanes in I9I8 had just 80 in I914» The invention 
of tardes and submarines ought also to be taken into account, as 
well as the fact that lorries, cars and oil-based TNT were
increasingly used. In the last month of the war the oil used by 
the allies in the Western front alone, exceeded by 20% the whole 
of the oil used by all the fighting armies during the entire
40/
year 1914.
Nevertheless, the First World War while encouraging the oil 
industry in world wide terms, hampered Venezuelan oil business. The 
oil companies involved in oil exploration in Venezuela met 
increasingly greater difficulties in obtaining the equipment they 
needed, as British industry was now engaged in war production. In 
fact oil was becoming one of the main strategic materials, but all 
the Venezuelan oil enterprises excejzit the Caribbean Company were at 
the exploration stage, at that time when oil was needed right 
away. A war like the First World War which absorbed the whole 
economy of each fighting country left no time for thinking of the 
future. Thus only the Caribbean Petroleum Company was producing oil 
at the end of the war; the other companies had to wait until its 
end. Apart from that even Caribbean had some problems obtaining 
suppies due to the facts that the British industry was entirely 
involved in the war effort and the German submarines created
15/
strong difficulties in the transport. Shell lost about 25% of its
41/
tanker fleet during the war.
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CHAPTER VIII
Venezuelan oil policy following after the "Mene Grande" discovery
Effects of "Mene Grande" discovery on the Venezuelan oil 
policy - In fact, the successful drilling of Zumaque 1 had a 
great impact on Venezuela's oil policies, particularly on its 
attitudes towards foreign investors. The Venezuelan policy makers 
became strongly confident in this new source of revenue and tried to 
obtain from oil as much as they could.
This excess optimism was based on the above mentioned achievement, 
but also on the development of the oil industry in world wide terms, 
boosted by the First World War and the subsequent development of 
the internal combustion engine. This is the period when oil 
producing countries first obtained some of the strong bargaining 
power they still retain.
This Venezuelan attempt to re-negotiate with the oil companies 
the conditions of the original concessions led to a hidden confron­
tation between Venezuela and the companies. It reached its 
bitterest moment in what is called in this research "the Venezuelan 
oil crisis 1919-1921". The development of this struggle and its 
end in 1921 is the subject of this and the next chapter. In 
this struggle, Venezuela was defeated; the reason why it was 
defeated is linked with one of the main hypothesis of this research, 
namely, the weak internal structure of Venezuela which enabled 
companies and powers to take advantage of it. How the oil companies 
and their supporting powers exploited this weakness in this 
particular case is explained in these two chapters.
Gomez's Government and his attitude towards the Great Powers — 
Few historians see the dictator of V. Gomez in a positive way.
n
Brian S, McBeth is one of those few. He presents Gomez as the
man who put order in the Venezuelan budget, who developed
Venezuelan education and health, who created a modern road system
and other public works, and in short, who brought Venezuela to
the twentieth century.
His enemies are so divided in the view which they present
of him that it is difficult to find common ground for their
rejections; perhaps the fact that he used his power to increase
his personal wealth is one of the few commonly accepted assertions.
Betancourt and others like Marcano and Salcedo Bastardo,
who follow the line of Accion Democratica nresent Gomez as a
2/
puppet of the White House, and consequently of the US companies. 
If Gomez used to have some occasional difficulties with British 
companies, it was, according to these writers, due to suggestions 
Gomez had got from the US embassy. For some American writers, like
V
Lieuwen and Rourke, more connected with the transnational 
corporations, Gomez is a ruthless dictator who used his absolute 
political power to exploit both the Venezuelan nation and the 
international companies. Finally, some modern writers less 
linked with the events of 1928 and 1955? give to Gomez a mainly 
negative, but rather human personality. For D.A. Rangel, for 
instance, Gomez was a cunning and picturesque character whose 
flamboyant personality shone out in the Venezuela of this time
V
which, in I9OO was still living like in the Colonial Period.
At a time when there was nobody else to overshadow him, his 
cunning enabled him to take over the government in I9O8 and to
eremain in this leading position for the rest of his lifetime.
According to the evidence found in the present study.
DsAo Rangel's opinions are superficial or even wrong at some 
points, while at others his statements must be re-interpreted in 
the light of new evidence. However, in general terms his view 
about Gomez seems to be the most accurate one.
Gcmez, the ruler, was above all, a businessman. If he tried 
to remain in power, it was due to the fact that within Venezuela, 
control over the government was the main key to prosperity in 
business,
An implied view of Rangel ought to be stresses which he 
actually did not point out but which underlies his thinking 
namely the fact that if the modern Venezuelan state was not 
Gomez's creation, it was at least achieved through Gomez.
According to Rangel the only international creation of Gomez was 
the modern army, formed to destroy the old caudillos% the rest
V
was achieved by "King Oil" rather than "The Master of Power".
It might be argued that the "King" also played an important role 
in the formation of the army. Although its creation had been 
blueprinted by Castro, prior to the oil boom, the "King" provided 
the revenues to bring it to formation.
Venezuela was changing, not against Gomez's will, but, to 
some considerable extent, independently of it. Gomez was able to 
shift his policies, friends and attitudes according to the 
circumstances in order to be the master of the situation at every 
turn. In 1928, when he had exhausted the possibilities of manouvre 
and his power had faded, the old man was still the one best 
prepared to unify the ruling classes. He obtained a comfortable
position by remaining in power while others ruled in his name.
Thus Gomez cannot be presented as a mere puppet of the White 
House, as Betancourt tried to do. The abovementioned views 
held by writers connected with the foreign companies and those 
held by British diplomats appointed in Venezuela - especially 
before 1922 - show a quite different emphasis. To some extent 
Gomez was a "nationalist" in so far as nationalism meant more 
money for him and his followers. In 1914? the British Minister 
at Caracas, Frederic Hartford, complained in one of his despatches 
to Sir Edward Grey;
"I do not think there is any real desire for 
progress. The Government clique, the 
President and his rapacious relatives can 
always make large sums by the mere sale of concessions, 
or by renewing existing contracts at a price," ^
He struck a compromise between the interests of these national 
groups which supported his government on the one hand, and the 
Great Powers and the transnational companies on the other.
Otherwise these Powers could unbalance his government and put him 
at risk of being overthrown by his own supporters; the memory 
of Castro’s fate was still fresh in his mind. However he was 
permanently trying to obtain from the foreign companies as much 
as he could without clashing with them and their supporting nations. 
At the same time the Great Powers supported Gomez as a lesser evil 
(This was particularly true before 1922),
It can certainly be agreed that Gomez’s personality is not 
enough to justify his success if the Powers had not given strong 
support. The internal situation prevailing in Venezuela during 
this period helped him to achieve his political success. After 
Crespo or even before, as the need for a powerful central government
132.
was generally realised, regionalism, although surviving to some
extent until today, became a pale echo from the past. But the
old caudillos still existed; then, a powerful central government,
able to destroy them was generally needed. After Castro’s
failure Venezuelan rulers understood they could raise the national
flag, but not so high as to create problems for the Great Powers,
The ruling classes faced no real internal challenges; the industrial
workers and the middle class were almost non-existent, while the
illiterate peasantry posed no threat at all. Thus the unchallenged
ruling class was able to divide itself on minor issues, the most
prominent of which was the question of concession and concession-
mongers. This is the "shameful utilitarianism" blamed by
General Hernandez in the letter to Leopoldo Baptista quoted in 
1/
Chapter 4« This question was underlying the activities of the 
caudillos and others opposed to Gomez until 1928.
This real nature of the Venezuelan political struggle up to 
1928 increased the internal power of Golnez, but made him weak in 
terms of international affairs, A change at the top only meant 
a change of personality not of policy. This situation gave the 
Powers and the Companies the possibility of blackmailing the 
Venezuelan government by giving some support to the caudillos 
conspiring abroad, without danger of promoting a real revolution 
which could put their interests in jeopardy.
To finish this general view of Gomez, it is necessary to 
comment on one of the statements of Rangel which seems to be 
erroneous. He insists on the excellence of the well organised 
secret police set up by Gomez against his political enemies, 
worldwide. In further chapters, evidence will be given to prove that
this secret-police force was too weak to operate without the
help of the police of other countries, especially Scotland Yard,
This was one way used by the Powers to bring pressure on Gomez,
as Britain did when he tried to attack Shell’s priviledges.
Bow the oil market was affected by the Great War - The
Venezuelan attempt to increase revenue from its recently established
oil industry was not based only on internal factors, although they
were extremely important ones, Zumaque 1 had shown the existence
of shallow oil deposits in Venezuela at, or even above 1,000
feet, Venezuelan ports were nearer to New York and Europe than
Tampic or Veracruz, Finally, with the opening of the Panama Canal
and the increased number of ships propelled by oil fired engines,
Venezuela was like a filling station next to the main road from
Europe and Eastern USA to the Pacific coast, therefore the
Venezuelans were in a powerful position to demand more revenue
because even then their oil would be cheaper than elsewhere,
Venezuela was entitled to expect at least a share from these
natural advantages.
But apart from these internal advantages, which were offset
by certain difficulties like the wilderness of the country and the
shallowness of its coasts, there was an external element
which strengthened not only the Venezuelan bargaining power, but
the bargaining power of every oil producing country; it was the
First World War, As previously said, the war made oil a main
strategic element; General Joffre compared it with blood.
The initial effects of war on the oil market were negligible.
For instance, British oil imports increased only by 6% in 1914-
8/
Consequently, prices continued going down until December 1914-
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Graph No. 1 shows how the crude oil prices changed in the 
New York market between 1915 and 1920, At the end of the war the 
price was 196,5% higher than on 1st January 1915j cn the 51st December
-Lpp,
1920 this price was 450% higher than in 1915®
There are two elements which promoted these high rises in oil 
prices during the war. Apart from the increased use of oil for 
warefare purposes, important oil sources, namely Russia and 
Rumania, became temporarily out of production. Both had played an 
important role during the first months of war. However, when 
Turkey entered into war on the side of the Central Powers (first 
week October 1914)? Rumania was no longer able to send its 
production through the Straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles, It was 
eventually solved by carrying the Rumanian oil through the Russian 
territory. But later, in 1917 when the Germans conquered Rumania, 
the Rumanian output fell to less than 33% of its standard production.
This drop was due to a well organised sabotage of these oilfields
10/
by the allies just before the Germans conquered this territory*
After 1915 the Russian oil industry was particularly affected 
by labour unrest. Strikes, which lasted for months, crippled the 
Russian oil production. The Russian output of 1913 was not
n /
reached again until the late 192 0*s.
In these ways, the war affected the oil market in both structure
and prices. Its effects lasted until after the armistice.
First of all the great oil combines were able to enjoy the 
relative support of the Great Powers and they took control of the 
oil market with no official interference. In the USA the Supreme 
Court had forced the dissolution of Standard oil in 1911. However 
nobody complained when all the thirty four companies which appeared 
after Standard’s dismemberment continued working in alliance, led 
by Jersey Standard’s manager John Archbold. In Great Britain,
W. Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, who, in 1914 had
136.
accused Shell of blackmailing the Royal Navy, in 1915 expressed
publically the government's gratitude to Shell for its services
12/
to the war effort* After the armistice three of their main 
executives were awarded; Sir Marcus Samuel was made a viscount 
while H« Deterding and R. Walley-Cohen became K.B.E.'s*
A kind of de facto agreement among the oil companies along the 
lines suggested by Sir Henri Deterding was established» The 
situation did not change with the end of the war and this sort of oil 
cartel was maintained after the armistice and rose dramatically between 
these two periods. As a result of this agreement, between February 
I9I8 and October 1919 and between April 1920 and January 1921 oil 
prices were stable. The price of US/6,10 per barrel, prevailing 
since April 1920 created conditions in which small oil 
corporations were able to survive, because this price gave them 
a "standard" profit, which at that time was about 6%. Meanwhile 
the great oil consortia obtained incredibly high profits*
Table No. 5 shows the rate of dividends paid by the "Shell"
Transports and Trading Company and the Royal Dutch Petroleum Co» 
between I9O8 and 1919® It must be remembered that the dividend does 
not include that part of the profits which was retained as capital 
increase*
In fact the war only accelerated a process which had begun some 
time before. Oil demand had increased incredibly fast and it forced 
prices higher. On the other hand the diminishing waste, as every 
kind of hydrocarbon now found commercial use, reduced costs. It 
created an increasingly large gap between oil prices and oil costs®
This gap, which could be called the "oil surplus", continues to be 
a real fact in any economy based on the free market system, and exists
even when the oil companies do not take advantage of it® During 
the period being studied now, the big oil combines were able to 
catch almost all the "oil surplus" by fixing oil prices high enough 
to allow the survival of the smaller oil companies. In this 
way these big consortia obtained high profits because they were able 
to enjoy economies in costs brought about by large scale production.
Table No. 5
Dividends
T
Df Royal 
& T Co
Dutch Petroleum 
between I9O8 and
Co, and
1919
"Shell"
Year Royal Dutch Shell Year Royal Dutch Shell
1908 28% 20% Free of Tax 1914 49% 35% Free of
1909 28 22& " 1915 49 35 II
1910 26 22& " 1916 38 35 It
1911 19 20 " 1917 48 35 It
1912 41 30 " I9I8 40 35 It
1913 48 35 " 1919 45 35 It
Source - The Financer 6th July 1920 13/
This situation encouraged not only Venezuela but all the oil 
producing countries to seek a better return from their oil 
treasure. This struggle reached its climax during the 1920's and 
will be observed again in further chapters®
Gomez's mining policies until 1921 - Castro was 
overthrown by people who had been amongst the strongest supporters 
of his policies. When Gomez took over, there were therefore changes 
only for those aspects of policies which had led to Castro's 
overthrow. Even later, when Gomez sought new support and called 
the old caudillos to power in order to put Baptista and Paul aside, 
his mining policies did not change, as Castro's mining policies had
been the traditional ones followed by every Venezuelan government 
for decades.
Changes of oil policy in Venezuela were eventually brought about 
in 1912 by the international oil companies which actually boycotted 
the Venezuelan oilfields® As previously pointed out the change 
was marketed by the issue of the second Valladared concession and 
the amendment of the other ones. These concession-contracts had 
force of law; therefore the holders of these old concessions were 
well protected against any further change in the Venezuelan law.
During the 1910's the Venezuelan oil policy must be understood 
as a part - a small part - of the concession policy followed by 
Gomez, because not only had concessions become the most important 
issue in Venezuelan politics but because also there was no real oil 
law until 1918, and consequently, through the oil concession- 
contracts the whole Venezuelan oil policy was drafted.
Until 1914, oil concessions in Venezuela were less important 
than any other kind of concession. The concessions policy followed 
by Gomez annoyed the British investors and consequently the British 
Government, In his previously quoted despatch, Frederic Hartford 
reported:
"In the last year just closed namely every 
British undertaking in Venezuela had a struggle 
to defend their interests," ^
Among the multiple problems faced by the British concerns, 
Hartford mentioned unfair competition, blaclonail and unfriendly 
attacks from the Government and the press. But the main problem 
was the attempt of the Venezuelan government to annul concessions, 
once they had become profitable enterprises. These attempts were
based on twisted interpretations of the law*
But due to G<rnez*s partnership with the old caudillos, the 
policies followed by him during the first years of his government 
produced a sort of internal opposition which was strong enough to 
be exploited by the Powers® So, in I9II a conspiracy was discovered 
in Venezuela® Gomez denounced it as a Gastroist one* In this 
way Gomez obtained the full support of the USA, because they were 
especially anxious to avoid Castro's return® The British Charge d' 
Affaires at Washington, Brice, reported in 1912:
"The United States Government are of the opinion 
that nations desiring to see a responsible 
government in Venezuela® ®, would prevent the 
use of their ships and territory in manoevres 
which would hamper the Venezuelan Government in 
dealing with the menace of Castro's return®" I4/
The sensational way in which the US media reported these 
events produced some concern in influential circles within Great 
Britain. This concern became publicly apparent when an M.P, asked 
the Foreign Secretary in Parliament about these stories® Minister 
Grey answered that he had no information about the subject, apart
15/
from that supplied by the press® But Sir Edward Grey was well 
informed not only about the situation inside Venezuela, but also 
about the dealings of some of the most important exiles involved
w
in the conspiracy®
This event shows, firstly, that Gomez was able to exploit 
jealousy between Great Britain and the USA and secondly that 
Castro's presence in Venezuelan politics was no more® He himself 
had become nothing more than a name used by Gomez to obtain US 
support® The Castroist party split into two groups, one to be 
absorbed by Gomez's party and another to join the caudillos®
After 1913 Gomez changed his internal policy® Now, rid of 
Baptista and Paul, the old caudillos were no longer needed. Apart 
from some of them who had accepted Gomez’s conditions, these 
occasional allies were put aside and very soon they were abroad, 
hatching conspiracies against the Venezuelan dictator. One of these 
few caudillos who remained at Gomez's sidems Felix Garviras, He 
played an important role in the formation of the new Venezuelan 
army. The discovery of "Mene Grande" oilfields in 1914? had a great 
impact on the Venezuelan oil policy. Firstly, Oil policy and oil 
concessions became an important element within the whole Venezuelan 
concession issue, even though the Venezuelan oil output was non 
existent until 1917 and negligible until 1921, In Venezuelan politics 
oil was to become an issue in itself after 1920, Secondly, the 
"Mene Grande" discovery also encouraged Venezuelan politicians to 
intensify the oil policy they had followed before. Royalties went 
higher, areas were smaller, concession periods were shorter and 
duties to be fulfilled by the concession-holders were increased.
This mining policy was expressed in the Mining Law enacted on the 
22nd June 1915- As pointed out in the second paragraph this new 
la,w did not affect the concessions granted before 1914 because 
these old contracts had force of law,
"Val de Travers" was prevented from transforming an asphalt 
concession which they Imd bought from a French company, into one
ii/
for oil. The Venezuelan government thus prevented a concession 
granted before 1914, and consequently much more advantageous to 
the company than this new kind of grants awarded following the 1915 
law, entering into effect. The only concession-contracts still 
in force which were not affected by the new law were the four granted
J-4.L o
by Castro in 1907 the Valladares concession of 1912®
Just after this law .wæ enacted the team of geologists sent
by Standard Oil reported that in Venezuela there was no trace of
18/
oil, except in the already granted areas* Seems to be that 
what the Standard Oil geologists discovered was that the other 
areas were highly affected by the new law. If they did not 
find oil in the areas which had not been granted yet their report was 
very inaccurate; after 1922, when the Venezuelan oil legislation 
had been changed, US companies found enough oil in these areas
iV
to surpass the Venezuelan Shell output.
During the First World War, Gomez followed a policy rather
similar to that of the other Latin American country which was a
main oil producer, namely Mexico® It was to keep a neutral position,
rather favourable to the Central Powers, This attitude was not
changed even after the USA entered the war and despite the
pressure the USA put on Venezuela to force such a change. For
instance, the USA declared by unofficial statements that Venezuela
could no longer be considered a friendly country. But the USA
also took measures which went far beyond whad the International
Law could accept, like the unlawful retention in Puerto Rico of a
shipment from Spain to Venezuela, containing paper and other goods
needed by cigarette consumers, El "estanco" (State monopoly on
trade in goods needed by smokers and card players) was an important
20/
source of revenue in Venezuela, During the 1910's the amount
yielded by the estanco averaged 24% of the whole Venezuelan annual 
21/
revenue,
Gomez's international policy seems to have had no connection 
with the political ideas reflected by the Reiser as he aud V, Carranza
held a similar position despite the Mexican ruler's conviction 
that his policies were diametrically opposed to Gommez. The 
reason why Gomez was pro-German seems to be connected with his 
policy towards foreign capital® Due to the activities developed 
by the German investors in Venezuela (apart from a railway, German 
capital invested in the country was entirely devoted to foreign 
trade enterprises) they had less difficulties with the Venezuelan 
government* Moreover, due to the fact that they had arrived later 
than the British (and the TJS) entrepreneurs they had accepted less 
advantageous conditions than the first arrivals and, finally, the 
German capital invested in Venezuela was almost negligible compared 
with the British* The Mexican situation was very similar®
The new ministers appointed by Gomez after his alliance with 
the caudillos was ended, were doctors, sometimes trained in European 
or US Universities, well informed about what was going on beyond 
the Venezuelan frontiers® As previously said, Gomez and his 
"most nationalist ministers" were keen to "attract foreign investments", 
but not to bring progress in vague terms® bliat it was hoped the 
foreign capital would bring was revenue® Therefore the Venezuelan 
government tried to force the foreign companies to accept the 
conditions imposed on them® It became apparent when a law was 
enacted for force the foreign companies to accept the conditions 
imposed on them® It became apparent when a law was enacted in 
June I9I8 according to which all foreign companies whose principal 
object of exploitation, trade or industry was in Venezuela were 
to be registered as national companies® This law promoted deep 
concern in the British government, as nine large companies and 
several smaller ones operating in Venezuela were British® Moreover,
one of the two large US companies working in Venezuela was the 
Shell subsidiary Caribbean Petroleum Co® The British protest against 
this law was kindly answered by the Venezuelan Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Ur Mosquera, by sending his principal advisor,
Ur Gil Borges to the British legation to explain the objects of 
the law, but it was still enacted without any amendment.
The Mining Law enacted on 27th June I9I8 shows the same policy* 
As far as oil is concerned, this law claims the ownership of this 
resource by the nation; its exploitation is given to concession- 
holders but without resigning the property right on it® This 
policy had been clearly defined in I916 by the Minister of Fomento 
Manuel Uiaz Rodriguez® This policy had obviously not suffered any 
change with the replacement of Uiaz Rodriguez by Torres in 1917»
The entrance of the USA into war and later, the German defeat, 
did not affect Gomez's stability, partially due to the increased 
importance of oil in the world economy generally but also because the 
Powers found no better alternative to Gomez® Pressures on Gomez 
to break relations with the Central Powers have been previously 
mentioned® But the fact is that the US Government did not go 
beyond the above reported measures and they were not enough either 
to force Gdmez to change his international policy or to de-stabilise 
Gomez's government «
A few weeks before the war's end a letter sent by Gomez to his 
friend Ur Cesar Zumaeta was published by "El Universal" (28th 
September 1918)» In this letter he declared that he had been 
always sympathetic to the allies' cause and explained that his
2 1/
neutrality had been due only to reasons of principle* He also
changed a large number of his war time ministers. So Ur Mosquera was
J - 4 4  «.
/  /
replaced by Ur Borges in Foreign Affairs and Ur Uiaz Rodrigues 
by Ur Torres in Fomento®but the policies followed by the previous 
cabinet were maintained in every aspect.
Thus the Mining Law of 1918 was followed soon afterwards by 
the Coal and Oil Law (6fch March 1919) and both laws drafted an 
oil policy which finally embodied the First Venezuelan Hydrocarbon
,  25/
Code (30th June I920),
In general terms, the new legislation represented an important 
change in favour of the Venezuelan State with regards to the 
concession-contracts of 1912 and 1907» The royalties per granted 
area went from Br«2 up to Br,5 per hectare. The royalties per 
production went from Br*2 per ton up to 15% of the production, 
to be paid either in cash (at the world standard price) or in 
crude oil according to the desire of the Venezuelan government.
The concession area could not be wider than 40,000 hectares and 
the exploration period was reduced to two years. Finally, after 
exploring the area, the concession-holder had to surrender 50?^ 
each selected hectare plot, and these 250 hectares would be 
granted by the government by auction*
In such conditions, Venezuelan oilfields were actually boycotted, 
No company showed any interest in new Venezuelan concessions while 
these reports which had established that all the Venezuelan potential 
oil bearing areas had been already granted, received wide publicity. 
Until 1922 only "Mene Grande" oilfield were in production.
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CHAPTER IX
The Venezuelan Oil Crisis 1919-1921
Venezuela becomes an oil exporter - As soon as "Zumaque 1"
was successfully completed? Venezuela became a Promised Land as far
as oil was concerned and the press announced the strong possibility
1/
of having in Venezuela a future Mexico* There were some problems, 
many connected with transport, but there was no problem in the 
detection of oil. These difficulties took two years to overcome 
and in 191? Venezuela appeared in the oil producer's ranking. In 
I9I8 the Venezuelan output was 2,7 times as much as in the previous 
year (see Table No, 6),
Table No, 6
Venezuelan crude oil output between 1917 and 1921
Year
Venezuelan
output 
(1 ,0 0 0 barrels)
annual
inc^ase
Ratio
Ï9Î7
% of 
world 
output
Venezuelan 
oil exports
(1,000 barrels)
% exported
of the
Venezuelan
output
1917 121 “ 100 0.02 57 47
I9I8 321 165 265 0 ,0 6 147 46
1919 304 -5 251 0 ,0 5 14 5
1920 462 52 382 0 .0 7
1921 1,449 214 1,198 0 .1 9 1 ,0 0 4 69
Sources M« M, H, Algimos Aspectos de las Actividades Petroleras 2/
Venezolanas, Mundiales y Apendice Estadistico I967? p. 1-A185
As in I9I8 the San Lorenzo Refinery entered into production, 
this waa the last year Venezuela had to import oil products for
2/
its own consumption. Since 1917 Venezuela had also been an oil 
exporter, and in 1917 and I9I8 Venezuela exported nearly half of its
own production. In 1918 over 99*5% of its petroleum exports were of 
unrefined oil (see Table no® 7)®
Table No. 7
Venezuelan Oil Imports and Exports in I9I8
Imports Exports
Tons % Tons %
Kerosene 2,388 71*0 4 negl.
Gasoline 960 28.5 88 0.5
Crude Oil — 26,062 99.5
Others 25 0.5 —
TOTAL 3,373 100 26 ,154 100
Source; Report of Petroleum; Enclosure in C. Dormier's despatch 
No. 13 to Lord Curzon. 31st March 1920. j/
San Lorenzo’s activity led to a drop in oil prices within 
Venezuelan territory. One gallon of kerosene had dropped in price 
from Es.3 to Bs.2.40 (from 2s. to Is lOd,), and gasoline went dovm 
in price from Bs,2.95 to Bs.2.30 (from 2s 3&b to Is lO^d), The 
former oil supplier of Venezuela had been the West India Oil 
Company (subsidiary of the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey).
This activity in oil had, however, made very little change in 
the economic activity of Venezuela. Agriculture still provided 
over 95% of Venezuelan exports. Coffee alone represented around 
36% of Venezuelan exports in 1917, less than 38% in I9I8 and 
over a half of these exports in 1919® Oil made up only 0.4% of 
Venezuelan exports in 1917 and 1% in I9I8 while asphalt which was 
a hydrocarbon, and also a Venezuelan commodity represented 1.4%
4/
in 1917 and 1.5% in 1918.
The importance of the recently established Venezuelan oil 
industry was also negligible in terms of absorbtion of manpower.
In a country with about 3 million inhabitants, "Caribbean", the 
only company which had reached the stage of production, employed 
just over 4OO men. The other enterprises invoved in oil exploration 
had less than 200 workers altogether* Due to the lack of skilled 
labour many of these men came from abroad, especially from the 
West Indies.
In 1916, the US embassy in Venezuela, sent a memorandum
2/
reporting the development of the Venezuelan oil industry* It 
reported the existence of about 10 companies, almost all incorporated 
in London, involved in oil exploration. This was the main importance 
of Venezuela's oil in the late IRlO's, namely as a source of 
further supply in a world increasingly hungry for oil. Therefore, 
the companies found particular difficulty in putting pressure on 
Gomez to change his new oil policy. As it has been explained, the 
boycott against the new Venezuelan oil concessions was being 
carried out, but it could not last indefinitely; Venezuelan oil 
was badly needed in the world market*
As previously said what is named in this work "the Venezuelan 
oil crisis 1919-1921" was the bitterest stage of a struggle between 
Venezuela and the oil companies, in which Venezuela attempted to 
obtain a better share of its own oil. This struggle between 
Venezuela and the oil companies, in which Venezuela attempted to 
obtain a better share of its own oil. This struggle was hidden, 
because not one of the contestants taking part recognised the 
struggle, but Table No. 6 shows how bitter it was. Moreover,
Table No, 6 cannot show the forms of political pressure put on the
Venezuelan government. These are to be explained later.
US oil companies and the Venezuelan oilfields during the 1910*s - 
It has been said that after 1905j Standard Oil had initiated oil 
enterprises beyond the U.S. frontiers. In fact some unsuccessful 
attempts had been initiated shortly before. At the end of the 
first World War, Standard Oillh Jersey's, subsidiary International 
Petroleum Company controlled nearly 80% of the Peruvian output. 
However, to create a world wide drilling system, was difficult if 
not impossible, as Shell, which controlled the world market, would
y
do anything to hamper Standard Oil in this task.
Therefore, despite some important attempts to develop a 
further world wide drilling system - in some cases successful - 
Standard Oil preferred to leave this task to other companies from 
which, it bought crude oil. During the 1910's Standard Oil 
obtained crude oil in Mexico from Doheny's Huasteca Co. and even from 
Lord Cowdray 's Mexican Eagle Co.
The First World War improved the position of the US companies, 
especially Standard Oil, in the world oil market, as Shell failed in 
supplying the allied armies, 80% of the latter*s needs were
supplied by the USA and 25% of the total was provided by Standard Oil
V  , ,
of New Jersey. During the war US output was increased by 34% (266
million barrels in 1914 and 356 millions in I9I8) while the world
output only increased by 25% (404 million barrels in I914 and 503
millions in I9I8). Consequently, the US output which was 65*8% of
8/
world production in 1914? was 70.8% in I9I8® The US tanker fleet 
which had been just 158,267 tons in 1913? was 1,790,648 tons by 
1920. In 1913 it represented 10% of the total of tankers crossing
A
world seas; by 1920 the percentage had risen to 51%» Moreover,
the US government was supporting the US companies where it was
10/
possible. Phillipinnes and Haity are two examples.
However, the policy followed by the Standard Oil of New 
Jersey? was to leave the drilling activities to other "independent" 
enterprises, which would then become their eventual suppliers.
This was the policy followed by Standard Oil in Venezuela until 
the late 1920's.
The "small" US oilmen appeared in Venezuela after 1914» They 
were small concerns like Sun and Pure? receiving full technical 
support from Standard Oil of New Jersey. However, at the end of 
the day, the small company was wholly responsible for the success 
or failure of the enterprise. In I916 the US embassy at Caracas 
drafted an accurate memorandum concerning the Venezuelan oil 
activities. He shows that the USA had a special interest in the 
subject although the only US oil company reported in this 
document is the Caribbean Petroleum Company.
During the early 1920's, the British Minister at Caracas 
reported the presence in Venezuela of a number of US concession-
u J
hunters. He gave names like Addison-MacKay, Kay and Woods. 
Addison-MacKay is the most important among them as he was the man
i P
who drafted the Hydrocarbon Laws of 1921 and 1922. He had 
arrived in Venezuela in 1917®
But these concession-hunters and the companies which were 
behind them had got concession drafted according to the same rules 
which were established by the "unworkable" law of 1920. None of 
these Gompanied did anything to develop the concessions they had 
won and consequently no Venezuelan oilfield owned by US concerns 
(excepting Caribbean, of course) produced any part of Venezuelan
output until 1924*
Shell in 'Venezuela before 1920 - Two out of four oil concessions 
granted by Castro in I907 were under Shell control. The second 
Valladares concession was also transferred to Shell; all these 
concessions were not affected by the new laws. However, Shell 
was not particularly active during this period® Only "Caribbean" 
had reached a production stage and in 1919 this company had just
M /
five wells all over its 500,000 hectares concession area.
There were both internal and external reasons for their 
lack of activity, (development). Shell, as other foreign.concerns 
working in Venezuela, was suspicious d)out the attitude of the 
Venezuelan government should their enterprises prove profitable.
Due to the development of the new Venezuelan oil legislation, 
future attempts by this government to annul the old concessions 
were to be expected.
But there were also external problems. Shell was particularly 
badly battered during the First World War. Its powerful fleet 
was one of the main targets for the German submarines; as pointed
22/
out in Chapter 79 25% of its fleet was sunk. Subsequently, 
at the end of the war the British tanker fleet, although 
increased from 862,760 tons to 1,257s546 tons between 1913 and 
19205 had decreased from 56% of the total world tonnage in 1913 
to 36% in 1920, However, as part of the Shell fleet sailed under 
Dutch, US or other flags, it was still by far the largest 
tanker fleet in the world owned by a single consortium, though 
Shell ' 8 ov/n influence was diminishing.
Apaxt from the war, the Russian Revolution was also a setback 
for Shell, as the bolshevicks expropriated all their ventures
there without any compensation. "Shell" oilfields in Russia had 
yielded 32% of Shell world output in 1914» That year the 
Russian oilfields ranked second among Shell crude oil sources,
M /
less than 1% behind Dutch East Indies, which ranked first.
But all these events would have had only temporary consequences 
if there had not been a permanent element which allowed them to 
persist. This permanent element was the fact that the USA was not 
the only the main oil producer, but also the main oil consumer® 
Although this phenomenon was particularly clear during the 1920's 
- Table No. 8 shows it well - it has always prevailed in the world 
oil market from the very beginning of the oil industry to this 
day.
This fact gave the US Government the possibility to intervene
in the world oil market on behalf of the US consortia, and the
big ones were able to take advantage of it. For instance the
British Government made some attempts to prevent US consortia from
entering the Middle East and the Commonwealth, while Holland
attempted to do the same in its colonies, but the policy, clearly
planned on Shell's behalf, failed. To reach its world wide
dominant position, the Shell Group had been present in the USA
since the beginning of this century. During the 1920's the USA
ranked among the three main Shell crude oil sources', yielding
18/
between l/3 and l/4 of Shell's output; therefore Shell was
unable to face the retaliatory measures the USA could take and,
and, consequently, the US companies had to be allowed to compete
22/
with Shell in both, British and Dutch colonies. For 
similar reasons, the "oil entente" signed by Great Britain and 
France in San Remo (24th April 1920) failed only a few months
155.
after being signed.
Table No. 8
US oil imports and exports between 1921 and 1926
imports exports Balance in favour
% of the US output
Year (1 ,0 0 0 barrels)
exports or 
imports exported imported
1921 125 ,364 66,399 58,965 12.5
1922 127,308 69,587 57,721 10.3
1923 82,015 94,943 12,928 1.7
1924 77,775 110,992 33,217 4 .6
1925 61,824 106 ,968 45,144 5 .9
1926 60,384 123,583 73,199 9.4
Source: US Department
,11/
of Commerce (1927)
Because of the great power of the USA in the world oil
market a sort of unsigned agreement seems to have come about, 
according to which Shell withdrew from Latin America. During the 
period studied here the mass media reported a bitter contest 
between Shell and Standard Oil. In later chapters evidence will 
be given to deny the reality of such a contest. Between 1914 and 
1920 this struggle actually took place to a minor extent, but 
even then it was much less bitter than it has been depicted.
There are some facts which should be taken into account in 
detecting the sort of agreement which has been suggested. Shell 
never entered Peru and did not undertake any hew concession in 
Venezuela between 1915 and the end of the period studied in 
this research, Mexico can be considered as an exception;
Mexican Shell output increased from 20% of the whole Mexican output
1 5 6 ,
21/
in 1920 up to 63% in 1937 when the Mexican oil industry was
22/
nationalised®
The Venezuelan oil policy between 1919 and 1920 ™ Thus? 
the oil policy drafted in the concession-contracts issued after 
1914, had failed® The only ventures being either explored or 
exploited were not affected by the new policy as they enjoyed 
concession-contracts issued before 1912,
Minister Torrez and his advisers were also well aware of 
what was going on all over the world. The high profits obtained by 
the oil consortia were also knovm and Venezuela, as well as other 
oil producing countries was eager to increase its revenue from 
this source of wealth. The Colombian oil la,w of 1919 is a good
22/
example of this generalised attitude. It ought to be said that 
this policy among oil producing countries was most widespread 
during the 1920's; Colombia and Venezuela were merely the forerunners 
In fact, after 1919 the big oil combines were no longer 
unchallenged as far as appropriation of the "oil surplus" was 
concerned. Apart from the governments of the oil producing 
countries, ca,r and transport industries, the governments of the 
oil consuming countries etc. also became interested in obtaining a 
share in the "oil surplus". This phenomenon will be explained later 
because it had delayed effects in Venezuela.
The Venezuelan government was aware of the buoyant New York 
oil market, where crude was making US/6,10 per barrel. In view 
of the optimistic world situation envisaged by the oil producing 
countries, Torres ignored the initial failure of his oil policies 
to produce development, and continued with those same policies.
Thus he issued his Mining Law of I9I8 and his Coal and Oil Law
of 1919® World needs for oil meant that the kind of boycott being 
carried out by foreign oil companies regarding the Venezuelan oilfields 
could not last for much longer*
However, there was a weak point in the Venezuelan position 
which had to be defended. Shell and the newly incorporated 
British Controlled Oilfields Ltd. (This last concern owned 
Planas concession) had large concession-areas and their contracts 
were not affected by the new legislation* So they could compete 
with the government by leasing part of their concession-areas for a 
rent amounting to less than the difference between the royalties and 
taxes to be paid under the new legislation and the royalties and 
taxes to be paid according to these old concession-contracts (in 
fact this sort of lease was established at least once by BCO Ltd)* 
Therefore, the nullification of the old concession-contracts was 
necessary for the government to have any possibility of succeeding 
with this new oil policy. The fact that Shell and BCO were 
actually supporting the boycott on Venezuelan oilfields held by 
US companies both encouraged the government of Caracas to carry 
out the attempt to nullify the old concessions and gave a good 
pretext to gain this nullification.
As previously said, a kind of world wide contest between 
Shell and Standard Oil took place during the First World War 
and just after the armistice. However, the struggle was 
exaggerated by the mass media when this contest was in progress*
These reports by the press seem to have misled the Venezuelan 
government which assumed it could obtain US support in its attempts 
to annul the old British owned oil concessions. This wrong belief 
was reinforced by some legal attempts launched on behalf of certain
15Ü.
minor US oilmen to annul the Valladares concession. Although 
there was no official association between these companies and 
Standard Oil, the actual link (previously explained) with this 
great US oil consortium was well known*
However to obtain the nullification of these old concessions 
was only a small part of Torres oil policy. The most important 
part of it was to enact a new Hydrocarbon law which would give to 
Venezuela the best possible share of its oil wealth.
How this oil policy was implemented - The Venezuelan 
government initiated its attempts to annul the old concessions by 
attacking the Caribbean Petroleum Company. The accuracy with 
which this concession-contract had been issued made the company 
more vulnerable as it could not exploit loopholds on its own 
behalf. The campaign, against CPC had been initiated in I916. The 
la,wyers appointed by the company issued a memorandum on its behalf, 
explaining the reasons why the company had proceeded more slowly 
in its works than was expected and stressing the disadvantageous 
position of the company, as holder of the Valladares concession; 
the grantholders of the concession granted by Castro in 1907 only 
needed a single well anyi^ fhere on the concession-area to fulfil 
these duties. Eventually the case of the company was rejected and 
CPC after paying a Hr.409,000 fine £16,360) only retained 409 plots 
out of 1,008 previously selected (204,500 hectares instead of
,  m l
514,000).
Caribbean produced the whole Venezuela output until 1922.
Table No . 6 shows particularly clearly the effects of these events. 
The final verdict had some positive effect regarding Venezuelan 
interests, as the Venezuelan output, after decreasing by 5% between
1918 and 1919, increased by 52% between 1919 and 1920. However
25/
Venezuelan oil exports went do\m to zero*
In spite of its scant success in this first stage, the 
Venezuelan government decided to go ahead with their attempts to 
annul the old oil concessions. The next stage was directed 
against the concessions granted by Cipriano Castro in 1907» In 
October 1919, the Colon Development Company, which held the Vigas 
concession was prosecuted as, according to the Government, the 
concession-contract had lapsed because the concession-holder
26/
had not fulfilled the duties he had agreed to undertake*
In fact the contract established that the concession had to be 
ruled according to the I9O6 Mining Law and also established that 
the concession-bolder had to initiate the works in the area 
within four years of the publication of the contract in the 
Official Gazette. The concession-contract also established that 
the concession-holder had to draw a map of the concession-area, 
dividing it in 200 hectare plots* The royalties to be paid 
upon the granted area were charged only on the previously selected 
plots. In the Attorney-General's view there was a contradiction in 
the contract. It was to be governed by the Law of I9O6 , but it had 
an area of over a million hectares when the mentioned law only 
allowed concessions for some thousands of hectares. According to 
the Attorney-General this last rule had to be taken into account 
even though the I9O6 Law excluded oil from its rulings, and left 
the government to establish these concession as it wanted. To solve 
the alleged contradiction the laiyyers of the Venezuelan government 
considered that each 200 hectare plot had to be taken as an independent 
concession and as exploitation had been initiated in only four of
I b U o
these hundreds of concessions within the four years period; the 
company would be able to retain only eight hundred hectares of 
the million initially granted to it.
The lav/yers of the company argued that the word "conoesion" 
(concession) appeared in singular in the concession contract, 
it meant the concession was considered as only one* The alleged
2J/
contradiction between the Vigan contract and the Mining Law of
igo6 did not exist. If this law did not accept concessions
for more than some thousands of hectares, it also excepted oil
from its rules and gave right to the executive to issue
the concessions without any restriction®
The government rejected these statements as childish;
according to such an interpretation the company would be able to fulfil
the duties undertaken in the concession-contract by digging a
single well and thus the company would retain for forty years the
exclusive right to exploit the existing oil resources within an
area of one million hectares by paying royalties for only two
hundred hectares* After correspondence to discuss this which
lasted for a couple of months, the problem was submitted to the
28/ 22/
Federal Court of Cassation* Soon after VOC and BCO were 
involved in similar litigations, as all these concession-contracts 
issued by Castro in I907 followed the sa,me pattern.
Without the nullification of these old concessions any new 
Hydrocarbon Law would be meaningless. How, when the legal 
proceedings to get this nullification were in progress, a well
X /
studied law was enacted on 20th June 1920; in order to give to 
Venezuela the highest share possible from its oil wealth. The new 
law fixed the royalty per granted area in Br*5 per hectare and the
Ibl,
royalty over production in 15% of the whole company's output - paid 
either in crude oil or in cash (at the standard price in New York) 
according to the will of the Venezuelan government. In comparison 
with the old concessions (Bs.2 per hectare and Bb*2 per ton), 
taken into account that the standard price in New York was US^6alO 
per barrel (B;S*50.50) and that a ton is roughly 7»5 barrels, the 
royalty per granted area had been increased by 150% and the 
royalty over production by 1,600%* The concession-area granted to 
each company could not be larger than 40 ,000 hectares and the 
exploration period was reduced to two years* Finally, after 
exploring the area, the concession-bolder had to surrender 50% of 
each selected 500 hectare plot, and these 250 hectares would be 
granted by the government by auction*
At the beginning of 1921 the Federal Court of Cassation gave a 
final verdict in the litigation between the Venezuelan government 
and the Colon Development Company* As it was to be expected this 
Highest Venezuelan Tribunal supported the government's views in 
all its points. The litigation between the government and other 
British owned companies holding the same kind of oil concessions 
were still in progress, but their position was hopeless after this 
verdict*
Romulo Betancourt tries to present the case as a natural
reaction of Dr G. Torres facing the blunt violation of the
Venezuelan law by these companies and that this action was inspired
by US oilmen. Finally, Betancourt presents the solution of the
problem, the giving back of these concessions to their holders,
as being imposed by the USA, because 25% of Colon's stock was
11/
owned by a US company® According to certain opinions expressed
IbZ,
by Torres and mentioned by the British Minister it is clear that 
Torres' target was to annul these contracts which in his view
12/
were bitterly unfair with regards to the Venezuelan interests®
The concessions of I907 can in fact be considered as unfair for 
Venezuela, but the legal view held by the government was clearly 
weak® Moreover, according to the British documents, the verdict 
was delayed for nearly a year because the government tried to 
reach an agreement with the companies, and it was not possible 
because H» Beterding did not accept any solution in which the 
companies had to surrender the advantages granted by the old
n /
concession-contracts.
Betancourt, stressing his view that the core of bhe litigation 
was a struggle between US and British capitalists, describes US 
oilmen as vultures hovering over the Colon company's corpse®
But, apart from any literary allusion used by Betancourt, McBeth 
can only present one case to back Betancourt's description; Pure 
Oil Co® applied to obtain the area included in the Planas concession 
(owned by BCO Ltd®}® The lack of real interest in these 
concession-areas shows that the real advantage of these old oil 
concessions was not the quantity of knoivn oil resources within 
their areas but the special treatment they had according to their 
concession-contracts; this advantage would not be obtained by 
anyone else if these contracts were annulled® What Americans 
really needed was the abolition of the 1920 Hydrocarbon Law, This 
law was eventually described by the British Minister as an
15/
"unworkable la,w" ®
Both, British and US oilmen were holding a kind of boycott over 
the Venezuelan oil in order to defeat Torres' policy® But now the
world situation was rather different than in 1912* In 1920 the
world output had increased by about 90% as compared with the 
16/
me:Mti(p.'3d year* Moreover, the situation prevailing in Russia as 
a consequence of social unrest before 191? and because of civil 
warfare after the Soviet Revolution, crippled one of the main oil 
producers. Thus, Torres was right to some extent. The boycott 
could not last for much longer.
But the oil consortia and their supporting Powers could 
exploit Venezuelan disturbances to force Gomez to advance these 
oil policies. In fact they did it with full success; the role 
played by the exiled caudillos on behalf of the transnational 
companies was invaluable*
Companies and caudillos together against Gomez - Since the 
very beginning of Gomez's rule, exiles tried to obtain support of 
both foreign governments and private capitalists in order to launch 
an invasion and to "liberate" the country. Apart from flattering 
declarations - like ("Britain USA etc.) is a democratic country and 
therefore has the duty to help the liberation of Venezuela from the 
dictator Gomez - private entrepreneurs received the promise of 
attractive concessions as a reward in case of success. These exiles 
became more active after the armistice. They assumed that they 
had then more chance of obtaining support due to the neutrality 
maintained by Venezuela during the First World War.
Britain was particularly convenient for these conspirators; its 
colony of Trinidad was in a very strategic place. Therefore 
Britain was one of the countries where the conspirators put more 
emphasis in order to obtain support.
Until 1919, these conspirators did not obtain any success in the
JLU^ I-,
efforts to seek support for their conspiracies in any foreign 
country, particularly Great Britain. The British Government was 
not particularly happy with Gomez and his government, but in 
Venezuela there were nine large British companies and many smaller 
ones (the US Caribbean Petroleum Co, which was controlled by Shell 
was not included)® In case of civil war the premises of these 
companies would be under threat of being damaged or even destroyed.
Even in 1920, when the British Government had changed its views 
regarding this problem, it was rather worried about the effect that 
political disturbances inside Venezuela could have on British 
companies working there. Concerning this problem, the British Minister 
at Caracas wrote in May 1920;
"If a revolution were to break out it would 
probably not be very serious and foreign 
interests would not greatly suffer*" 38/
So, the British Government was not willing to support any 
attempt to disturb the peace inside Venezuela as long as Gomez 
remained just acceptable to the British interests®
Weapon export prohibition from Trinidad was maintained, aud the 
conspirators did not obtain even tolerance for their actions 
inside the British Empire.
But lack of internal support was not the only problem these 
conspirators did not obtain even tolerance for their actions 
inside the British Empire.
But lack of international support was not the only problem 
these conspirators faced. They were divided into as many groups 
as there were caudillos. Although all of them were against Gomez 
they had difficulties accepting any one of them as the overall
I b p ,
leader.
But suddenly in 1919, all these exiled caudillos were able to
find a common leader in the person of Dr Ortega Martinez. It
seems that they got foreign help even to achieve this agreement;
private letters interchanged among them are conserved as official
12/
papers by the Foreign Office,,
After having obtained the unity, the civil war began® There
was some warfare in the eastern parts of Venezuela, but the main
effort was concentrated in the Western Region, using Colombian
territory to sustain the rebel force® Although a cavalry unit
initiated some actions in Apure, the main offensive was launched against
Tachira* San Cristobal, capital of the latter state fell under
rebel control, but Tachira's governor General Eustoquio Gomez
(Juan Vicente's uncle) once reinforced was able to retake the city®
Venezuela had changed* How the army was powerful enough to
stop these guerrilas without hesitation® The only possibility of
success for this revolution was the army's splitting, but apart
y 40/
from some exceptions the army remained united around Gomez*
The international press tried to exaggerate the importance and 
success of the rebels in this guerrila warfare, but at the end of 
1920 Gomez was master of the situation. Moreover, in this difficult 
moment Gomez showed all his resources as an opportunist. To 
ensure his position a series of populist measures, like price 
control on goods of popular consumption were imposed.
But Gomez had won only the first battle* His enemies, well 
supplied by Powers and companies, were preparing a second offensive*
In many cases, they needed no more help than the authorities 
turning a blind eye to their activities; they had enough money to
l 6 6 ,
buy a good stock of weaponry by themselves. A good example of this
was General Linares Alcantara, a West Pointer, son of a former
Venezuelan president, who was preparing a shipment of weapons and
42/ y
ammunition to send to Venezuela; Gomez's secret police were 
partially aware of this event, but they were unable to do anything® 
However, the main problem for Gomez did not come from abroad.
Kany of these who supported his government, did so because his 
dictatorship gave peace. Therefore a long civil war would undermine 
his government no matter what partial victories his army could 
obtain*
Finally Torres' oil policy suffered another setback. The US 
government had kept an absolute silence about the Colon case, 
and the US ambassador at Caracas, T. McGoodwin, had denied support 
to the "Caribb Syndicate" (US partner in the company). This fact 
suggested that Torres was succeeding in exploiting the rivalry 
between British and US companies® But just after the final verdict 
against Coldh, the US ambassador visited Gomez to talk on behalf 
of the company because of the 25% of the stock owned by the mentioned 
US concern.
Thus a few weeks after the verdict of the Federal Court of 
Cassation against Colon, the old concessions were reestablished.
In fact the representatives of Colon, VOC and BCO signed a new 
contract with the Venezuelan Government. According to this new 
contract all the priviledges granted to the concessions of I907 
were conserved except that the duties connected with exploration 
periods and selection of plots were precisely defined. The 
companies would have five years to select plots for exploration, 
the companies would have to pay a special royalty upon these plots
selected for exploration amounting to only B.s*0.20per hectare*
During a second five years period they had to select plots, for 
exploration; then they would have to pay upon these plots the full 
territorial royalty amounting to Ds®2 (March 1921),
Once Gomez had been forced to withdraw from his oil policy, 
the caudillos were no longer needed. General Linares Alcantara 
had chartered two vessels, the Odin and the Harrier, but both were 
embargoed due to actions of Scotland Yard when they were being 
loaded in Amsterdam and Swansea respectively. The Harrier had 
been the HMS Harrier, sold by the Royal Navy just after the Hirst
41/
World War,
How Gomez withdrew from his nationalist oil policy - The 
agreement between the Venezuelan Government and the three above- 
mentioned British companies was the beginning of a series of 
measures which shaped a new attitude towards the transnational oil 
companies. As previously pointed out, these three companies (namely 
Colon, VOC and BCO) owned three of the four concessions granted by 
Castro in 1907» The agreement, signed in March 1921, gave new life 
to the referred concessions which had been actually abolished by the 
Federal Court of Cassation less than a month before.
Almost simultaneously. Dr Gil Borges, Minister for Internal 
41/
and Foreign Affairs and one of the leading persons in this oil 
policy, was dismissed. Dr Gumercindo Torres became isolated in the 
cabinet.
After the agreement between Venezuela and the three companies, 
the Hydrocarbon Law of 1920 became meaningless; under such circumst­
ances, concessions granted under the above mentioned law resulted 
in such disadvantages with regards to the old concessions that no
168.
one would be interested in these concessions* So on 11th July 
1921 the Official Gazette No* 14414 published the New Hydrocarbons
15/
Law sanctioned on l6th June* The new law brought great
advantages to the concession-holders, The exploration term, in 
which the concession-bolder had to select plots was extended from 
two up to three years* The maxiiram extension allowed to a single 
concession-bolder was increased from 40 ,000 up to 120 ,000 hectares 
and the royalties over production were decreased to 10% of the 
company's output* However, this duty to surrender 50% of each 
selected plot was maintained*
In June 1922, Gomez was reelected for the period 1922-1929*
When he formed his new cabinet Hr Torres was not recalled,
46/
being replaced as Minister of Homento by Da? Alamo*
12/
Finally on 9th June 1922 a new Hydrocarbon law was enacted*
The new law put no limits to the area that a single concession-bolder
could hold, the concession-period was extended from thirty up to
forty years and the royalties over production to be paid were
diminished to 5% of each concession-holding company's output * The
concession holder became able to hold 100% of each selected plot.
V/hen the law was being studied by parliament, private companies
were invited to give their opinions* Shell and BOO did not reply
to this question; their concessions were not affected by this law.
Only one British company, namely the British Equatorial Company,
answered the Venezuelan question. In fact the proposals stressed
by this company (which was affected by the new law) were less
advantageous to the companies than the articles of the law as it
was finally enacted* For instance, British Equatorial did not
attempt to abolish the article which forced the concession-bolder
48/
to surrender 50% of each selected plot*
In studying the Hydrocarbons Law of 1922, Godofredo Gonzalez
says:
"The tax system undergoes a radical change: 
taxes are considerably reduced and it is 
difficult to understand the reason why*"
The British Minister at Caracas, H*B* Beaumont gave a non 
diplomatic explanation of the enactment of this new law by saying;
"a..at the same time the American financier 
mentioned in my despatch OTA No* 3 of June 15th 
last year (Addison MacKay) has again been active in 
influential quarters by methods which tactfully 
employed appeal with special force to South 
American legislators*" 47/
It could be understood that H*B* Beaumont was suggesting that 
the American concession-hunter had bribed a number of Venezuelan 
congressmen*
In fact, these events can be explained without supposing any 
bribery* After having failed in the abolition of the old oil 
concession, the Venezuelans could not expect any good effect from 
the Hydrocarbon Law of 1920* The old concessions were large enough 
to allow the old concession-holding companies to lease part of 
their areas to other concerns so that there would be little or 
no development in other areas of Venezuela* By the new law, new 
concessions were granted and at least a part of the Venezuelan 
oil gave a bit more revenue *
The crisis of 1919-1921 finished in a sort of overthrow, but 
the person who overthrew Gomez was Gomez himself. In fact this 
statement seems a bit odd* However, at least as far as oil was 
concerned, the change was stronger than in December 1908* Gomez 
remembered as head of government, but in only one year all the
170,
Ministers had been changed, especially the Minister for Foreign 
and Internal Affairs Dr Gil Dorges and the Minister for Fomento 
Dr Gnmercindo Torres, both of them leading fignres in Gomez's 
previous cabinet. Moreover, Dr Borges went in to exile just after 
leaving the cabinet; Borges never became involved in any dealing 
with other Venezuelan exiles. Between 1922 and 1928 Gomez can be 
considered as subservient to the Great Powers and international 
companies, especially regarding oil affairs^
This subservience is nevertheless only real to a certain extent® 
Gomez had been tamed but he did attempt to release himself on at 
least one occasion (1924-1929), Be tried again a new hydrocarbon 
law to obtain the abolition of the old concession. As before, he 
attempted to use the alleged rivalry between British and US 
interest, but he failed. His enemies however, succeeded in 
exploiting the caudillos to press him.
The US attitude must be observed; they kept an initial silence 
which led the Venezuelan government into the belief that they were 
being supported in their attempts to abolish the old oil concessions. 
When the real US attitude became knov/n, the psychological shock to 
the Venezuelan Government was therefore that much greater, Marcano
52/
and Betancourt evidence shows a bitter disappointment to the 
oilmen interested in the concession-areas controlled by Colon,
What the US attitude actually shows is that the main oil consortia, 
either British or US, were fighting together against the smaller 
companies and the disagreements between the big oil companies were 
exaggerated to hide the real struggle.
In fact the US oilmen had nothing to gain by the abolition 
of the old oil concessions. In spite of the report drafted by
171.
Standard Oil geologists in 19155 the rest of the Venezuelan 
territory was rich in oil resources, as was eventually proved®
The real advantage these concession-holders had, was the contracts 
which forced the Venezuelan Government to give them special 
treatment® But if the contract was abolished, the company 
which obtained the area would no longer enjoy the advantages of 
the old contracts*
1922 marks the beginning of the British withdrawal from the 
Venezuelan oilfields* Until 1924 British companies produced 100% 
of the Venezuelan output and US companies only obtained over ^0% 
of the Venezuelan output from 1927 onwards* But after 1922 no new 
British company initiated works in Venezuela, and moreover, most 
either sold their concession to US companies or amalgamated with 
them* By 1940 only Shell remained in Venezuela*
It was, nevertheless, not a consequence of the litigation 
against Colon* The only reason which can allow such a view is the 
chronological connection between both events, for there is nothing 
else connecting both occurrences®
NOTES
1. Financial Times, 25th February 1920; Shell Archives, Cutting 
Papers Vol® 21, p, 5 left. Financier* 6th July 1920; Shell Archives, 
Cutting Papers Vo® 25, p. 11 right. Loyd List* 4th September 1920; 
Shell Archives, Cutting Papers Vol® 24 p. 12 left*
2, Although from the same source, the Venezuelan annual outputs were 
quoted by Mejia Alarcon, Pedro Esteban. La Industria del Petroleo 
en Venezuela (Caracas 1972) p. 154, and the annual exports by 
MordnGu-illermo. A History of Venezuela (London I964) p. 224.
The international information is taken from Encyclopedia Espasa™ 
Calpe Supplement 1951 (Madrid 1935) vol® 8 pp® 580-581» The rest 
of the Table has been calculated from this information.
5 . Oil Report. Ehclosure in Mr C* Bormier's despatch No* 15 to 
Lord Curzon 51st March I92O. F.O. 571 Piece 4622 No. 1805»
4* McBeth, B.S. Juan Vicente Gomez and the Oil Companies (Oxford I98I)
p. 226, Quoted from Alamo Ibarra, Roberto. Resumenes estadistlcos 
del Gomercio Exterior de los Estados Ilnidos de Venezuela 
Gorrespondientes al lapso 1908-1928 y primes semettre 1929 
TcSFa“5as 1930).--------------------- ---------------------
5* The US report of I916 was included in a Memorandum sent by HM 
Petroleum Executive to the Foreign Office. 8th April 1919 
F.O. 571 Piece 4254 No. 71449.
6. Bames, John K. Beterding - The Napoleon of the Oil World.
(fifth article of the series "The Crisis in the World's Oil 
Supply). World Work January I92I p. 55* Shell Archive Cutting 
Papers Vol. 25.
7o Benny, Ludwell, We Fight for Oil (New York-London 1928) p. 28.
8. Encyclopedia Espasa-Calpe, Volume 44 (Madrid I921) pp. 242-245.
9. Manchester Guardian 27th January I92I, Shell Archives Cutting 
Papers Vol. 26 p. 11 centre (245)
10. Letter from Lord Curzon to Bavies, on 9th,August 1920. Quoted by 
Poster, Henry A. IraEj. (London 1956) p. 106.
11. C. Dormer's annual report to Sir A, Chamberlain. 25th June 1925 
F.O, 571 Piece 9658 No. 5572,
12. H. Beaumont's despatch OTA No. 5 to Lord Curzon 15th July I92I 
FO 571 Piece 5721 No, 5977 and H. Beaumont's despatch No. 47 
to Lord Balfour 15th Jime 1922. F.O. 571 Piece 7525 No. 4286.
1 5. Addison McKay had arrived in Venezuela to acquire the copper
mines owned by the South American Copper Syndicate. McBeth, B.S, 
Juan Vicente Gomez and the Oil Companies (Oxford I98I). 
p. 82. Marcano, Eduardo. Los Corminzos de la Industria Petrolera 
an Venezuela y la Legacion de los Estados Unidos en Caracas 
(Caracas 1976) p. 6 7.
1 4* McBeth B.S. Juan Vicente Gomez and the Oil Companies (Oxford
1981) p. 77.
1 5. The Annual General Meeting of the "Shell" shareholders, held on 
1st July 1919. The Times 2nd July 1919 P. 21.
1 6, The Times 28th January 1915@ P® 15*
1 7* Benny, Ludwell We Fight for Oil (New York-London 1928), p. 282.
18. In 1920 US fields owned by the Shell Group yielded 28% of its 
output Money Market Review and Investor's Chronicle, Shell 
Archives Cutting Papers Vol. 27 p. 49*
1 9® Benny, Ludwell, We Fight for Oil (New York-London 1928) p. 285®
20. Signed by Mr Philippe Berthelot and Sir John Cadman, and
confirmed by LLoyd George and Millerand a day later, Cmd,675P 
(1920) LI 895.
21o Despatch to His Majesty’s Ambassador At Washington Enclosing 
Memorandum on the Petroleum Situation. Lord Curzon to A®
Geddes 21st April 1921 Cd. 1351 (1921).
22. Mexican Government. El Petroleo de Mexico. (Mexico City)1963 n 90
23. McBeth, B.S. Juan Vicente Gomez and the Oil Companies (Oxford 
1981) p. 113."
24. McBeth, B.S. Juan Vicente Gomez and the Oil Companies (Oxford
1981) pp. 77-79.
2 5. McBeth, quoting Dr Alamo states that some oil was exported in 
1920 (see note 4 ) but Moron, quoting the official records of 
the Ministry of Mining and Hydrocarbons states that no oil was 
exported in 1920 (see note 2).
2 6. Co Dormer's despatch Wo. 27 to Lord Curzon. Sent on 26th March
1920 F.O. 371 Piece 4622 No. 2523.
27. VIgas Contract. Venezuelan Offical Gazette No. 990. Enclosure in
C. Dormer's despatch No. 27 of 26th March 1920. F.O. 371
Piece 4622 No. 2523.
28. G. Dormer's cyphered telegram No. 22 to Lord Curzon 4th May 
1920. F.O. 371 Piece 4622 No. 2895.
2 9. British Controlled Oilfields Ltd. to the ITsqder-Secretary of 
State, Foreign Office 7th June 1920 F.O. 371 Piece 4623 No.3694.
30. Enclosed in C. Dormer's despatch No. 87 to Lord Curzon®
12th December 1920 F.O. 371 Piece 4622 No. 8392.
31o Betancourt, Hcmulo. Politica y Petroleo (Mexico City 1956) p® 61«
3 2. C. Dormer's despatch No. 58 to Lord Curzon 25th June 1920
F.O. 371 Piece 4622 No. 5152.
33® C. Dormer's cyphered telegram No. 11. 25th March 1920 FO 371
Piece 4621 No. I764. C. Dormer's cyphered telegram No. 13
20th April 1920 FO 371 Piece 4621 No. 2320.
34. McBeth, B.S, Juan Vicente Gomez and the Oil Companies (Oxford
1981) pp. 130-1 31.
35* H. Beaumont's despatch OTA No. 3 to Lord Curzon 15th July 1921 
FO 371 Piece 5721 No. 5977®
36. Espasa-Calpe Encyclopedia. For 1920 Supplement 1931 (Madrid 1933) 
Vol. 8 pp. 380-381. For 1912 Main Edition (Madrid 192l) Vol. 44
pp. 242-243.
37o In I9I85 the main British companies working in Venezuela were 
"La Guaira Harbour Corporation", the "La Guaira & Caracas 
Railway Co", the "Puerto Cabello & Valencia Railway Co” the 
Venezuelan Oil Concessions Ltd" the "Bolivar Railway Co", 
the "South American Copper Syndicate", the "National Match 
Factory" the "Colon Development Co" and the "Venezuelan Meat 
and Products Syndicate", It does not include the "Commercial 
Bank of Spanish America" (non affected by the new law about
174.
foreign companies working in Venezuela, then being discussed in 
the Venezuelan Congress) and a few smaller concerns®
H, Beaumont's despatch OTA No. 5 to Lord Balfour 25th May 1918*
F.O. 371 Piece 3433 No* II7II8*
38* C, Dormer's despatch No* 34 to Lord Curzon, Received on 21st May
1920. F.O. 371 Piece 4623 No. 3228*
39® It is the case of the letter sent by General Jose Manuel 
Hernandez to Dr Leopoldo Baptista, from La Habana on 10th 
September 1919 und. a letter sent by Doctor Leopoldo Baptista 
to General Jose Manuel Hernandez from New York on 20th 
September 1919. F.O. 371 Piece 4623 No. 3570.
4O0 G. Dormer's despatch No* 108 to Lord Curzon 4th December 1920.
F.O* 371 Piece 5721 No. 66,
4 1. The Times published two reports about this Venezuelan war*
Both were vague and untruthful regarding to the events as they
are known nowadays. On 14th October 1920, The Times' correspondent 
sent a, vague report from Caracas about the rise of a revolt.
The Times, 15th October 1920, p, 9. On 18th October I92O The 
Times' correspondent at Curacao reported important rebel victories. 
General Olivares had taken La Victoria helped by a revolt 
within the local garrison while General Penaloza had obtained 
great victories; Generals Blanco and Fombona were masters of 
the situation in Tachira (The victory of La Victoria never 
happened and Generals Blanco and Fombona did not exist)* He 
also reported a ruthless reprisal in Caracas, The Times 
20th October 1920, p* 9 .
4 2, Memorandum of Scotland Yard to the Foreign Office 5th August 1926* 
F.O, 371 Piece 11.202 No. 4592*
43* H. Beaumont's despatch No* I6 to Lord Curzon. Received 17th March
1921, F.O. 371 Piece 5722 No, 1926,
44» Sir Howard's (British Ambassador at Madrid) despatch No, 793 to 
Lord Curzon* 13th December 1921, F.O. 371 Piece 5723 No. 9248.
45» C. Dormer's despatch No* 87 to Lord Curzon. 12th October 1920 
F.O. 371 Piece4622 No. 8392. Dormer's Despatch No* 114 to Lord 
Curson (Annual Report) 31st December 1920* FjO* 371 Piece 5722 
No, 993-993-47» H. Beaumont’s despatch. No, I6 to Lord Curzon,
17th March 1921 F.O, 371^Piece 5722 No. 1926 Betancourt 
Romulo, Politica y Petroleo (Mexico City 1956) p. 6 4*
4 6, H. Beaumont's despatch No * 50 to Lord Balfour 27 th June 1922,
F.O. 371 Piece 7324 PP® I67 left-169 right *
47® H, Beaumont's despatch No. 47 to Lord Balfour 15th June 1922,
F.O. 371 Piece 7.325 No. 4286.
48. Memorandum about the Petroleum Law of Venezuela. Department of 
Overseas Trade to the Foreign Office, l6th June 1921, A29721*
I1183/47» P.O. 371 Piece 7323 No. 2974.
49« Gonzalez G., Godofredo Perecho Minero Venezelano (Caracas 1945) 
P® 1 65.
50. The same despatch sent hy the US Embassy at Caracas, dated on 
14th Nobember 1921, in which the ambassador reports some 
actions on behalf of the Colon Development Company, had 
been quoted by E. Liewen, R. Betancourt and E. Marcano*
Liewen Edwin Petroleum in Venezuela (3rd Ed. New York 19&7) 
note in p* 25 Betancourt, Romulo* Politica y Petroleo (Mexico 
City 1956) p, 6 0. Marcano, Eduardo Los Comienzos de la Industria 
Petrolera en Venezuela y la Legacion de los Estados Unidos in 
Caracas 1976') p® 6 7.
CHAPTER X
The Rapid Development of the Venezuelan 
oil industry during the 192 0's
When the "Barrosos 2" well at "La Rosa" oilfield Became a
powerful oil gusher with an estimated initial dailey output of 
1/
80,000 Barrels, it is generally considered that a new stage of
fast development in the history of the Venezuelan oil industry
Began (December 1922)*
Table Ho® 9 shows us that during 1920-1928, the Venezuelan
output increased by an annual average of 102%. In 1920 59% of the
Venezuelan exports were coffee and cocoa while only 1,7% were
hydrocarbons; in 1928 coffee and cocoa were only 18,1% while
2/
hydrocarbons were 74%.
But the discovery of "Barrosos 2" was not alone in causing 
such essential changes. In fact 1921 registered a Venezuelan annual 
output increase of 214% and in 1922 of 54%, before "La Rosa's" 
exploitation had even begun. The event is more connected with the 
change of the Venezuelan oil policy and subsequently with the 
end of the boycott imposed on Venezuela by the International oil 
consortia. Moreover, evidence exists which suggests that engineers 
of Shell were partially aware of what could happen with Barrosos 2 
and therefore stopped drillings there (these drillings had been 
initiated some years before) and works on this well were restarted 
only when the crisis had ended.
As previously stated, the problem never was how to find oil 
in Venezuela, Due to the lack of initial development, Venezuela 
had not an initial market which could sustain such activity and had
to rely almost entirely on the foreign markets* In fact, the 
Venezuelan oil "boom of the 1920's is as much a consequence of 
the situation in the world oil market; nevertheless the rapid 
increase in world oil demand, as it is of internal developments, 
is not in itself enough - between 1921 and 1927 the Venezuelan oil 
output increased by nearly 42 times while the world output 
increased by only 87%,
Table No* 9
Venezuelan oil production between 1921 and 1930
Year
Output
(in
1,000
barrels)
% Ratio 
increase
with
1921
Venezuelan Exports 
(in
1,000 barrels)
% of the 
Venezuelan 
to be 
exported
1921 1,449 — 100 1,004 69
1922 2,255 54 154 1,833 82
1923 4,327 94 299 3,410 79
1924 9,129 111 630 8,248 90
1925 19,933 118 1,376 18,424 92
1926 35,654 79 2,461 32,762 92
1927 60,419 69 4,170 56,956 94
1928 105 ,957 75 7,312 100 ,602 95
1929 136,074 28 9,391 130,566 96
1950 135,246 -2 9,334 134,451 99
Sources Algunos Aspectos de las Actividades Petroleras ^
Venezolanas, Mundiales y Apendice Estadestico p* 1- A185,
The world oil market during the 1920's was a particularly 
complex one* The great international oil consortia met an 
increasing number of challengers for the control of the "oil surples"
j, fa,
In this complicated situation the oil consortia got a good 
partner, or rather a good servant, in General Juan Vicente Gomez, 
who helped them to overcome their new difficulties.
However, Gomez did not willingly accept this humble role, nor 
was he forced into it solely by the "free conditions of the 
market". The oil companies and their supporting Powers, blackmailed 
Gomez by exploiting Venezuelan internal political disturbances to 
their own benefit.
Venezuela between 1922 and 1928 - It might be' suggested that 
1922-1928 is the period when Gomez reached his maximum of power.
The constitution was changed on three occasions during this period, 
namely in 1922, 1925 and 1928. These new constitutions increased 
the personal power of Gomez and strengthened the authority of the 
central government in general terms.
The opposition had practically no opportunity for any action. 
Inside Venezuela the ruthless dictator repressed them without 
pity. Abroad, national governments (especially the British and US) 
stopped any action of the rebels, although public statements 
denounced the crimes of the dictator. Such activities did not 
affect Gomez in any way.
I922-I928 is the period in which Gomez's family ruled 
Venezuela a,s if it were their own property. The a,rmy was headed by 
Gomez's elder son, Jose Vicente, while the Vice-presidents were 
Gomez's brother, Juan Crisbstomo, and his son Jose Vicente, Other 
relatives were some of the governors, members of the parliaments 
(either national or regional) etc, and, what was most important, 
Gomez's relatives were also the most important "concession mongers". 
The type of Ministers Gomez had during this period were technocrats,
strongly devoted to Gomez and his family. Describing the new 
cabinet appointed by Gomez in 1922, the British Minister H* 
Beaumont wrote;
"This new ministry may be described as a business 
cabinet, unified chiefly by the common devotion to 
the President or members of his family, without 
political colour of any kind. It may be expected to 
deal fairly with foreign interests in accordance with 2j 
the evident wishes and present policy of the President,
The internal power of Gomez reached its highest tide between 
1922 and 1928, However his international situation was weaker than 
ever. While other oil producing countries had become able to use 
the power given by the increasing importance of oil, Venezuela was 
unable to do so, becoming a sort of paradise for the transnational 
companies «
Oil had become the main political issue in Venezuela and this 
is the subject of this research. While Gomez's oil policy during 
this period deserves a special study, some general ideas must be 
advanced and some views previously shown must be examined.
In 1921 the Great Powers and the transnational oil companies 
had defeated Gomez by using Gomez's political enemies to their own 
advantage. This effective strategy could be used again, and it 
made Gomez's international position particularly weak. The method 
was used again at least once, namely between I924 and 1925, and the 
results were as effective as before. This event is to be studied 
later in this chapter.
The opposition against Gomez was, until 1928, weak, but not 
only because it was repressed inside the country and stopped 
abroad. Based upon obsolescent theories the opposition was becoming 
increasingly divorced from the Venezuelan reality.
J-UW  a
Neither Gumez nor the caudillos were able to attract the passive 
part of the population (over 95% of the Venezuelan inhabitants); the 
British Papers suggest that Gomez did obtain the support of the 
majority among the active rest. Moreover, if either were in any 
way successful in attracting the passive majority, it was Gomez.
When the external opposition tried to obtain support from the US 
Trade Union leader Samuel Gompers, Gomez presented a Venezuelan
, 4/
Trade Union leader on his side, namely Jesus Maria Hernandez® 
Whatsoever one's feelings about the reality of this Trade Union, the 
fact is that Gomez was able to present one worker on his side, but 
his opposition none. The rest of South America was facing the first 
industrial actions during this period and almost all of them had a 
bloody end. The first Venezuelan oil strike took place in June 
1925 and affected the "Mene Grande" oilfields; and soon afterwards, 
workers in other oilfields followed in their wake. The government 
did not support the strikers in any way, but no one was injured, 
and the workers finally obtained some improvement in their
y
conditions; almost simultaneously the Colombian oil workers
y
initiated a strike which ended in a massacre* The Gomez jails were 
full of political opponents but very few prisoners, if any, were 
workers *
Gomez's attitude towards the first Venezuelan oil strike has 
been presented in a different form by the modern writer Jesus 
Prieto Soto, Augusto Malabe, the man who led the workers during 
this industrial action, was kidnapped a few months after the strike 
had finished and disappeared for ever, Prieto Soto said that the
2/
abduction had been performed by "the men of the regime". It 
might be pointed out that it could be dangerous to accuse Gomez's men
without any kind of direct evidence; let us remember that since the
very beginning of the Venezuelan oil industry the companies
engaged in oil activities had themselves employed armed groups
8/
"to protect their premises from robbing Indians"* These armed 
teams usually worked in favour of the government, but their 
purpose was not to serve the government, but the companies®
Thus the only thing this weak opposition had was plenty of 
money and on certain occasions, some support from the international 
companies and their supporting Powers* Therefore it was hardly 
able to weaken Gomez's international position. Moreover, as the 
caudillos did not represent any real change in policies and did not 
have any popular support, they did not represent any major danger 
to the government apart from the destruction that would occur 
as a result of warfare* Venezuela was certainly not like Mexico, 
where the civil war promoted a revolution which put the interests of 
the companies in serious jeopardy*
In fact, provoking a civil war was a last resort, unlikely ever 
to be used, but Great Britain exploited this possibility to blackmail 
Gomez whenever it needed to put pressure on him. There is no 
evidence to assume that the British government gave economic 
backing to these conspiracies, but the British, authorities turned 
a blind eye to t'rese plots, being organised within the Commonwealth, 
when Gomez had to be forced to change his attitude towards British 
interests* The USA did not trust the caudillos as Great Britain 
occasionally did. They preferred to work with the Zulia’s separatism* 
They tried to create a. puppet republic including the Colombian 
and Venezuelan territories within the Guajira Peninsula and the 
banks of the Maracaibo Lake*
182,
Meanwhile Great Britain was being increasingly replaced by the 
USA as the most influential Power in the Venezuelan Economy*
As far as international trade was concerned, British exports to 
Venezuela, which represented 30® 3% of the total Venezuelan 
imports in 1912, dropped to 17*6% in 1921 and in 1922 was 2 1*8%®
On the other hand the USA increased its share of Venezuelan imports 
from 27.3% in 1912 to 58.4% in 1921; in 1922 it was 51.5%.
Venezuelan exports to Britain which represented 8% of the total in 
1912, in 1921 represented 2.3% and in 1922, 4.1% while Venezuelan 
exports to the USA which represented 32.5% in 1912 were 35.2% in
5/
1921 and 33.1% in 1922.
However, this increased UnS. share in the Venezuelan foreign 
trade did not imply control. In the threshold of the 1920's
12/
about 70% of the foreign investments inside Venezuela were British.
But after 1921, when the First National City Bank of New York opened 
a branch in Caracas, the situation underwent a rapid change, 
particularly so at the end of the decade. While US companies 
were being established in the country, other enterprises, previously 
established either by Britons, French or citizens from other countries 
were sold out to US corporations.
Grounds on which the Venezuelan oil industry was developed - 
As previously said, oil discoveries in Venezuela were in no way a 
great surprise; the real problem was how to find a market for the 
well known Venezuelan oil. As the internal market was negligible, 
it had to depend almost entirely on world oil demand.
The increasing world demand encouraged oil production and 
consequently the world oil output increased by 87% between 1920 
and 1927. Although merchant ships changed to diesel only in a very
gradual fashion and coal fired steam engines continued to he
preferred hy railways even after the Second World War (in 1945? 90%
of the US railway engines were coal fired), the car industry
underwent a very rapid development during the 1920's. In 1928
the US and the British car outputs were 225% and 281% as large as the
12/
outputs of these same countries in 1921.
While this fact encouraged oil consumption, another invention 
made oil products less costly, and consequently the "oil surplus" 
increased in size. This invention was the development of the 
cracking method which enabled the refineries to decide on the 
amount of each by-product to be obtained from each kind of crude 
oil according to the market demand. It allowed the refineries to 
avoid falls in the price of certain by-products when production of 
crude oil had been increased to meet higher demand for other 
hydro-carbon products. Moreover, due to the cracking method, the waste
iV
also diminished*
Table No, 10
Profits of Shell T & T Go. between 1920 
and 1927
bource;
Year dividend
1920 35% free of tax
1921 27è "
1922 22-1
1925 22*
1924 224
1925 224
1926 25 "
1927 25 "
Annual Shareholder's meetings 1921-1928* I4/
However, the profits of the great oil consortia decreased 
during this period. Table No, 10 shows how Shell Transport and 
Trading Goe's dividends went below 30% during the 1920's.
Although the "Oil Surplus" had increased, the big oil combines 
now had powerful challengers struggling to take part in this 
"Surplus" for themselves.
First of all other industries tried to take a part of this 
"Surplus" either indirectly or directly. In general terms, a 
special taxation upon oil products could give revenues to enable 
the government to activate the economy. During the 1920's this 
way was only partially developed in the USA, because influential 
circles preferred just the opposite policy; cheap oil would 
encourage the car industry while the transport industry would 
^njoy a decrease in costs.
But the other main challenger is more directly connected with our 
research. The oil producing countries became eager to talce a 
better share of their oil wealth themselves.
This new situation shaped the oil market during the 1920's,
First of all the alliance between all the oil companies was no 
longer possible, as oil prices had to go lower. Graph No, 2 
shows the fluctuations of the crude oil prices in New York between 
January 1921 and December 1927» From this graph it can be realised 
that the oil cartel formed by all the companies no longer 
existed. A bitter struggle had begun, in which the large consortia 
tried to take advantage of every possible element in order to 
keep at least part of their high profits.
The small companies were easily defeated. Apart from those 
working inside the USA only a few small companies were able to
18'
survive after 19$0 (Burmah is one of these exceptions). In this 
context, like Venezuela, Mexico, Iran, etc. helped in the 
establishment of the big companies. They could produce a very 
cheap oil provided that the output was high enough to absorb the 
initial investments. Only a big consortia was able to work in 
such conditions as they had world wide marketing systems able to 
deliver such outputs in a profitable form (see graph No. 3),
Graph No, 2
Prices for the Crude oil barrel quoted in the 
New York Market between 1921 and 1927Price in
1722-
Source; Prices quoted by "American Produce Market" section in 
The Times. 1'3/
h,?rinr the 1920's the USA took full control of the world oil 
market. Yhey not only produced over 2/3 of the world, output. Thf 
also consumed over a half o.f its output, and this consumption is 
calculated without taking into account the crude oil which was
imported into the USA to he re-exported once refined,
Graph No, $
Prices of US and imported oils in the US Marke.t
Price
US prices ^
yimported priceYear
Source; Graph No. 2 with regards to the US oil and El Petroleo de 
Mexico concerning imported oil, 16/
Therefore the US government was ahle to impose its oil 
policies all over the world, and the world oil market became 
subordinated to the US one. No problem about oil history during 
the 1 9 2 0's can be rightly studied without linlcing it to what was 
happening in the US market at the same time. Due to the high 
consumption, oil prices inside the USA were higher than anywhere 
else. Therefore, the US goverrurient was able to keep internal oil
J. U  / 9
prices within certain margines by changing customs duties on 
imported oil* Consequently, if as was said previously the oil 
obtained from the oil expld^ting countries was to be cheap, the 
oil industry in the oil producing countries had also to become 
subordinated to the US oil policy* Subsequently the local 
economies vrauld have to suffer because of it* Graph No * 4 shows 
the,changes in the output increases of the USA and Trinidad 
between 1921 and 1928 and how the Trinidadian oil was being used 
to balance the world oil production according to US interests,
hut the oil producing countries would not accept this unfair 
situation. They were encouraged by the well known high profits 
the big oil consortia were obtaining and were embittered by the 
US policy which damaged their interests. However, these 
feelings alone would have produced littJe action had it not been for 
two events which weakened the position of the big consortia and thus 
made it possible for the oil producing countries to challenge 
the power of these big consortia. These two eventa were the 
Soviet Revolution .and the Mexican Revolution,
In 1919, after the withdrawal of General Dunsterville's 
force and the collapse of the Caucasian Republics, the Red Army 
entered the Trans-Caucasian territory and brought the nationalisation 
of the oilfields without compensation to reality. This event 
seriously weakened Shell interests, as it had important 
investments there. Standard Oil (New Jersey) was not seriously 
affected by the event; it had bought the Nobel premises there but 
ad a very cheap price as this deal was agreed after the 
nationalisation decree had been issued and when the Soviet victory 
was an established fact.
JLOO,
Graph No, 4
Annual -in or G as es of TJS, Trinidadian and World outputs 
during 1921-1927
% of increase
Xu
Source : Calculated from Kspansa-Galpe Encyclopedia Apendice l?il. 
Vol. 8. 17/
The Soviet problem was followed in 1921 by the Mexican crisis/ 
Until that year, in spite of the revolution, Mexico was still a 
paradise for the oil exploiting companies. Although there was some 
labour unrest in the country and the Mexican government had 
raised ne,w oil taxes on many occasions, manpower was still cheap 
and taxation was comparatively low; in 1921 Mexico produced 
over 190 million crude oil barrels and was easily the nmner up in 
the World producers ranking (it produced over 5% of the world 
output), But in 1921 the USA decided to diminish oil imports by 
raising custom taxes upon such imports and Mexico retaliated by
189,
imposing 60% custom tax over exported crude oil. This first
i§/
struggle in which Shell stood on the Mexican side lasted 
until 1924. In 1925 Mexico enacted a new oil law and began a second 
struggle in which it had to fight against both British and US 
interests; the second crisis lasted up to 1928* Both international 
crises were complicated by a situation of labour unrest which 
stopped activities in both oilfields and refineries for long 
periods.
Therefore the oil consortia faced serious problems in both the 
second and third countries in the world producers ranking. And 
as the US oil certainly was very expensive, these countries were the 
main source of cheap oil. It encouraged other countries like 
Argentina, Turkey, Egypt, Rumania and even the Dutch East Indies, 
to try to obtain a better share of their own oil wealth*
This struggle between great oil consortia and oil producing 
countries, forced them to stop any struggle between themselves.
Shell and Standard Oil reached agreements concerning different 
parts of the world in order to face the oil producing countries to­
gether, None of the consortia could win a struggle between themselves, 
as the oil producing countries would simple take advantage of 
this struggle. These local agreements gave rise to a comprehensive 
pact which included the whole of the world, excepting the USSR, It 
was established by Sir Henri Deterding on behalf of Shell and 
Walter Teagle representing Jersey-Standard, in Achnacarry 
(Scottish highlands) in September 1928, The Standard Oil companies 
of New York and California, Texaco, Gulf and Anglo Persian joined 
the Achnacarry cartel soon afterwards.
However, the agreement was not enough to enable the consortia to
deal with their problems in Mexico and the USSR; the oil companies 
had enough power to defeat either of these two main producers on 
their own but not to face the challenge of both countries together. 
The situation had become worse due to the policies followed by 
other oil producers. In this case the role played by Venezuela 
was oven-fhelmingly important. Due to the large quantity of 
o i l  V e n e z u e l a  had, and because of its oil laws (so 
convenient to the foreign companies) Venezuela became the only 
producer through whom the oil consortia could bring about the 
defeat of the other oil producing nations, especially Mexico,
After an attempt to reach an agreement with the Soviet 
Government (Genoa I92I), the oil companies tried to organise 
a boycott against the Russian oil (The Hague 1922), but it failed 
because one company was able to resist the temptation of the 
cheap oil offered to them, Mexico, however, was categorically 
defeated in the battle. It wan much easier because Mexico was 
entirely subordinated to the US market. When Mexico capitulated 
in 1928, its output was just 26% of its own 1921 output,
Venezuela played a crucial, though passive role, in 
crushing the Mexican oil policy during the 1920's, Shell,
Uoheny and other oil producers transferred their capital from one 
country to the other and, as Table No, 11 shows, Venezuela was 
able to replace the Mexican oil in the world market.
How Venezuela was forced into a policy convenient to the 
interests of the international oil consortia; It could be argued 
that Venezuela obtained great advantages from this alliance with 
the big oil consortia. Oil, which produced a negligible part of 
the Venezuelan Gross National Product in 1920, in 1925 gave 9«5%
J. 7-J-,
of this product and in 1928 it represented 24.5% of the G.N.P® 
The GaNaP* itself grew in absolute terms; in 1935 it was nearly 
2,4 times as large as in 1925. Mining, which in 1921 yielded 
just 3% of the Venezuelan revenue, in 1928 had become the source 
of 20% of this revenue*
Table No* 11
Replacement of Mexico by Venezuela in the world
oil market
Mexican decrease Venezuelan increase % of Mexican decrease
Year (million barrels) (million barrels) given by Venezuela
1922 11.2 0.8 7
1923 32.7 2,1 6
1924 9.9 4.8 48
1925 2 4 .2 1 0 .8 45
1926 2 5 .1 1 5 ,7 63
1927 2 6 .3 2 4 .8 94
1928 1 3 .9 4 5 ,5 327
19/
Source : Mexican information from Mexican Official Records and
Venezuelan from M.M.H, Algunos Aspectos de Ian Actividades 
Petroleras Venezolanas, Mundiales y Apendice Estadistico 
1967 p. 1-A185. 20/
The subject of this thesis is not to decide whether Venezuela 
was enjoying a sort of symbiosis with the great consortia or 
whether these consortia were Venezuela's parasites, even accepting 
that Venezuela obtained valuable advantages from this alliance, 
the fact is that it did not accept the alliance freely.
In previous chapters the way in which Venezuela was driven 
to change its oil policy in 1921 has been explained. This way was 
frequently used during the 1920's. Here the exile played an
192,
important role on the foreign companies' behalf. The most 
important example of this kind of crisis was (developed) 
between 1924 and 1925, In fact, in 1924 Gemmez launched a new 
offensive in order to obtain a better share of Venezuelan 
oil for the Venezuelan nation. As previously said, any change in 
the Hydrocarbon law was meaningless as long as the old concessions 
were still in force ; after the agreement between the Venezuelan 
government and the holders of these old concessions (l92l) 
it was impossible to abolish all of them at one go.
However, the abolition of any one of these old. concessions 
would be enough if it involved a particularly prolific enterprise.
In 1923 "Caribbean" still yielded through its "Mene Grande" 
oilfield about 75% of the Venezuelan output, but after the 
discoveries of the "La Rosa" and "Lagunillas" oilfields, VOC 
became the most promising company. Therefore the offensive was 
launched against the Aranguren concession.
Initially the Venezuelan government tried to take advantage of 
some articles in the old concessions which established that the 
concession holders were not allowed to drill in certain areas, like 
navigable rivers, and adl these areas were now declared vacant, 
to be granted to other concession-holders according to the
22/
Hydrocarbon Law of 1922.
But then came the main assault, aimed at abolishing the 
Aranguren concession as a whole. In Chapter No. 7 the law suit 
agarnst VOC initiated by Espina, Bohorquez and Valvuina was 
reported. After failing in their attempts to annul the Aranguren 
concession, Espina and his partners initiated a new law suit 
against "Caribbean". After a long period of inaction their law suit
193
was suddenly activated. At the end of 1922, the judge of the 
first instance settled a verdict in favour of Espina, Bohorquez and 
Valvuina.
Although British, Dutch and US diplomats initiated some sort 
of diplomatic pressure on behalf of the company, Shell seemed not 
particularly worried about the problem; even after the verdict 
and when its appeal was still pending, the consortium paid to 
extend the Caribbean concession for another thirty years (1942-1972)* 
Shell had to pay Bro5 millions (£200,000) by annual instalments of
a /
B:s,l. million.
In fact, the real target of the suit against Caribbean was 
VOC* For, in order to obtain a favourable verdict, the 
lav/yers of Shell were forced to demand a settlement from the 
Federal Court which declared that an asphalt concession was not 
the same as an oil one.
In this way, the final verdict in favour of Caribbean gave 
rise to a new litigation initiated by the Venezuelan government 
against VOC, as the Aranguren concession referred to asphalt only* 
Therefore the resolution in favour of Aranguren extended by the
M /
Department of Mines on 18th June 1912 had to be considered as 
a concession itself and this concession was illegal because 
it was granted in an unlawful way* According to the Venezuelan 
Constitution of 1909 any concession granted by the government had 
to be studied by "Gonsejo de Estado" and this resolution had not 
been studied by this Council*
The litigation against VOC was the beginning of a whole 
campaign initiated by the Venezuelan government in order to increase 
the Venezuelan oil. Meanwhile, the discussion of a new Hydrocarbon Daw
was introduced in parliament, but the litigation against VOC, 
nevertheless remained as the main object of the campaign*
This litigation against VOC consisted of a series of 
bargainings, with numerous intrigues which lasted for nearly a 
year. After the settlement in fabour of Caribbean, the la\gyers 
of VOC were in an embarrassed position. Thus General McDonogh, 
a, top level executive, sent by Shell to Venezuela to deal with the 
affair on the spot, established that the company had at least to
25/
pay some money if it was to solve the tricky situation.
Both McBonogh and Andrew Agnew; another Shell executive who 
eventually replaced McBonogh in Caracas, failed in trying to 
solve the problem. They did obtain some success in diminishing 
the amount of money to be paid by the company. It was reduced from 
the initial E,s.40 millions (over £1.5 millions) to Bs.26 millions 
(£1 million). But the key problem remained unsolved. According to 
the Venezuelan government, the VOC concession was an old one and had 
to be ruled by the Venezuelan Hydrocarbon Law.
But at that moment, the government of Trinidad suddenly 
abolished the prohibition on the export of weapons to Venezuela.
Soon afterwards the British Minister at Caracas, H. Hobbson, 
visited Gomez to talk with him about the VOC affair. After this a 
bill was sent by Gomez to parliament which was enacted after a short 
period of time. According to this new law VOC would have to pay 
B:s.lO millions (nearly £400,000) after which payment the company 
would keep all the priviledges enjoyed by the old concessions, 
and in addition would be able to drill in the beds of navigable 
rivers and other places which the old concession holders were not 
allowed to exploit.
The solution a,ppeared so suddenly that when the success was 
reported by Agnew in July 1925j Deterding did not trust the 
effectiveness of it. Therefore, Sir Henri suggested to Agnew an 
agreement with Jersey Standard or any other US corporation at the
z U
same level of power, in order to prevent any new problems*
This idea was rejected by Agnew, whose view was eventually
confirmed by events* This proved to be the last major attack
against the old concessions and so the agreement suggested by
28/
Ueterding proved unnecessary*
Ifhen VOG had solved its problems, Trinidad re*»established the
29/
prohibition on exports of weapons to Venezuela (October 1925).
Previously, two important cargos of weapons were discovered and
subsequently embargoed. The one was found by Scotland Yard on
board of the S,S, Odin, chartered by General Lin ares-Alcantara to
30/
support a conspiracy led by him. The other was on board of the
SS Angelita. and was embargoed in La Havana by the Cuban police.
It had been chartered by Leopoldo Haptista and had sailed from
Hew York without having any difficulty there,
Linares-AlcantaraJs conspiracy was a world wide network
which. Scotland Yard took two years to finally dismantle.
Although centered in Trinidad, it had offshoots in many other cities
and countries. Among Linares-Alcantara's supporters were a number
of non-Venezuelans, some of whom enjoyed diplomatic status, Scotland
Yard only obtained the names of two of them, namely the Swedish
Hairy Captain David H, Lindblad and the German citizen Friedricb
21/
W, Peterson, Lindblad was Consul of Horway at Trinidad,
The newly appointed British Minister at Caracas, Seeds, 
described the event in glowing words:
196.
"It concerned the validity of the company’s 
titles; an undonhtahle flaw in this, had 
arrived from the cupidity of the 'bobber gang'% 
inevitable in all business connected with oil* 
Although however, the gang had support of 
influential individuals, backed by no less a 
personage than the President's son and heir, a 
single interview with General Gomez enabled 
Mr Hobbson, at that time His Majesty’s Minister, 
to obtain immediate settlement," 29/
The information previously reproted suggests the arguments 
Minister Hobbson might have used to obtain this immediate settlement, 
Although a causal connection between these political and economic 
events has not hitherto been stated by researchers, it is arguable 
that the chronology outlined above strongly indicates such an 
interpretation*
Since the attempt to abolish the Aranguren concession had 
failed, any change in the Hydrocarbon Law became meaningless or 
rather inconvenient. V/hen the bill of 1924 became the Hydrocarbon 
Law of 1925Î no real change with regard to the 1922 Hydrocarbon 
Law had been made.
Thus, the well-planned attempts to change the Venezuelan oil 
policy carried out between 1924 and 1925 eventually failed and 
the same oil policy wa.s maintained between 1922 and 1928. This 
policy, which was particularly convenient to the foreign oil 
companies, had its basis in the Hydrocarbon Law of 1922. The 
replacement of this law by the Hydrocarbon Law of 1925 did not 
represent any change at all.
However, this policy was not the consequence of conviction. 
Gomez was forced by political expediency to follow a certain 
policy. He was being blackmailed by the Foreign Powers and trans­
national companies through the use of his political enemies.
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CHAPTER XI
Internal Structure of the Venezuelan Oil Industry 
During t h e  1920 ' s
People who support the free enterprise system have the 
tendency to consider capital as a homogenious and impersonal 
element. If they recognise any contradiction within capital; it 
is connected with the different flags these companies come under.
In the Venezuelan oil industry during the 1920's this was not
the case. There were violent clashed between capitalists but the 
least important was that between British and US interests, although 
these conflicts were widely reported in order to hide the real 
ones.
A good example of this is the case of oil freight. During the 
late 192 0's Venezuelan oil royalties and taxes on production were 
paid according to the standard prices for crude oil at the New
York Products Market, less the cost of transport from Venezuela
to the consumption markets according to the freight rates fixed 
by the transport companies. D. McBeth explains how "foreign 
capital" exploited it to defraud the Venezuelan government in the 
payment of royalties and taxes. In fact all the big oil consortia 
had oil transport subsidiary companies to do their own freight.
Thus they could diminish the amount to be paid the Venezuelan
1/
State by declaring high freight rates.
Oil freight rates were actually being used in this way, not 
only in Venezuela, but all over the world. It was used not just 
by "foreign capital" to avoid tax payment in Venezuela or anyvrhere 
else, but as a weapon in the hands of the large oil consortia to
keep their profits high by matching money whenever and wherever
they could. For instance, Caribbean Co. fixed very high rates for
VOC’s oil to be shipped across the Maracaibo Lake to either the
San Lorenzo refinery or to the oil harbour where it had to be
2/
shipped to Curacao. In this way Shell transferred profits from 
a company where it oraed only 50% of the stock, to another which 
was wholly controlled by the Group, Oil freight was a weapon 
for the great oil combines not only in Venezuela but all over the 
world. Oil tankers were not a good investment for shipping 
companies as they required heavy investment and were useful for
i/
a single purpose only. Therefore Oil shipment gradually became 
controlled by the shipping subsidiaries of the big oil combines,
V
After 1927 the standard Oil Freight rates were very high.
The presence of British capital in Venezuelan oil - The 
Peruvian and the Mexican oil industries were developed by British 
"free" companies like "Lobitos", "Negritos" and "Positos" in Peru 
and "El Aguila" in Mexico, But the 1910's were a twilight period 
for British "free" enterprise in South American oil. While Peru 
was left to IPG, a Canadian subsidiary of Standard Oil (New Jersey),
P
"El Aguila" was sold to Shell,
In Venezuela the British "free" oilmen were squeezed out.
In previous chapters the way in which they were replaced by Shell 
has been explained, Duncan Elliot Alves could have been the man to 
play in Venezuela the role of Lord Cowdray in Mexico, as he took 
two old concessions, namely Aranguren and Planas, under his 
control. It was explained in Chapter 7 how VOG, Ltd,, the company 
which held the Aranguren concession, fell under Shell control.
In Persia, British "small" oilmen had obtained the Crown's
support when in 1913 the government bought over 50% of Anglo- 
Persian stock. By the creation of a group, held by Anglo-Persian 
as holding company, the scheme had been extended all over the
k!
world. However Anglo-Persian was banned from operating in 
Venezuela as the Venezuelan law forbade any company owned, either 
wholly or partially, by a foreign country to operate inside 
Venezuela. Later it will be explained how Anglo-Persian was 
blocked when it tried to exploit a Venezuelan oil concession.
Anticipating this problem, Duncan Elliot Alves had tried to 
create a way in which this scheme could work in Venezuela. In 
1919 the "British Controlled Oilfields" Ltd was incorporated in
Canada, It had obtained a large quantity of concessions in Mexico,
u
Central America, Colombia- Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, Trinidad
and British Guiana. Its capital was fixed at Can /40,000,000,
The British Crown had no investments in the company. However, 
the articles of this company awarded the company's management to a. 
"Voting Trust" to be appointed by the British government; to 
become a member of this "Voting Trust" it wa,s not necessary to be 
a shareholder in the company. In fact, when the voting trustees 
were appointed in January 1920, two out of seven were not BCG shareh­
olders, namely the R, Hon E. Pretyman MP and Sir William Mercier 
KCMG; Sir William was a Crown Agent for Colonies,
From the beginning, the company seems to have been nothing 
more than a way to create a kind of Anrlo-Persian scheme fitted to 
the Venezuelan Law, Although BCO had obtained concessions in many 
countries the Venezuelan concessions meant over a half of the
9/
whole area granted to the company. BCO initiated explorations
10/
in some of these countries; but the only oilfield ever exploited
f J  o
by them was "El Mlene" in Venezuela, BCO also rented two oilfields, 
one in Venezuela and another in Colombia to be exploited by 
Standard Oil of New Jersey, It may sound rather strange that 
the shareholders agreed to give up the company's management to 
the British government when the British government did not have any 
investment in the company. But by denying any investment from the 
British government in the company it did not come under the 
Venezuelan law even though the company was wholly controlled by 
the British government.
In 1926 the company experienced a severe crisis in which it 
lost about 2 /3  of its capital. This failure was the result of 
the British oil policy and due to the fact that the company was 
incorporated when it was no longer needed.
The company was created with an initial capital over 53% 
larger than the "Caribbean" one. However its concession areas 
were two or three times as large. Taking into account that an 
oilfield not only needs drilling rigs but pipelines, tanks, harbours, 
refineries, etc, the company's capital was insufficient. This 
lack of sufficient capital was further exposed by the fact that the 
areas granted to the company were very far apart and in different 
countries; making necessary a duplication of investments which, at 
least partially would not have been required had the oilfields 
been in the same country and area.
Moreover the company did not invest a penny in other facilities 
apart from drilling rigs. The "El Mene" output was entirely sold 
to Caribbean, Even the pipeline to carry "El Mene's" crude 
from the oilfield to the Lake Maracaibo was owned by Caribbean,
BCO was as dependent on the Caribbean under estructure as VOC
204
and Colon,
The role to he played by this company seems to have been to
obtain oil concessions to be sold to the bigger concerns once
13/
they eventually became promising new oilfields. But after 
1921 Shell did not initiate any new oil extracting enterprise within 
South America, and Anglo-Persian, the only British enterprise
12/
apart from Shell, able to develop successfully these kinds of
enterprises within the area, was banned by Venezuelan law from
operating within the country. Consequently, BCO found it had no
possible British customers. Two years after its incorporation, the
kind of company BCO was intended to be, became obsolete*
The US journalist Ludwell Benny explains the failure of this
company as a consequence of the lack of experience among the
voting trustees and some geopolitic reasons connected with a
12/
possible war between Great Britain and the USA* This needs to
be mentioned because Romulo Betancourt supports Benny's views
M /
without any criticism, yet five out of seven voting trustees 
were founding shareholders of the company and one of them,
Mr BoE, Alves, who eventually became its first chairman, had been 
the first British entrepreneur to become involved in Venezuelan 
oil activities. So, to speak about lack of experience among the 
Voting Trust is nonsense.
As far as geopolitic reasons are concerned, the arguments are 
even weaker. Nevertheless Romulo Betancourt supports it with 
greater enthusiasm. Benny pointed out that through BCO the British 
government sacrificed economic convenience in order to have 
control over the areas surrounding the Panama Canal as an insurance 
against possible war*
In fact to have oilfields next to the Panama Canal in a 
period in which oil fired marine engines were increasingly used, 
was like having a filling station on the side of the main maritime 
was between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans; to exploit this 
advantage BCO would have needed the refineries it never built*
In any case this advantage would only exist in peacetime.
The lack of validity of this view was proved in 1922, 
because from that year onwards the company became increasingly 
involved in business partnership with US companies and BCO's premises 
were eventually sold to US companies when the concern was dismantled.
Therefore, Shell was practically the only British concern 
playing an important role in the development of the Venezuelan oil 
industry; BCO was producing less than 5% of the Venezuelan output 
and all this production was taken unrefined by the Shell Group.
As previously pointed out it was the international combines 
which led the Venezuelan output until 1923, over 58% of this 
output between 1924 and 1927, and ranked first as a single oil 
producer among the transnational oil combines operating in 
Venezuela until after 1930* On the other hand Venezuela ranked 
among the three main contributing countries to Shell output 
from 1926 (see Table No. 12) and from 1927 became first in this
15/
ranking.
Inside Venezuela, Shell acted through three main subsidiaries, 
namely Caribbean Petroleum Company, Venezuelan Oil Concessions 
Ltd. and Colon Development Company. These companies exploited 
each one of the three concessions awarded to Shell, Caribbean 
exploited the second Valladares concession; in the early 1920's 
its capital was US/30,800,000. VOC exploited the area awarded to
Antonio Aranguren; in 1921 this company had £3,000,000 capital.
Colon dealt with the Vigas award; during the 1920's its capital
16/
was below £300,000*
Table No , 12
Shell output arount the world (1925 and 1926)
1925 1926
Country
USA
million metric 
tons 
5*6
%
40
million metric 
tons
5.8
%
37
Dutch East Indies 2,9 21 2.9 19
Mexico 2,4 17 2.1 14
Venezuela 1,6 12 3,1 20
Others 1,4 10 1,6 10
TOTAL 1 3 .9 100 1 5 .5 100
Sources Royal Dutch report for 1926,
12/
In legal terms all these subsidiaries were directly controlled 
by the combine and no one was under control of any of the other 
three. There were some irrelevant differences between them.
For example, Caribbean had been incorporated in the USA while the 
others were legally British, Caribbean and Colon were legally 
possessed by the main Shell subsidiaries, Anglo-Saxon and Batabish, 
while VOC was owned directly by the "parent" companies, Shell and 
Royal Dutch, No one of these three companies was wholly owned by 
Shell, In the case of Caribbean, 25% of its stock belonged to 
General Asphalt Co; in the case of "Colon the minor partner was a 
certain "Caribb Syndicate"; it was an American concern and also 
owned 25% of the company's stock. In the case of VOC Shell ovmed 50%
C.^ I a
of the stock only, the rest being distributed among a larger 
number of minor partners.
However, Caribbean led the other companies. In terms of 
output of crude oil Caribbean lost importance. It had been the 
first Shell subsidiary inside Venezuela to reach a production 
stage; between 191? and 1922 it had produced the whole of the 
Venezuelan output. In 1927, although Caribbean output was over 
4.8 times as large as then years before, it represented only 12% of 
the Venezuelan output and VOC produced three times the Caribbean
w
output in that year. However Caribbean was the only Shell
subsidiary which had a tanker fleet both in the Maracaibo Lake 
and in the sea, two refineries (one in Curacao, another in 
Venezuela), harbour installations fitted to load the tankers, 
and other necessary facilities to deal with oil; the other Shell 
subsidiaries depended on services owned by Caribbean. Even the 
pipeline between "La Rosa" oilfields, where an important part of 
VOC output came from, and Maracaibo Lake belonged to Caribbean 
instead of VOC,
During the 1920's the full absorption of General Asphalt by
Shell seems to have been achieved. In 1928 Burlington Co was
disolved as it was no longer needed; at that time the whole of the
12/
Burlington Board was formed by Shell top level executives.
Consequently Caribbean had become a Shell subsidiary wholly owned
by the combine.
During the period studied by this research, Colon was the
less important among the Venezuelan Shell subsidiaries. Until 1926
it did not obtain any output; in 1927 its small oilfields of Tarra
and Rio Negro yielded less than 0.5% of the Venezuelan Shell 
18/
output.
VOG on the other hand was the main achievement of Shell in Vene­
zuela during the 1920's, In 1921 the company was reorganised, 
establishing a capital of £3,000,000. In December 1922 the 
successful drilling of Barroso 2 well gave origin to ehe prolific
"La Rosa" oilfield. A few years later the company developed the
20/
even more prolific "Lagunillas" oilfield. In 1927 VOG had also
"Ambrosio" and "Punta Benitez" oilfields, however 90% of VOC output
18/
was yielded by "Lagunillas" and "La Rosa" oilfields*
VOC had no output until 1923, but afterwards it increased
incredibly quickly. In 1924 VOC output was just over half as
large as the Caribbean one, in 1925 the Caribbean output
surpassed the VOC output by just 30% and in 1926 VOC oilfields
22/
yielded more oil than the Caribbean ones. In 1927 VOC produced
three times as much oil as Caribbean, VOC oilfields yielded 75%
of the Venezuelan Shell output and a third of the whole Venezuelan 
18/
output*
Although Caribbean did not have any share in VOC stock, these 
existed a sort of dependence of VOC on Caribbean* Since 1915 
Burlington Co. had been in charge of VOC's reorganisation and 
after 1921 Shell mana.ged VOC through Burlington Co. Moreover 
in 1921 VOC signed a contract with Caribbean according to which VOC 
had to sell all its output up to 4 million barrels to Caribbean 
at a fixed price. The price fixed by the mentioned contract, 
which had to last I5 years, was inferior to the world standard 
price. It should be born in mind that the Summer of I92I, when 
this contract was signed was the period when oil prices were the 
lowest between 1921 and 1927®
Furthermore, the rates VOC had to pay Caribbean for the services
given to them by the latter company, like the use of harbour
premises and the transport of oil by pipelines and tankers, were
much higher than the world standard rates. Thus VOC was
transferring a large part of its profits to Caribbean, Anyi-ray,
VOC's dividends in 1926, the first year when the company delivered
any dividend to its shareholders, amounted to 15%. It was much
higher than the standard dividends delivered by any enterprise
except the oil ones, but 10% below the dividend given by Shell in
the same year. It could be argued that pa,rt of the previously
mentioned "oil surplus" obtained by VOC was being transferred to
the Shell Group*
This situation promoted some sort of reaction among those
VOC shareholders who were not either connected with Shell or Shell
itself* The VOC board had 12 members, six appointed by Shell and six
elected by the other shareholders* The protest against the above
mentioned situation was carried out by the six elected directors
led by the famous Calouste 8 * Gulbenkian, The problem began when
VOC surpassed 4 million barrels a, year; then Gulbenkian proposed to
build a harbour next to the Caribbean one, which would enable the
company to sell the excess of crude oil to other customers who
would pay a higher price. Gulbenkian's proposals were rejected as one
of the elected directors voted against, with the six ones appointed
by Shell, Within the next month, Gulbenkian and the other four
24/
rebel directors resigned. One of them was Antonio Aranguren*
Although Shell defeated the rebels once again in the extraordinary 
shareholders meeting, held to discuss the problem, with Gulbenkian's
zJ
proposals being rejected by 2 ,320,40? votes to 798,40? votes, 
the crisis continued; the British press, particularly "The Times"
supported the rebels. Finally a commission was appointed to study
15/
the situation, while a press campaign led by "The Times"
26/
suggested that Shell was defrauding its partners.
While the commission was making slow enquiries about the 
problem (eventually it never reached any practical solution) VOC 
gave a 55% dividend for 1926® After such a dividend, high enough 
to shut up whispering mouths, the situation went back to normal.
In 1929 VOC signed a new contract with Canadian Eagle, 
another Shell subsidiary which had built a refinery in Aruba to 
process part of the Mexican output* According to this contract 
Canadian Eagle would buy the part of the VOC output which exceeded 
the 4 Million barrels a year to be sold to Caribbean*
Thus Shell gave shelter to the "independent" oilmen, as minor 
partners in some of its subsidiaries, but these investors had to 
pay for this protection. The links between Caribbean (lOO% 
controlled by Shell) and VOC (50% controlled by Shell) shows clearly 
how the links between Shell and the "small" oilmen had been established 
in Venezuela and elsewhere. Moreover,* British "small" oilmen who 
were still involved in the Venezuelan oil industry, either as 
minor partners of Shell in VOC, or as shareholders in the Crov/n 
directed corporation BCO were, at the end of the day, under the 
control of Shell and the big oil combine was taking advantage of 
them. Moreover, the fa.te of the VOC shareholders, whose subordination 
to Shell was officially declared, was much better than that of 
the BCO partners, whose company was officially "free"; while VOC 
had some profits and normally indeed higher than the standard ones,
BCO was going into bankruptcy.
The last oil concessions to British companies which were not
part of the Shell combine, namely the British Equatorial Oil 
Company and the North Venezuelan Petroleum Company, were granted in
27/
1920.
The British Equatorial Oil Company had got a number of new 
concessions, totalling 193>000 hectares. These concessions were 
located within the States of Zulia, Trujillo, Sucre and Mona.gas*
75>000 hectares had been granted to Pedro V. Navano (9th June I92O) 
4 3 ,500 to Juan Garcia Gomez (14th June 1919) and the rest to 
Jose M, Capriles (8th June 1920). Only the latter concession was 
sold to British Equatorial by the concession monger himself; the 
company finally obtained these concessions between April and 
September 1920, This is the little information about this company 
registered by the British Foreign Office, It is clear that neither 
Shell nor the British Crown were involved in it. When the company 
was eventually absorbed by the US Lago Oil and Transport Company 
in 1925, it had not yet achieved any output.
The North Venezuelan Petroleum Company had got the Jimenez 
28/
Arrais’ concession, the only one among those granted by Castro 
in 1907 which had not been developed, by 1920. The company was in 
fact a subsidiary of Anglo Persian which made it illegal, as 
Anglo-Persian was controlled by the British Crovm, As the 
concession was taken up by North. Venezuelan late in 1920 and the 
company's partnership with Anglo-Persian was never hidden, it 
might be assumed that a capitulation to the transnational 
corporations was already accepted by Gomez as inevitable even before 
the Federal Court had settled its verdict against "Colon" early 
in 1921. Therefore, the British Company took the Venezuelan 
concession without any fears for the future and the Venezuelan
212,
government did not attempt any action against the company in
23/
spite of its unlawful situation*
North Venezuelan initiated the exploration in the concession
area almost immediately. Then at the beginning of 1922 the
company's manager visited the country and was officially received by
the authorities; but later, while he was still on his way back to
London, the company was suddenly declared illegal,
The truth about the struggle between British and US oil
companies with regard to the Venezuelan oil - The fact is that the
US Ambassador had visited Gdmez in order to ask him whether the
Venezuelan government had taken into account that Anglo-Persian
was owned by the British Grown. In this diplomatic way the US
/
government indicated to Gomez that any action taken by the Venezuelan
52/
government against North Venezuelan would have US support*
Those writers who, like Betancourt, try to prove the existence 
of a real struggle between Great Britain and the USA on oil, 
have in this event the strongest piece of evidence to support 
their views. However it is only an isolated event, while there are 
at least three occurrences involving Venezuela which show that 
some unofficial agreement between Shell, Standard Oil and other 
big oil combines was in existence. Moreover, it is clear that 
Deterding himself did not like State interference in a field which 
"naturally" belonged to free enterprise. Eventually, North 
Venezuela was not allowed to work in Venezuela but it was not 
stripped of its grant and the Jimenez Arriz Concession was not 
annulled. It was transferred to another British concern and if the 
concession eventually fell under "Gulf" control it happened 
because Shell was not interested in it*
213.
British authorities suspected US intervention behind the VOC 
affair of I9 24, but there is no evidence to sustain this 
supposition. Moreover US oilmen denied any connection with the 
matter, Mr Hobbson said:
"American companies interested in doing legitimate 
business and opposed to title breaking would be 
all on the side of immediate settlement," 31/
In fact, relations between the big oil combines inside 
Venezuela were particularly friendly during the 1920*s. Apart from a 
"line fight" between Shell, Gulf and Lago in the oil fields of 
"La Rosa" and Lagunillas (1924) there were no other difficulties 
between them. This "line fight" eventually ended in an agreement 
in 1925 and after a new crisis caused by Lago by breaking the 
agreement (January 192?) & new agreement was established some
1 2/
months later. Moreover, although Lago had a large amount of
capital, and some of its founding partners were big oil consortia, 
until 1932 it must be considered as a "small" company, as it ha,d no 
marketing system and consequently it had to sell its output to 
those oil consortia which had such a system. The only venture 
developed by Standard Oil (New Jersey) in Venezuela before 1952 
was a small field rented from BCO, whose whole output was sold 
unrefined to Shell; there is no better example of friendly relations
15/
between big consortia than this one.
The real struggle was between Shell and the "small" US companies, 
although these "small" oilmen were not all US citizens. Among the 
group of oilmen who tried to take advantage of VOC during the crisis 
1924-1925, - the "Robbing Gang" about which Minister Hobbson and 
Seeds spoke with so much contempt - were the Buckley brothers. In
fact their company "Pantopec" had been incorporated in the USA 
and this corporation was one of the founding partners in the US 
"Lago" company. However the Buckley brothers were British 
citizens,
Therefore the Venezuelan oil struggle during the 1920's wa,s not 
a war between British and US companies. It was a struggle between 
big and small companies in which both British and US governments 
supported the big consortia®
This is the reason why Deterding tried to solve the VOG problem
i P
by seeking the partnership of a big US oil combine® In 1929
when the US citizen Henry W. Shumacher demanded the nullification
15/
of the Caribbean contract, the British Minister at Caracas 
W. 0,Reilly wrote reporting this litigation and another like it:
"Litigation unfortunately started by the 
Venezuela Consolidated against the Caribbean does 
not seem to give the latter any concern, nor does 
an attack of their Valladares concession on the 
part of an American of the name of Schumacher, 
especially as this concession is one in whose 
validity is Standard Oil also interested®" 33/
US companies in Venezuela - Without considering the small 
"Petrolea del Tachira" the forerunners of the Venezuelan oil 
industry were two US corporations, namely General Asphalt 
and Caribbean® These companies had been incorporated according to 
American law and part of their respective stock was ovmed by US 
citizens. However they were in fact British concerns which eventually 
became absorbed by the Shell Group®
The first oilmen from Wall Street who appeared in Venezuela, 
landed there in 1918* That year the New York-Standard sent a 
team of geologists to do some preliminary prospecting around
215.
Venezuela® After their researches they reported that every
inch of any trace of oil had been already granted to the British 
36/
companies.
In In spite of this negative report, Venezuela was invaded by
US concession-hunters« Addisson-MacKay has been previously
mentioned; he was according to the British Ministers, the man who
12/
drafted the Hydrocarbon laws of 1921 and 1922, but British
despatches also mention other concession-hunters like Fred Kay 
!§/
and Woods®
In 1922 British diplomatic despatches reported that US 
investments in Venezuelan oil had reached an amount similar to the
12/
British ones® However, the whole of the Venezuelan output 
came from British owned companies until 1924*
The first achievement by American oilmen in Venezuela was the 
blowing of the Barroso and La Paz gushers in 1923? both located
ÉO/
fifty miles apart on opposite sides of the Lake of Maracaibo®
In 1925 US oil companies produced part of the Venezuelan 
output for the first time® After that, the share coming from US 
companies increased rapidly, and soon afterwards surpassed 50%;
22/ 40/ 18/
about 20% in 1925, 41% in I9 26, nearly 45% in 192?,
11/
just over 50% in 1928 and about 57% in 1929®
In 1921 the US companies involved in oil exploration around 
Venezuela consisted of a large number of concerns owned by "small" 
US oilmen. The British documents report names like "Venezuelan 
Petroleum Company", the "Maracaibo Petroleum Company", the 
"Creole Syndicate", the "New England Oil Refining Company", the 
"Bacon Sun Company", etc® If the powerful Standard Oil Co® of new 
Jersey appeared in Venezuela during this period, it was playing the
humble role which was previously reported® Jersey-Standard was still 
trying to leave drilling activities in the hands of "small" concerns 
which eventually would sell their output to them® These small 
concerns even got technical support from the Standard Oil Co® of 
New Jersey. This was the case of Maracaibo Co, when Jersey-Standard 
sent a team of geologists to explore their concession on their 
behalf.
However, in 1925 only two US companies, namely the Gulf of 
Venezuela and the Lago Petroleum Company, produced any output.
The Gulf Combine had entered Venezuela in 1925. It charted its 
subsidiary there by absorbing Venezuela Petroleum and Creole 
Syndicate®
The other company was created also in 1925 by Texaco, Pantopec, 
Pure, California-Standard and a number of New York investors.
Lago absorbed a number of smaller companies and obtained a special 
concession to explore the bed of the lake of Maracaibo (Lago means
42/
Lake in Spanish). It held concessions for about 5 Million acres 
(over 1.2 million hectares).
In 1925 Lago's output was three times as large as Gulf's. In 
1928 Lago's production was still larger but by this time the 
companies' outputs were almost similar.
Gulf of Venezuela was the subsidiary of a giant oil consortium, 
but Lago can be considered a "small" corporation. It had in fact 
powerful partners like Texaco and California-Standard, but none of 
them had control over the concern and consequently it could not be 
included in any combine.
In 1925 Lago was amalgamated with British Equatorial Company 
into the Lago Oil and Transport Company. In fact Lago actually
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absorbed the British company, since the latter concern had
42/
concessions for just 7 hundred thousand acres (below 285,000
hectares). In Lago, the links between British and US interests 
can be observed. One of the main founding partners of this company 
was Pantopec Co., a company incorporated in the USA, but owned by 
the British Buckley brothers. After the amalgamation with British 
Equatorial, new British partners entered the company*
In 1925 Doheny's Pan American obtained a share stock large
42/
enough to take control on Lago Oil and Transport Co® The following 
year Boheny sold Pan American to Indiana Standard, and Pan American, 
now under new owners; took full control of Lago by exchanging the
44/
Lago share of all the other shareholders with Pan American ones.
Thus Gulf and Standard Oil of Indiana became the only US 
companies which had producing oilfields in Venezuela, The process 
through which the capital became controlled by these companies was 
carried out in Wall Street, the Venezuelan government having no 
part in it. In the same way Lago became part of Jersey-Standard's 
empire when Pan American was transferred in 1952,
As in the process through which British oil companies were 
replaced by US ones, the Venezuelan government had no part in this, 
an event which was decided far away from Venezuela's frontiers.
The events of 1928 in Venezuela and their effects in the 
further Venezuelan evolution - Thus up to 1928 the internal situation 
in Venezuela had undergone little change. Some new social groups 
had been developed. While the working class, still small in number, 
was appearing around the oilfields, a middle class, especially of 
university graduates and white collar workers, had become increasingly 
influential in the cities. However the new situation presented by the
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emerging social groups was still under official control and 
the booming Venezuelan economy helped to cushion the social differences 
Due to any lack of challenge, the ruling class had indulged in 
internal fighting on matters of secondary importance. Against 
this background, the foreign companies were able to exploit these 
political disputes to their own advantage*
Dut 1928 marks a crucial change in Venezuela’s situation. That
45/
year’s carnival was the starting point of a series of riots.
Although the leading role in these events was played by the University 
students, the social revolt affected all the Venezuelan social 
structure. Strong popular discontent towards the army was expressed 
and it affected the morale of this institution. The vice-president 
assumed that his opportunity had come, and he conspired against
46/
his father. Dut the plot was discovered; Jose Vicente was forced
41/
into exile and the vice-presidency was abolished.
At this moment, Gomez called on Gumercindo Torres again,
Gumercindo Torres was now less radical. A new law enacted in 1929 
did not make great changes to the 1925 law. The main targets of 
Torres’ policy was not to increase the payments to be made by 
the oil companies either in tax or royalties, but to force 
the companies to pay fairly what was due according to the existing 
agreements and contracts. He also intended to discourage crude 
oil exports in order to compel the companies to build refineries 
inside the country.
To discourage crude oil exports a "Buoy Tax" had been enacted 
on 28th June 1926 (special tax on unrefined oil exports). But now 
Torres increased this tax by 100%; however a special rebate of 
50^ 0 of this tax was granted to those companies which had started
construction on a refinery (2nd July 1928). Torres also attempted 
to build a state-owned oil port to control the real amount of oil 
exported from the country®
Even this new version of Gumercindo Torres was dangerous for the 
oilmen* In this context the "Palke" expedition was organised.
The study of this expedition in detail is not particularly con­
nected with this research, althout it has some relevance. It was 
organised in Europe® The conspirators created a provisional 
government in Geneva and sent a military expedition headed by 
General Roman Delgado Ghalbaud® The expedition departed from 
Danzig and after a short stay in Santo Domingo, they reached the 
eastern coast of Venezuela early in August 1929® On the 10th 
August they attacked Cumana, capital of the State of Sucre General 
Emilio Fernandez and General Roman Delgado Chalbaud, died in 
battle, the rebels surrendered*
There are two aspects in this campaign, particularly intersting 
in showing how the Great Powers and their supported companies 
exploited the Venezuelan political disturbances for their own 
advantage, and why it was no longer possible after 1950.
The conspiracy was detected by the Venezuelan authorities at a 
very early stage. In March 1929 the conspirative plans of General 
Delgado Chalbaud were denounced by the Venezuelan Legacies of
49/
Paris and London* Normally, on receiving such reports, Scotland 
Yard acted according to its own criteria, but in .1929 the British 
Government was interested in forcing a change in Vicente Gomez’s 
oil policy; therefore Scotland Yard, instead of dealing with the 
affair on their own, strictly followed only the instructions given by 
the Venezuelans, Then, without real support from Scotland Yard, the
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Venezuelan intelligence services showed total incapacity to deal 
with the problem. While SS Palke was departing from Danzig with 
no difficultyj Scotland Yard, following instructions from Gomez's 
secret police, was looking for a hypothetical shipment of weapons 
in the ports of Western Scotland.
The other aspect of the event is the fact that among the 
"Palke" invaders were old caudillos like Delgado Challhaud,
Linares Alcantara, Aristeigueta, etc, together with people like 
Betancourt and Leoni who represented the new opposition that 
appeared during the riots of 1928*
In this context this adventure must not he observed as a 
merely isolated event. Late in 1928, Generals Regulo Olivares 
and Juan Pablo Penaloza launched an invasion from Cucuta (Colombia) 
to Tachira. This invasion followed the classical pattern of 
ouch invasions, but its defeat was easier than ever. It was 
crushed in the very border area between both countries. In 1929 
another invasion headed by Rafael S. Urbina was launched from 
Curacao against the State of Falcon, two months before the Palke
m J
affair. Among his men were Miguel Otero Silva, famous poet 
and journalist and. Gustavo Machado, eventual founder of the 
Venezuelan Communist Party, This was the second invasion 
launched by Urbina; he had initiated another a year previously and 
he was to launch a third expedition in 1950. The second Urbina 
invasion was organised by his followers, particularly by Machado, 
while Urbina himself was merely invited to take part in it as the 
commander. This one was different in style. It was clearly against 
the foreign companies and sought support among the workers. It 
certainly did not obtain any support among the foreign companies
~L «
and powers «
Urbina's army did not obtain the support it expected. If it 
enjoyed any support from the working class, it happened in 
Curacao, not in Venezuela. However Urbina's expedition and, to a 
certain extent, the Palke one, had shown that the Venezuelan 
reality was changing. Now, Foreign Powers and companies were no 
longer able to exploit political dissent inside Venezuela.
Otherwise they might promote a real social revolt in which foreign 
interests would be in real jeopardy.
The caudillism had been in decay for years, but now, without 
support from foreign interests it disappeared for ever. With the 
disappearance of the old caudillos, and the achievement of national 
unit, Gomez became unnecessary. If he remained in Power it was 
because the old tyrant was less likely to divide the Venezuelan 
ruling class, which needed more than ever to be united when new 
groups were appearing to challenge it. Gomez's son had been 
overthrown; but one of the Jose Vicente's followers, Pleazar Lopez
y
Contreras became the actual heir. Gomez himself became a king
s /
without power, and Lopez Contreras and Tinoco were the real rulers.
Venezuela, however, became able to speak firmly at an 
international level, since the Achilles heel had been eliminated. 
Venezuela did not enjoy its improved international position 
immediately. As in 1912, in 1929 it was overtaken by adverse 
economic circumstances. Due to the world economic crisis 1929-1955 
the power of the transnational corporations was increased, and thus 
they were able to impose their terms. Dr Torres was dismissed 
(1951)? after this he was not to be called again to take part in 
the cabinet. Although his laws and new oil rules were not changed.
they were not put into operation. But the Hydrocarbon Laws of 
1955 and 1938 represented some relative improvement as far as the 
Venezuelan budget was concerned, in comparison with the previous 
situation, although the oil policy was not radically changed 
until 1943* Until 1945? Foreign Powers and companies were not 
to encourage political revolt inside Venezuela, They did so 
again in 1945? but through a coup d'etat led by the armed forces 
themselves «
Venezuela and the oil ™ During the nineteen twenties Venezuela 
underwent great transformations, A poor country, almost unpopulated 
and whose economy was principally based upon agriculture, became a 
wealthy country in which the mining activity was the basis of its 
economy. Oil was the element which promoted all these changes.
However we cannot say that Venezuela became a populated area. 
Population was largely increased during the 1920's due to the 
high rates of immigration; a city was practically created (Maracaibo, 
at present is the second urban centre). But today it has scarcely 
reached ten inhabitants per square kilometer, and after the Second 
World War Venezuela still had less than 4 million inhabitants*
Venezuelan poverty before 191? was less obvious. It is true 
that the country which today ranlcs as the first nation in income 
per capita in South America, was at that time behind the majority 
of the countries in the area, Venezuelan railways totalled half 
the mileage of those in Uruguay, while Venezuela'6 land area was 
six times the Uruguayan area. But, can we consider as poor a country 
whose balance of pa^ a^nent, even at that time was between 30% and 50% 
in the black? Venezuela would be better described as wild and 
underdeveloped,
Railways were not developed and finally were abandoned.
But during the nineteen twenties, with the forced help of 
political prisoners, a modern motorway system was built (it was 
particularly convenient to Juan Vicente Gomez becanse his private 
enterprises supplied the raw materials needed for their construction). 
The industries were developed later; lack of population and 
subsequently lack of markets precluded such developments until the 
nineteen fifties, and sixties.
In 1912 over 99% of Venezuelan exports came from agriculture; 
only three crops, namely coffee, cocoa and sugar can represented 
/'o of it. After 1921 it was vastly changed. In 1925 oil became
the leading commodity among Venezuelan exports (42%) followed by
53/
coffee (31%) and cocoa (l?%)* In the next year oil surpassed 
50% of the Venezuelan exports and in 1928 hydrocarbons were 74% 
of the Venezuelan exports. In 19779 94*7% of the Venezuelan exports 
was oil, followed by iron with 1.9%= All the other commodities 
together yielded 3=4% of the Venezuelan exports; over half of this
14/
was coffee.
If we cannot say that everything changed overnight, during 
the 192 0's Venezuela underwent a metamorphosis promoted by oil, 
and the social problems which arose in 1928 were the expression 
of this metamorphosis.
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•CHAPTER XII
Conclusions
Conditions in which the Venezuelan oil industry emerged - 
Although some mining enterprises existed in Venezuela even before 
independence (especially important were the gold mines in 
Guayana), during the nineteenth century, mining was considered 
by the Venezuelan ruling classes, and consequently by the 
Venezuelan government, as a rather abnormal activity which should 
be carried out by other people in order to balance the budget 
without affecting the pocket of these private landowners*
Therefore all kinds of schemes were drawn up (even a state- 
owned mining enterprise was planned), yet the diverserion of 
public resources for subsidising such enterprises, even for a 
short period, was never envisaged.
Until 1904? no Venezuelan government paid any attention to 
their visible oil resources. The failure of Mexican, British 
and US entrepreneurs in Mexico seems to have deterred them from 
venturing into this field, Petrdlia del Tachira and the Asphalt 
industry were two exceptions, but until 1917 Venezuela had to 
import almost all the oil products it needed,
1881 is a turning point in Venezuelan economic history. The 
increased needs of the world market caused the main Powers to 
re-discover Venezuela, while Venezuela began to feel the need of a 
stronger central power to face the increasingly strong pressure 
made by the World Powers upon the nation and to provide the 
political aud material sub-structure needed by their fast developing
230,
international trade.
During the second half of the nineteenth century, foreign 
investments were welcomed in Venezuela, especially when such 
investments were ploughed into railways and other sub-structures 
necessary to the swelling international trade. Nevertheless, the 
Venezuelan government did not give "carte blanche" to the foreign 
companies, and wa.s very zealous in demanding the fulfilment of all the 
duties undertaken by them.
The Venezuelan policy towards this increased foreign investments 
and other signs of interest from the Great Powers towards Venezuela 
gave rise to a number of diplomatic crises, the main ones being 
the frontier dispute with British Gyana (early 1880's), the 
blockade of the Venezuelan coast imposed by Great Britain, Germany 
and Italy (I902-I9O3) and finally the unfriendly actions of 
the Dutch which ended in the overthrow of President Castro (1908), 
After I87O, Venezuelan investors initiated a number of 
enterprises. These investments were initially devoted to railways 
and international trade. The 30% surcharge upon goods imported 
from European colonies in the Caribbean area, established by 
President Guzman Blanco, wa.s clearly directed against trade between 
Trinidad and Venezuela; until then the main Trinidadian trading 
houses had been able to control the entire Venezuelan wholesale 
market from Port of Spain. This surcharge had been established, 
in 1882, and in spite of permanent pressures exercised by the 
British government to abolish it, the surcharge was maintained
1/
during the whole period covered by this research*
After I89O Venezuelan investments increased in scope. They 
now spilled over into mining, public services and manufacturing
2)1.
industries. Hov/ever, after 1900 Venezuelan investors were forced 
to withdraw from many of these activities.
The failure of the Venezuelan investors had several causes ; 
some political, others economic. First of all, Venezuela was 
unable to fight against any of the Great Powers; it could only 
exploit the disturbances existing between them. Therefore, the 
Venezuelan government had to yield concessions to the Powers; so 
German trading companies entered Venezuela during the early l^OO's,
The continual increases of taxation which were the only source 
of revenue, damaged Venezuelan companies which, due to the lack 
of capital, were no longer able to compete with the foreign 
companies. But, the main problem was the fact that the Venezuelan 
companies were dealing with a foreign market and the competing 
foreign companies had control over it.
Therefore Castro's overthrow was the consequency of a process 
which had been initiated during his own government* Although 
the development of the Venezuelan oil industry was initiated only 
in 1912, the rise, rule and fall of Cipriano Castro (1899-1908) 
saw the erection of the framework in which it was subsequently 
to operate,
Gomez and the early development of the Venezuelan oil industry 
Thus Gomez's success was the consequence of Castro's failure and 
ensuing temporary surrender of Venezuela to the Great Powers and 
Foreign companies. Nevertheless he tried, at least to a certain 
extent, to continue the economic policies followed by Castro - 
namely to welcome foreign investment in Venezuela, provided they 
would give enough revenues to the state and occasional wa.ges to 
some Venezuelan citizens enjoying official support. The difference
23?,
between Castro and Gomez is that the latter understood that he 
had limited bargaining power and he never attempted to go beyond 
those limits.
The book "Gomez, the tyrant of the Andes" by Thomas Rourke has
been frequently quoted in this research. It could be argued, and
argued correctly, that this material is not a reliable source.
However, in spite of the lack of accuracy and depth of this book,
it certainly proves that the transnational companies, on whose
/
behalf the book was written, did not like Gomez* For instance, 
according to Rourke it was Gomez and not the transnational oil 
combines who was robbing Venezuela, Moreover, he argues that
2/
Gomez was robbing both the oil consortia and the Venezuelan nation®
Oil did not play any role in Castro’s overthrow. Although 
the presence of wide oil resources in Venezuela was knovm to be 
almost certain, no one had shovm any interest in Venezuelan oil 
concessions. World needs were still small enough to be supplied 
by the oilfields being exploited at that time, and Castro's 
Venezuela tried to obtain too much revenue from this activity for 
it to become convenient for the oil companies.
The replacement of Castro by Gomez did not mean any change as 
far as oil policy was concerned. Moreover Gomez tried to 
increase the margin of revenues to be obtained from oil ventures 
eventually to be developed in the country, V/hen he changed policy 
in 1912 it was due to the fact that the international oil corporations 
had successfully boycotted Venezuelan oil,
Betancourt tries to present Gomez as a subservient puppet of 
the USA, For instance, in Betancourt's view, the "Colon" conflict 
(1919-1921) was a dispute between the USA and Great Britain in which
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Gomez changed his position according to the instructions given to
1/
him hy the State Department of the USA, The oil policy followed 
hy Gomez until 1929 certainly shows that that was not the case. When 
"Mene Grande" oilfields were opened (l914)? Venezuela tried once 
again to go back to the old policy of seeking more and more 
revenue from the oil activities, culminating with the "Colon" 
conflict and the Hydrocarbon Law of 1920, However from 
1921 Gomez was forced to go back to a policy more convenient to 
the oil companies. Something similar happened between 1924 and 
1925 and between 1928 and 1929.
Until 1929 the subservient puppet of the Great Powers was 
not Gomez, but Gomez's opposition. If Gomez lacked a strong 
popular support, it did not mean that the opposition enjoyed it; 
while over 95% of the Venezuelan people was not involved in any 
political activity, the opposition had even less popular support 
than Gomez himself.
Therefore, the only chance for the opposition was through 
conspiracies hatched abroad in which armed invasions against 
Venezuela were organised. They needed the support of the foreign 
countries from which they were operating to turn a blind eye to 
their actions; and sometimes the plotters tried to obtain foreign 
financial support, to be paid after the "Venezuelan Liberation" 
with wide oil concessions.
Terms like political "leftwing" and "rightwing" are very vague.
If to define "leftwing" as being against the status quo and "rightwing", 
in favour of it is accepted, it could be said that until 1928 
Gomez was to the left of his opposition. In theory the core of 
the Venezuelan political struggle was the organisation of a strong
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central power (badly needed by the nation) against the traditional 
weak one which would guarantee the Venezuelan "liberty", in other 
words, status quo* Gomez represented the first position while 
his opponents fought for the other*
But in the new world conditions a weak central power was no 
longer convenient for any body; it is difficult to imagine any 
real change in Venezuela after a victorious revolution, apart from 
names in the government. It seems that the opponents of Gomez 
were using the old and already meaningless banners, and some new 
ones like the illdefined antipersonalismo to enjoy, once victorious, 
the economic advantages of controlling the government*
This lack of social maturity was a source of both strength 
and weakness to Gomez's rule * In internal terms it increased 
his power, because at the end of the day, the struggle was exclusively 
concentrated with the quest for personal power* It made difficult 
an alliance among his enemies, while people not very interested in 
politics were dismayed at the prospect of a struggle which could 
put the nation's economic activities in jeopardy and being no real 
change even if eventually successful* Describing the political 
reality inside Venezuela the British Minister at Caracas H*B,
Beaumont wrote;
"It cannot be denied that his (Gomez's) rule 
has been characterised by prudence and energy. 
Foreigners, businessmen and the great majority of 
the nation who keep clear of politics have 
nothing to complain of, and will see the removal 
of his strong hand with regret," ^
To understand such emphatic support from the British minister, 
it ought to be taken into account that it was written in 1922, 
just after his change of oil policy. However, there is enough
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evidence to accept this opinion as a truth*
But in international terms, this situation meant weakness*
The Great Powers and the transnational companies became able to 
exploit internal disturbances to their own advantage. In any 
country, civil war is not convenient for foreign investments, as 
their premises and machinery can be destroyed by the warfare. But 
apart from that, when the conflict is a real social stru-""gle which 
involves a large majority, if not all the national population, the 
situation could become even more dangerous to the foreign investments. 
This had been the main lesson the foreign investors, particularly oil 
entrepreneurs, had lea.rned in Mexico*
It did not happen in Venezuela. Civil war was a last resort 
which was never used. However the foreign opposition was used on 
a number of occasions, to be exposed once Gomez, facing such blackmail 
gave up in his attempt to change the Venezuelan oil policy*
It does not mean that the caudillos were agents of the oil 
companies to act when they were needed. They did what they thought 
they ought to do, but the characteristics of the Venezuelan 
situation allowed the companies to use them to their own 
advantage. In I929, when events like the Second Urbina invasion 
proved that this situation was changing and a real social struggle 
could, begin, the companies no longer used the caudillos and this 
character disappeared from Venezuelan politics,
Venezuela and the "oil surplus" - As Aristotle defined Egypt 
as the "Nile's Gift", so Modern Venezuela can be described as an 
"Oil's Gift", This agrictural country, in spite of its abundant 
natural resources, wa.s one of the less developed countries within 
South America, It had a density of population below 0,1 persons per
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square kilometer and a railway network whose extent averaged 
less than 0,5 meters per square kilometer; this Venezuelan 
network was ten times smaller than the Chilean one, although 
Venezuela was 30% larger than Chile, As has been said, although 
Venezuelan export value exceeded by between 30% and 50% import 
value, the Trinidadian foreign trade was over 9 times as active
5/
as . the Venezuelan one. Today Venezuela is in general terms,
one of the most developed countries in the area having the highest 
National Income per head as well as the highest level of wages in 
the region.
In fact, Venezuela had been re—discovered by Europe, particularly 
by Great Britain since the early 1880’s - not at first as a 
potential oil supplier, but rather as a supplier of coffee, iron 
and other resources. It also had control of the huge waterway 
network to be developed in the Orinoco river system which included 
not only Venezuelan territories, but also Colombian and Brazilian 
ones. And finally it was the possessor of extensive grasslands 
where cattle breeding could be advantageously developed, (This last 
activity had been practised to a certain extent since before 
Venezuela became independent). Therefore it can be assumed that 
even without oil, Venezuela’s time had arrived; however, oil 
provided the revenues and other resources needed to make Venezuela's 
development an easier task and to do it in a better form.
In 1981, Mr Bryan S, McBeth published a thesis to obtain a 
PheB, entitled "Juan Vicente Gomez and the Oil Companies (Oxford 
1981), In the summary published by him in the SLAS Supplement No, 9
§J
(April I98I) of the seminary on this topic to be developed at 
the SLAS Conference to be held in Birmingham, he pointed out that,
11
in 1922, after Venezuela had provided for the companies conditions 
good enough to he acceptable to them, these companies had made 
Venezuela a wealthy country and it had become the second country 
in the world oil producers' ranking. The basic différencies between 
this research and Dr McBeth's has been already explained, but there 
is a further point Dr McBeth points out that Venezuela, as other oil 
producing countries, had the weaker hand in the bargaining with 
the "foreign companies" and consequently obtained less from the 
deal than the companies themselves* Nevertheless, at the end of 
the day what he is trying to show is what Venezuela received from 
these companies. By contrast, in the tenth and in part of the 
eleventh chapters of this research, trying to be as unbiased as 
Dr McBeth, the other side of this coin is shovm, namely what the 
transnational companies themselves received from Venezuela,
What has been defined in this research as the "oil surplus" 
v/as greatly enlarged during the 1920's due to the grov/th in uses 
of oil products which increased demand and the development of new 
techniques of production which brought about reduction in prices. 
However the oil companies suffered high reductions in their profits, 
because they had to meet new challengers in the struggle to obtain 
their share of this "oil surplus". The tv/o main competitors of 
the Oil combines in this struggle were (i)other industries like car 
manufacturing and transport, and (ii) the oil producing countries.
As previously said, the contest in which Venezuela was 
particularly useful to the big consortia was the struggle between 
the latter and the oil producing nations. The oil policies 
followed by Obregdn and Galles in Mexico and by the Bolshevic 
government in Soviet Russia, encouraged the oil producing countries
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to try to obtain a better share from their oil wealth* Venezuela, 
this potentially important oil producer, was the one who broke the 
solid line presented by the other oil producing countries and this 
allowed the big oil companies to succeed in their struggle against 
them* Without the Venezuelan help, the oil consortia would have 
been in a more difficult, if not hopeless situation during the 
1920's. ]>uring the 1930's when the companies were no longer able 
to use Venezuela in this way, they obtained this kind of ally 
from the Middle East, After the war they obtained the alliance of 
the Shah of Iran, the King of Saudi Arabia and Venezuela's 
dictator Marcos Perez Jimenes, but only to a certain extent® When 
the seven partners of the oil cartel accepted the fifty fifty 
agreement, according to which 50% of their profits had to be given
to the oil producing companies, they were surrendering a part of the
"oil surplus" to them.
It is true, that Venezuela also obtained some advantages from 
this alliance, the principal being the fact that Venezuelan oil 
potential became a reality. It is profitless to argje what would 
have happened if Venezuela had not accepted the alliance with the 
main oil companies. But there is enough evidence to assume that 
Venezuela did not accept this partnership of its own will and 
made every effort to break this alliance. In 1912 and 1929 it
was forced to accept the situation b:" the "natural conditions
prevailing in the market" and between 1921 and 1928 Venezuela 
was forced to do so by political pressures, when Powers and 
Companies were able to exploit internal disturbances.
Today the "oil surplus" has been increased once again by the 
great development of the Petrochemical industry from the years of
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the Second World War onwards, and the fighting between different 
group to obtain the larger part of this surplus had become a deeply 
embittered, struggle.
Today the great oil companies pay dividend rates between &}o and 
12% which is not much higher than the standard rates paid by other 
industrial activities. Consequently they are surrendering almost 
all the "oil surplus". In fact, at the present time, the big oil 
combines control many other activities (for instance, during the 
197 0’s the copper consortia were absorbed by the oil combines).
The main contestants in the struggle for controlling the largest 
part of the "oil surplus" nowadays are the oil producing and the 
oil consuming countries. Oil, although it has a very low cost of 
production, is sold at a rather high price. The reason why no 
company involved in oil production obtains high profits, despite 
the large difference between costs and price, is because over 50% 
of this price represents different kinds of taxes. The Venezuelan 
oil is sold at over US/35 per barrel although it costs only just 
US/3 per barrel to produce. This price is increased 3 times before 
the oil is sold either aspoiye'IMl petrol, diesel oil or any other 
subproduct, over 2/5 of these new costs being new taxes to be 
paid in the centres of consumption. For instance, in Great Britain, 
considering the petrol prices of thirteen oil companies the 
average price was, at the end of 1981, 31=27 pence per litre.
There the special Tax on petrol amounting to 13*82 pence is included. 
Therefore of this average urice 44=2% is British tax, without taking
7/
15% VAT into 8.Ccount , Venezuela has become today one of the leading
8/
countries in this strurgle. In September i960, Venezuela joined
with Iran, Iraq, Saudi-Arabia and Kuwait in the "Organisation of
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Petroleum Exporting Countries" (OPEC), In the following years,
other countries like Ecuador, Algeria, Nigeria, Indonesia and
Lyhia joined this organisation® Although this move was an initial
attempt to create a common front among the oil exporting countries,
it did not produce any major changes over the next ten years; in 1970
crude oil prices oscillated between US/l,68 per barrel (Kuwait)
and us/2,25 per barrel (Libya)® Venezuelan prices were US/l,85 per 
10/
barrel®
But after 1972 a different policy was introduced by the oil 
producing countries leading to vastly increased prices* Libya 
increased its price to US/l0,80 per barrel (January 1971) and 
Indonesia fixed it at US/l5»77 per barrel (January 1974)=
Therefore, the so-called "oil crisis of December 1975" was the 
start of a war between oil consuming and oil producing countries*
This war has been a long one; Table No* 15 and Graph No* 5 show the 
development of this struggle* It seems that the war is only now 
coming to an end, or at least the first battle is ending. In this 
battle there has been an important psychological factor. The oil 
consuming countries i©CGu3?ed the OPEC partners of following a 
selfish policy which would bring hunger and misery to those less 
developed countries which had no oil. The OPEC countries have 
reacted by setting cheap oil to these poor nations and by helping 
them in other ways.
However the most important side in this struggle has been 
the economic one. The USA had two powerful weapons to fight OPEC. 
First of all the USA tried to prevent the entrance of new partners 
into the latter organisation by pressurising them in different 
ways. These measures have had bery little effect; new countries have
joined OPEC despite US retaliatory measures* The other 
weapon was the devaluation of the US/, In this way, while the 
OPEC countries were seeking more US/ per barrel, the US government 
ensured that this amount of US/ meant less than before.
Table No* 13
Prices of crude oil from 1st January 1972 
onwards
Date Barrel p:
1st January 1972 1.90
1st " 1973 2,41
1st " 1974 10.95
1st " 1975 10*46
1st " 1976 11,51
1st " 1977 12.09
1st " 1978 12.70
1st " 1979 13.54
1st April 1979 14,55
1st Sept, 1979 18.00
1st January 1980 26.73
1st April 1980 34.40
1st January 1981 39.25
1st July 1981 34,10
Source: Different articles and reports in the British and US press,
11/
After 8 years the battle seems to be lost by the OPEC countries 
as they are no longer able to raise oil prices of their ovm will 
and need. In fact up until July 1980, the "stand by" oil 
prices were normally higher than the OPEC ones, but since then the
stand by prices have fallen below OPEC prices and the North Rea
oil was being sold at that time at 113^53«75 per barrel while some
OPEC countries were charging bS04O and 113^ 41 per barrel for their 
11/
oil.
Graph No, 5 
Price of crude oil since 1970
prices
U3^
barrel .
year
Source ; Pertune Vol, 102 No, 5 (Chicago August 1980) and The Times 
14th August I98I. 12/
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This defeat can he explained in the following ways. Firstly, 
there was some lack of agreement among the OPEC partners. Some of 
them, the so called "hard liners" tried to bring the USA and the 
other oil consuming countries to their knees? others like Saudi- 
Arabia took a "soft line" trying to come to terms with their con­
sumers, The reason why this should happen was that the Saudi-Arabian 
rulers had big investments in the USA and Etirope and consequently 
their interests would have been seriously damaged by a major 
economic crisis in these areas. Thus Saudi Arabia broke the 
policy followed by the "hard liners" by keeping rather low prices 
and by increasing its ovm production up to 10 million barrels a 
day, Saudi Arabia, also rejected the plan to replace the US^ by 
other currencies as the one in which oil prices are fixed.
Oil prices were also affected by a well organised campaign 
trying to create a general scare regarding the exhaustion of 
world wide oil resources. This campaign, linked with some measures, 
like increased taxation which discouraged oil consumption by 
making oil products dearer, succeeded in reducing oil consumption.
It dropped by 6% between 1979 and 1981 within the non communist 
countries* Among the nations included in the International Energy 
Agency, this reduction v/as by 7e5% and the consumption of some 
of the oil products diminished in Ftirope by nearly 20% during this 
period. Finally, the countries not affiliated to OPEC increased their 
oil output and consequently OPEC presence in the v/orld oil market
M /
decreased from 58% in 1979 to 47% in 1981, As in 1912 a,nd 
1929 Venezuela and its OPEC partners have been defeated for 
economic reasons.
The Venezuelan attitude in OPEC ought to be studied at the end 
of a research centred on the Venezuelan oil policy during the 1920's
(:4 4
because the new Venezuelan oil policy is just the opposite of the 
one followed during that period. Without having been the strongest 
OPEC hard liner, like Algeria and Lybia, Venezuela has presented 
a coherent, not strong, but firm position. In January 1981, when the 
highest OPEC price (the Lybian) was US/4I per barrel and the lowest 
(the Saudi-Arab) was US^52, Venezuela kept a rather low price of 
US^35 (about 9% over Saudi Arabia and 15% below Lyhia) and a price
15/
higher than only three of nine OPEC nations* However, on the
17th August I98I, when the OPEC oil ministers gathered in Geneva, 
Venezuela emerged as the strongest opponent to any reduction in oil
M /
prices.
Finally it ought to be said that Mexico is playing to a certain 
extent, the role played by Venezuela during the 1920's, In fact the 
USA are able to press Mexico by economic means* The US and Mexican 
economies are strongly entangled and consequently the USA can retaliate 
in other areas. Especially important is the large number of 
Mexican temporary residents in the USA who go there to work.
So the USA retaliates against Mexico by preventing these Mexican 
citizens entering the country and even by expelling them when 
Mexico follows a foreign policy which the USA does not like. In 
these ways the Mexican membership of OPEC was prevented. However, 
Mexico can be forced only to a certain extent* During the last 
year the USA, even using all its strategies for retaliation, could 
not obtain an increase in Mexican oil output nor force them to 
fix a lower price on their crude nor to persuade them to accept an 
economic alliance with Canada and the USA which the White House 
was trying to impose on both of its neighbours, Mexico was also 
able to resist American pressure in other fields not connected 
with oil.
USA, GreatBritain and Venezuela -- Betancourt and other writers
try to stress the dependence of Gomez on the USA and they assume 
that Gomezes support for the US companies forced British capital to 
give way to US investors»
The events, as they occurred, suggest that was not the case»
The only occasion in which a US Ambassador took an active role 
against a British company was when he reminded President Gomez that 
the North Venezuelan Co» was ovmed by Anglo-Persian and that was 
against the Venezuelan law. But in fact many British businessmen 
agreed with the US ambassador and if North Venezuelan was not 
allowed to exploit the concession it would be able to sell it to 
any other concern* The concession eventually came under US 
control simply because no British oonce??n was interested in it* 
Moreover, on 24th June 1926, the Venezuelan government
published in the British press part of the annual speech of J.V*
/ /
Gomez to the Congress, In this part of the speech Gomez expressed
his government’s desire to attract foreign capital and the
means by which he would do it, Nven if a similar publication had
been made in the USA this event certainly proves that at that time
11/
British capital was still welcomed in Venezuela*
Moreover, the replacement of British comnan.ies by US ones, was 
carried on all over Latin America, These events originated far 
away from the Latin American shores and neither Venezuela nor 
other Latin American states took part in them*
The main occurrence which took Britain out of this area was the 
First World War, Although both Great Britain and the USA went to 
the Versailles Conference as victorious Powers, Great Britain had 
been strongly beaten by the war. Great Britain and France tried to
24 b ,
obtain compensation from Germany but, the general strike
in the Ruhr area, after it was invaded by the French (even though
the French could have crushed the strike with the help of the
German capitalists) proved that the excess burden on the German
shoulders could have promoted a soviet-style revolution in that
country® Therefore, France and Great Britain surrendered in Locarno
a great part of the advantages they had obtained at Versailles.
Due to this treaty and other similar agreements subsequently signed,
18/
Great Britain did not receive the badly needed compensation*
On the other hand, being far away from the theatre of war and 
beinc involved in the war for less than a year, the USA enjoyed all 
the advantages of being victorious but none of the inconveniences 
of having taken part in such a war. After 1918 the USA emerged as a 
main power in world wide terms*
There is a further problem, British capital was not so concen­
trated as the US capital. The large enterprises can produce much 
more cheaply due to economies of scale and can control the market 
instead of being controlled by it. But there was a, united number 
of such British transcontinental consortia, like Shell and 
Unilever, in a vrorld whose economy was being increasingly 
controlled by such corporations.
In this situation, the alleged dispute between Great Britain and 
the USA was only a bargaining, although sometimes an angry one, 
for the redistribution of the areas of influence within the world, 
Fven the uossibility of war between both Powers was reported by
19/
the mass media*
However the danger of war was not a real problem. Previously, 
the USA has been o, minor partner of Great Britain, Because of
I O
that, both economies were strongly entangled and it made a war 
between, them highly unlikely. Moreover, not only in the oil 
industry but in other areas, the big corporations were seeking 
agreement, and the alleged struggle between Britain and the USA 
was a way of hiding the fact that both British and US 
governments were supporting the big corporations against the 
smaller ones.
What the British authorities were afrojd of, was an economic 
war, in this field the British Advisers at the Foreign Office 
showed a rather desperate attitude;
"In view of the power of the dollar, British oil 
Interests in Venezuela will do well to compromise 
wit2 their American ccfreeres and to admit certain 
American participation in their undertakings,"
wrote one of them, called B,L» Gragie about H,A, Hobbson’s despatch
No, 52 of 17th April 1925 (in which the Minister reported the VOC
20/
trial, still in progress)* In spite of some occasional
exceptions, the USA fairly supported the "Open Door" policy. They 
knew that in a fair fight between pound and dollar, the dollar would 
be victorious; and the British authorities also knew it.
But an economic war between Great Britain and the USA would 
promote negative attitudes within the other countries. In fact 
they could try to obtain advantages for themselves from this 
contest and subsequently neither Great Britain nor the USA would 
be truely victorious.
Therefore both Powers needed to reach agreement* It was 
established during the 1920’s through a. number of treaties, a, 
number of agreements locally established by British and US private 
companies and by a kind of modus vivendi, established by the
£^ 40,
framework of the mentioned treaties and agreements.
For instance no treaty or agreement decided that Britain had to 
withdraw from Latin America hut many British companies were sold 
to US companies and Great Britain gradually left in US hands the 
leading position it had once had in the area*
This process of transference was not suggested by the Foreign 
Office and no local government took any part in favour of any 
of the contesting Powers; moreover some historians suggest that 
certain countries supported the British companies. The process was 
slow, and involved contradictory events*
Some companies remained under British control. US corporations 
were not interested in railways. A few rail.ways, like FCAB (Auto- 
fagasta^Chile to Oruro-Bolivia) are still under British ownership, 
the large majority were sold to the local states. In the case of 
Venezuela, railways were nationalised by Fleasar Lopez Contreras 
and eventually abandoned , Other companies, like Unilever are still 
run by British entrepreneurs. There are also cases of companies, 
initially sold by British investors and subsequently retaken 
by them. Nevertheless, British influence was replaced by the US 
all over the area*
It is difficult to establish a, precise date for the British 
withdrawal from Latin America. In the case of the Peruvian oilfields 
it was rather early. Even before the First World War. In Chile and 
Argentina British influence was still strong just after the Second 
World Wa,r, British presence in Argentina disappeared in 1949 
when railways were nationalised. The process in Venezuela 
occurred during the 1920’s especially between 1926 and 1929»
Therefore the whole process took place between 1920 and 1950 although
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it was particularly intensive during the late 1920's.
Now in the particular case of oil, as previously said, the small 
oil company was no longer profitable after 1910, unless it was working 
within the U.S. boundaries; their main problem was the lack of a 
marketing system. The British small enterprise, which had developed 
the Peruvian and Mexican oil industries between 1900 and 1910 failed 
when they tried to do the same in Venezuela and they had to give way 
to Shell. Now, linked with the "angry bargaining" previously 
described in this chapter, Shell also withdrew from South America and 
gave free way to the American companies.
Shell had only a small share of the South American oil. They kept, 
for instance, an important part of Venezuelan oil; this part even increased 
in absolute in absolute terms though it decreased in the % of the whole 
Venezuelan output. When the Venezuelan oil was nationalised in 1975 the 
part of the Venezuelan output produced by Shell had fallen below one 
third of the whole. Shell also kept an important part of the Mexican 
oil industry, until it was nationalised in 1958. In Mexico the Shell 
share was hugely increased; in 1920 the part of the Mexican output 
produced by Shell was 20^ while in 1958 the combine produced over 
60}{) of the Mexican output.
NOTES
1, The problem of the 30% surtax is frequently mentioned in the British 
papers. A complete record of it appears in : C.Morris’ despatch No.
4 to R.MacDonald (Annual Report for 1925) 26th January 1924. E.0.371 
Piece 9658 No. 1579.
2, Rourke,Thomas Gomez.The Tyrant of the Andes (2nd Edition New York 1962) 
PP 175-174.
3, BetancourtjRomulo Polftioa y Petroleo (Mexico City 1956) pp.57-61.
4, H.D.Baumont’s despatch to Lord Curzon (Annual Report for 1921) 11th
January 1922. P.0.371. Piece 7525 No.757.
5* Sir Vincent Corbett’s despatch No.19 to Sir Edward Grey (Annual Report
for 1908) 12th February 1909 P.O.371 Piece 795 No.9482.
250.
6. Society for Latin American Studies. Bulletein of the S.L.A.S. Supplement 
No.9 Summaries of the Papers presented in S.L.A.S. Conference of 
Birmingham (April 1981) p.7.
7. Petroleum Times Vol.1 No.16 (London 15th November 1981) Price Report 
pp.4-5.
8. SolbergjCarl. Oil Power (New York 1976) p.202.
9 . Vailenilla,Luis, Oil;The Making of A New Economic Order (New York
1975) p.171.
10. Vallenilla,Luis. Oil;The Making of A New Economic Order (New York
1975) p . 175.
11. To establish a price per crude oil barrel is rather difficult. Although 
O.P.E.C. suggest one at every meeting of the cartel, some of its members 
do not follow it and consequently there are a large variety of prices 
among the O.P.E.C. countries. Moreover, there are important oil 
exporters like Mexico and the North Sea exporting countries who are
not O.P.E.C. members. Table No.13 gives prices from the following 
sources: Between 1st January 1973 and 1st April 1979» average price 
calculated by Time, talcen from "O.P.E.C.’s "dangerous game," Time Vol.
113 No. 15 New York 9th April 1979, The prices of 1st January 1972 and 
1st September 1979 are the prices established by Saudi Arabia, taken 
from Financial Times 21st November 1979# Prices of 1st January and 
1st April I98O are the average between seven different countries; 
calculated from information given by The Times 4th January I98O and 
Financial Times l6th April 198O, 1st January 1981 and 1st July 1981 
are average prices given by the respective newspapers. Financial 
Times 10th January I98I and The Times 14th August I98I. Apart from
the New York Times, the others are cutting papers photocopied and
delivered by McCarthy Information Ltd.
12. The graph No.5 is taken from "Oil Greases the Skids for World Economy" 
Fortune Vol. 102 No,3 Chicago 11th August 1980. Put up to date with 
information from The Times 14th August 1981,
13. Sunday Times 27th July I98O (photocopy of McCarthy Information Ltd.).
14. The Economist 31st January 1981 (photocopy of McCarthy Information Ltd.).
1 5. Financial Times 10th January 1981 (photocopy of McCarthy Information Ltd.)
16. The Times 14th August 1981 (photocopy of McCarthy Information Ltd).
1 7. The Times 24th June I926 p.21.
18» The policy which "Locarno" established was continued during the 
following years. Particularly important for us was de 
"Lewes Plan" according to which Germany had to pay what it was 
able to (1924), The plan receives its name after Charles G*
Lewes (lS65“195d) chairman of the board of financial experts 
who studied the problem, Lewes wa,s eventually awarded the 1925 
Nobel Peace Prize jointly with Sir Austin Chamberlain and became 
US vive-president 1925-1929#
19* Both books of Ludwell Lenny, We Fight for Oil (London 1928) 
America conquers Britain (London 1930T^are a summary of all 
what the mass media reported about the alleged danger of war*
20* F.O. 371 Piece 10653 No* 2612,
21c Despatch to HM*s Ambassador at Washington enclosing a Memorandum 
on the Petroleum Situation Cmd, 1351 (London 1921) p, 4 *
22» Mexican Government El Petroleo de Mexico (2nd Edition Mexico
City 1963), The Mexican private oil companies were nationalised 
in March 1938» In 1937 the oil produced in Mexico was obtained 
by the following concerns*
Shell Group 60,4%
Standard Oil (New Jersey) 14
Continental Oil Gb, 7*1
Cities Services 5
8eabord 2,8
South River Oil Co. 1.4
Consolidated Oil Co,?., 0.5
Standard Oil (New York) 0.3
South Pennsylvania Oil Co* 0,2
•i^ Petromex and other companies 8,3
•^(petromex was a State Ovaied company controlled by the
Mexican government. Had been founded by President Ortez Rubio 
1930-1932» The other companies produced less than 0,1% of 
the Mexican output each. Among them there were powerful _ 
corporations like Standard Oil'“(California). Texaco and Gulf),
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